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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper provides an analysis of recent reforms of tax-benefit systems and a preliminary assessment of 
their impact on financial incentives to work and on labour supply. Many Member States have introduced 
policies to “make work pay” and have targeted low-wage workers with the aim of increasing their take-
home pay. The labour market improvements observed over recent years are a sign that structural reforms 
have started to pay off. The reduction of disincentives to work and to hire, especially for the low-skilled, 
embedded in tax and benefit systems, a greater link with activation policies and a stronger reliance on 
preventive and targeted active labour market policies (ALMPs), and widespread wage moderation are all 
factors that have contributed to the structural improvement in the functioning of labour markets. Yet, 
despite these improvements, in view of the ageing of the population and rapid technological change, more 
progress is needed to further increase and maintain high levels of employment and participation rates, 
especially among female and older workers, and to reduce structural unemployment. Member States should 
continue along the line of reforms followed so far. The Commission has stressed the importance of a 
comprehensive strategy of labour market reforms ("flexicurity") that shift the focus from protection on the 
job to insurance in the market. These reforms would enable workers to move more smoothly from 
declining to expanding activities, thus easing tensions in the adjustment process, while ensuring adequate 
income support and responding to potential anxieties among European citizens.  
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SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS 
 
This paper provides an analysis of recent reforms of tax-benefit systems and a 
preliminary assessment of their impact on financial incentives to work and on labour 
supply.  
Recent years have seen a substantial fall in unemployment (from about 10% in 1998 to 
reach 6.9% in July 2007), accompanied by increases in the employment rate (from 
59.3% to about 64.8% in the first quarter of 2007) and participation rates (70.5% in the 
first quarter of 2007).  
However, despite the progress made, Member States still need to reinforce or speed up 
reforms in various areas.1 Given the relative under-utilisation of labour resources in 
many European countries and the need for dealing with population ageing, the Council 
recommendations of 14 May 2008, issued to all Member States within the framework of 
the Growth and Jobs Strategy (Lisbon Strategy), aimed at improving the economic and 
the labour market performance. 
A sustained reform activity has been undertaken over recent years, largely aimed at 
improving the labour utilisation. A central part of many recent tax and welfare reform 
strategies has been to reduce benefit dependency by making work an economically 
attractive and rewarding option compared with welfare and by encouraging 
beneficiaries to actively seek work. Many Member States have introduced policies to 
“make work pay” and have targeted low-wage workers with the aim of increasing their 
take-home pay. These policies can be successful in raising employment and cutting 
poverty. But, as they are costly and must be financed by increased taxes elsewhere or 
cuts in public spending, they need to be well targeted and implemented carefully, and 
their interaction with social benefits has to be taken into account.  
The analysis of the interaction of tax and benefit provisions and of their recent 
developments shows that Member States have undertaken a series of reforms since the 
re-launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005. Some progress has been made in helping 
unemployed or inactive people to get a job. Some countries have reduced both the level 
and duration of unemployment benefits, notably Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary and 
France. However, looking at the indicators of financial incentives to work, the overall 
impression is that many of the financial measures adopted in the EU have addressed 
mainly the part of the tax-benefit system - such as reducing tax rates or social security 
contributions on low-wages to make work pay and to reduce the cost of labour - that 
encounters less political resistance. They also show remaining risks of low-wage traps 
and unemployment/inactivity traps for the unskilled or low income earners in many 
Member States. The increasing use of in-work benefits is making it more attractive to 
work relative to non-employment, although often with substantial budgetary impact and 
at the cost of introducing high effective marginal tax rates at a higher level of earnings.   
Many recent reforms that do not appear to directly target financial incentives to work 
may nonetheless have improved the overall incentive structure of the benefit system. In 
particular, this is the case for reforms which have aimed at enhancing the enforcement of 
benefit systems or at tightening eligibility to some benefits. Work-availability conditions 
have been tightened in a number of countries. These reforms have typically reduced the 
scope of the unemployed to reject job offers because of occupational incompatibility with 
the previous job, pay and/or workplace location. Tighter work-availability conditions 
 
1  European Commission (2006), "A year of delivery" The European Commission's 2006 Annual 
Progress Report on Growth and Jobs", 12 December 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/annual-
report-1206_en.htm  
 6
                                                
have often gone hand-in-hand with increasing and more systematic and effective 
application of sanctions for refusal of suitable job offers. These reforms are very 
promising as they could go a long way towards reducing disincentive effects. Indeed, as 
also recognised in the Integrated Guidelines, there are ways other than reducing out-of-
work benefits to encourage people to work, in particular activation policies (effective 
individualised help with job search and close monitoring of job-seeking activities, 
although they can be costly) and mutual obligations (the requirement to take any suitable 
work).  
Many countries have enacted measures that increase the access to more flexible working 
time arrangements for both employers and employees (such as working time accounts, 
part-time, opening clauses allowing  deviation from working time schedules agreed in 
collective agreements). While it is too early to evaluate their overall impact, it is 
important to underline that the more frequent use of opening clauses has increased the 
flexibility in the use of the labour force. More flexibility at the workplace can also be 
achieved by revising company-level legislation (e.g. reviewing the legislation restraining 
the opening hours of labour intensive sectors, as recently done for the retail sector in 
Germany, Belgium and Slovenia).   
A better reallocation of labour could be achieved through reforms of the labour market 
and of the welfare state that, in line with the flexicurity approach2, shift the focus from 
protection of workers in the same job for their entire lifetime to protection of workers in 
the market. Measures increasing flexibility at the margins, through easier access to part-
time and temporary forms of work, were enacted by many countries. The reforms of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) enacted so far have contributed to the 
emergence of a dual regime, as the increase in the labour market reallocation was 
achieved mainly with the liberalisation of temporary contracts while leaving almost 
unchanged the legislation for those workers with open-ended contracts. These reforms 
may have contributed to sustaining labour demand in periods of uncertain 
macroeconomic conditions by lessening the impact on firms’ hiring and firing practices. 
On the negative side, one should consider that in some instances partial easing of the 
employment protection legislation governing temporary contracts, combined with overly-
strict protection of permanent contracts, resulted in a surge in the use of temporary 
contracts in several countries. It also divided the labour market into segments providing 
different levels of protection. Thus, there is room to rebalance workers' protection in the 
labour market by revising the legislation for workers employed under permanent 
contracts.  
 
2  See the Commission Communication "Towards common principles of flexicurity: more and better jobs 
through flexibility and security" (COMM (2007)359), adopted on 27 June 2007. 
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Conclusions  
Although good macroeconomic fundamentals may have played a role, the labour market 
improvements observed so far are also a sign that structural reforms have started to pay 
off. In addition to a liberalisation of the labour market (although partial and imperfect), 
the reduction of disincentives to work and to hire, especially for the low-skilled, 
embedded in tax and benefit systems, a greater link with activation policies and a 
stronger reliance on preventive and targeted active labour market policies (ALMPs), and 
widespread wage moderation are all factors that have contributed to the structural 
improvement in the functioning of labour markets.  
Yet, despite these improvements, in view of the ageing of the population and rapid 
technological change, more progress is needed to further increase and maintain high 
levels of employment and participation rates, especially among female and older 
workers, and to reduce structural unemployment. Table 1 provides a synthetic view of the 
current country-specific recommendations and of the functioning of tax-benefit systems 
on the basis of the most recent available indicators. It shows different combinations of 
flexibility and security, with countries like Denmark and Netherlands featuring a rather 
flexible employment relation interplaying with a relatively generous social protection 
system but also rather strict job-search obligations and developed active labour market 
policies, and other countries characterised by stricter employment relation but relatively 
less generous social safety net.    
Member States should continue along the line of reforms followed so far. The 
Commission has stressed the importance of a comprehensive strategy of labour market 
reforms ("flexicurity") that shift the focus from protection on the job to insurance in the 
market.3 These reforms would enable workers to move more smoothly from declining to 
expanding activities, thus easing tensions in the adjustment process, while ensuring 
adequate income support and responding to potential anxieties among European 
citizens. Policies that enhance the flexibility of labour markets and promote higher 
labour market participation, such as reforms in the tax-benefit systems, effective 
activation measures and employment services, together with investment in human capital 
and an efficient use of policies such as training and lifelong learning that increase the 
adaptability to change, will contribute to improving the functioning of the EU labour 
markets as well as enhancing the adjustment capacity of the euro area and thus reap the 
full benefits of EMU.  
Policies should also be evaluated rigorously in order to make employment programmes 
cost-effective. A high priority should be assigned to identifying and disseminating best 
practice in this area and to limiting the budgetary impact of policy measures. 
 
 
3    European Commission Communication “Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity”, 
COM(2007)359. Flexicurity involves the combination of flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective active labour market policies, and 
modern, adequate and sustainable social protection systems. 
 
Table 1 – Overview Table 
 
 
MS
Covering at least 
one of the 4 main 
policy areas
Flexicurity Flexicurity Flexicurity
Net Income 
Replacement   
(single 67% 
average wage)   
Net Income 
Replacement   
(single 67% 
average wage) 
Net Income 
Replacement   
(single 67% 
average wage; 
including social 
assistance) 
Implicit tax on 
returning to 
work - spouse 
with 2 children 
Tax burden on 
low-wage    
EPL highly 
restrictive 
EPL highly 
restrictive 
Loose 
availability 
criteria  & 
job-search 
obligations 
2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2006 2006 2004
Higher than Higher than Higher than METR higher than 
Tax wedge 
higher than 
index for 
regular 
employment 
index for 
temporary 
contracts   
index
80% 80% 60% 40% 40% (0-6) (0-6)
after 2 month after 1 year after 5 years equal to or higher than
equal to or 
higher than
equal or 
lower than
2,5 2,5 3
AT CSR x
BE CSR CSR x x x x x
BG CSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CZ CSR CSR x x x
CY CSR n.a. n.a. n.a.
DK x x x x
DE CSR CSR CSR x x x x
EE PTW PTW n.a. n.a.
ES PTW PTW x x
EL CSR CSR CSR x x
FI x
FR CSR PTW PTW CSR x x x x
HU PTW PTW x n.a.
IE x n.a.
IT PTW x x x
LT CSR x n.a. n.a. x
LU PTW x x x n.a.
LV CSR x x x n.a. n.a. x
MT CSR CSR x n.a. n.a. x
NL CSR x x x x x x
PL CSR CSR x x n.a.
PT CSR CSR x x
RO PTW n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. x n.a. n.a. n.a.
SE PTW PTW PTW x x x x
SI CSR x n.a. n.a.
SK x
UK x
Flexicurity related CSRs or PTW Indicators of tax-benefit systems and EPL 
Benefit 
system
Taxation 
system
Employment 
protection legislation-
EPL
 
Source: Commission services. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides an analysis of recent reforms in tax-benefit systems and a 
preliminary assessment of their impact on financial incentives to work and on labour 
supply. The analysis is based on information on most recent reform measures provided 
by the members of the EPC-Labour Market Working Group (LMWG) in August 2008. In 
addition, the paper presents the latest available data on existing comparable cross-country 
indicators of the financial incentives to work, which have been calculated within the 
framework of a joint Commission (EMPL-ECFIN-TAXUD-EUROSTAT)-OECD 
research project. By combining information on reform measures with comparable cross-
country indicators, it is in fact possible to take a first step towards analysing their 
possible effects and to gauge whether they are having a material impact on growth and 
employment. 
 
The reform activity in 2008 largely confirms the importance given to the reduction of 
benefit dependency by making work an economically attractive and rewarding option 
relative to welfare and by encouraging beneficiaries to actively seek a job. Flexicurity, 
which had come to the forefront of the European reform agenda in 2007, has been at the 
centre of the policy debate this year, and its making-work-pay dimension continued to be 
a key element of national reform activity.  
 
Some further progress has been made to help unemployed or inactive people get a job, 
mainly through reforms of the tax and unemployment benefit systems and more effective 
active labour market policies. Reforms which aimed at enhancing the enforcement of 
benefit systems or at tightening the eligibility to some benefits also contributed to 
improve the overall incentive structure of the benefit system. Work-availability 
conditions in particular, have been further tightened in a wide number of countries in 
2008. These reforms have typically reduced the scope for the unemployed to reject job 
offers because of occupational incompatibility with the previous job, pay and/or 
workplace location, and have often gone hand-in-hand with more systematic and 
effective application of sanctions for refusal of suitable job offers.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates the need for 
reforming tax-benefit system in order to increase labour supply and employment. Section 
3 illustrates the topic of "making work pay" policies and puts it in the context of 
flexicurity and of the integrated guidelines for growth and jobs. Section 4 illustrates the 
main policy instruments in the field of taxes and benefits. Section 5 presents the latest 
available data on quantitative indicators on progress towards removing financial 
disincentives to work via reforms to both tax and benefit systems. In particular, it 
presents the estimates for the implicit tax on returning to work (Marginal Effective Tax 
Rates - METRs) in 2007, which are calculated in a joint OECD-Commission project. 
Section 6 considers the most recent reforms in the field of tax and benefit systems, based 
on the information provided by the Members of the EPC-Labour Market Working Group 
(LMWG) in September 2008. Section 7 comments upon public expenditure on labour 
market policy interventions across countries and over time.  
 
Annex 1 reports flexicurity related country-specific recommendations and points to 
watch. Annex 2 presents a description of tax and benefits reforms adopted in the EU27 
over 2006-2007, based on the LABREF database. Finally, the Statistical Annex presents 
the most recent estimates for a wide range of indicators which measure the financial 
incentives to work for different family typologies and at different wage levels.      
 
 2 REFORMING TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEMS TO INCREASE LABOUR SUPPLY: 
CLOSING THE GAP WITH THE LISBON EMPLOYMENT TARGETS  
Despite the overall good performance of labour markets over most recent years, 
employment and labour force participation rates remain rather low in the EU, and 
particularly so in the euro area, especially among women and older workers. Policy-
makers have started to address this problem with a combination of measures to 
encourage both job creation (labour demand) and labour participation (labour supply). 
Removing disincentives to entering and staying in the labour market is an important 
element of the strategy for increasing labour supply, and therefore for achieving the EU 
employment targets and for ensuring the long-term sustainability of public finances, in 
view of the looming ageing of the EU population.  
Progress made between 2001 and 2007 towards the Lisbon employment targets (overall, 
female and older workers employment rate of respectively 70%, 60% and 50% at the 
horizon 2010) is shown in Table 2. In the period under consideration, the overall EU 
employment rate rose by about 3 percentage points, to reach 65.4% in 2007.  
 
Table 2 - Lisbon employment targets: required job performance 
 
LISBON PROJECTIONS 2001 2007 2010 Pro memoria
2008-2010 Annual
Total (15-64) 1998-2000 2001-2007
Employees (15-64)      (000) 200385 214673 234491 19818 3.0% 1.4% 1.2%
Employment rate         (%) 62.5 65.4 70
Population  (15-64)     (000) 320435 328307 334987
Older workers   (55-64 ) 2001 2007 2010 1998-2000 2001-2007
Employees (55-64)      (000) 19597 25795 30375 4580 5.6% 1.8% 5.3%
Employment rate         (%) 37.5 44.7 50
Population  (55-64)     (000) 52312 57721 60750
Female 2001 2007 2010 1998-2000 2001-2007
Employees (15-64)      (000) 87407 96009 100294 4285 1.5% 2.2% 1.6%
Employment rate         (%) 54.3 58.3 60
Population  (15-64)     (000) 160935 164596 167157
New Jobs
Required 
Employment  growth 
New Jobs
New Jobs
 
Source: Commission services, DG ECFIN calculation using Eurostat figures (Europop2004 demographic projections) 
 
Only six countries (Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Finland and the 
Netherlands) exceed in 2007 the three employment targets set under the Lisbon Strategy, 
while five countries stood out as being particularly far from the three targets (Hungary, 
Italy, Greece, Poland and Malta) (see Graphs 1 and 2 hereafter). 
Between 2001 and 2007, the employment rate of women increased by 4 percentage 
points in the EU27 (and almost 6 percentage points in the euro area) to reach 60% in 
2007. Women from younger generations showed higher participation rates than women 
from older generations, mainly due to a cohort effect fostered by changes in cultural 
attitudes and the increasing average level of female education. The female employment 
target was already achieved by 14 Member States in 2007 (Denmark, Germany Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia). Among the countries with low female employment 
rates, Italy and Poland strongly impinged upon the achievement of the target.  
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Despite considerable recent improvements, in 2007 the employment rate of older workers 
stood at 44.7%, still far from the 50% Lisbon target. The target had been already 
exceeded by 12 Member States in 2007 (Denmark, Germany Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia). 
 
Graph 1 - Progress towards the Lisbon targets: total and female employment rate, 2007 
 
Note: EU objective 2010: 70% for total employment rate, 60% for female employment rate. 
Source: Commission services 
 
Staying at data from 2007, reaching the 70% overall employment target by 2010 would 
require about 20 millions additional jobs to be created – equivalent to an employment 
growth between 2008-2010 of 3% per year, far above the growth of both the most recent 
period and the historical average.  
 
Yet, after several years of favourable growth and of good performance in terms of 
employment creation, economic conditions have deteriorated rapidly in 2008, mainly due 
to the impact of a financial crisis which came on top of a correction of in-house prices in 
many economies. The financial crisis deepened and broadened in autumn 2008 and 
started to negatively impact economic growth and labour market performance during the 
third quarter of 2008. 
Labour market performance is expected to further deteriorate sharply in 2009. 
Employment is expected to increase by a meagre ¼ million jobs in the EU and ½ million 
in the euro area over the period 2009-2010, compared with the 6 million new jobs that 
were created in 2007-2008 in the EU. As a result of the decline in employment, the 
unemployment rate is expected to increase by about 1 percentage point in the next two 
years, to some 8% in the EU and 8.75% in the euro area by 2010, with increasing 
differences across Member States.4 
                                                 
4 Source: Commission autumn forecast, October 2008. 
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On the other hand, the increase in the participation rates observed over the last months of 
2008, despite the strong headwinds faced by the European economy, seems to go in the 
opposite direction of what one would expect from a "normal" cyclical reaction of labour 
supply to a deterioration of the employment opportunities. Available evidence suggests 
in fact that the labour market has become more flexible and adaptable due to recent 
reforms. In particular, the reforms of the tax and benefit systems and the less easy access 
to early retirement seem to have reduced the elasticity of the labour supply to cyclical 
developments. The availability to work of those less attached to the labour market has in 
fact increased as the employment opportunities of the main earner in the household 
deteriorate and family incomes fall. A decline in the labour demand amid an unchanged, 
if not increasing, labour supply could soon bring the unemployment rate to 
unprecedented levels. Yet, it may relatively fast revert towards the pre-shock levels when 
the economy recovers. 
Graph 2 - Progress towards the Lisbon targets: total and older workers employment rate, 2007 
 
Note: EU objective 2010: 70% for total employment rate, 50% for older workers employment rate.  
Source: Commission services. 
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3 MAKING WORK PAY POLICIES 
3.1 Making Work Pay and Flexicurity 
A broad consensus has emerged that labour markets should be adaptable to technological 
change and increasing heterogeneity of the workforce, and that the failure to reform is a 
source of poor economic performance. Labour markets should create jobs, not distort the 
incentives to supply labour, promote the reallocation of labour between sectors and 
occupations and, especially in periods of rapid change, be able to respond to the demand 
of security coming from risk-adverse individuals, particularly from those at high risks of 
non-employment. Europe is thus confronted with a double constraint, symbolized by the 
flexibility-security nexus.   
Recent policy debate at European level has concluded that flexibility and security, rather 
than being two conflicting dimensions of a market economy, can be part of 
comprehensive labour market and welfare state reform strategies. These strategies should 
help reconcile workers' demand for protection against unemployment and income risks 
with the need of modern firms to respond quickly to - and anticipate - swings in 
consumers' preferences and the challenges created by technological progress and 
globalisation. By combining new forms of flexibility and security, these strategies can 
help increase adaptability, employment and social cohesion. They have become a key 
component of the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. 
The move towards a flexicurity approach has had important implications in the policy 
debate. First of all, it is helping develop comprehensive rather than partial approach to 
reforms of the welfare state. The recognition of the advantages of more flexible European 
labour markets has also led to a rethinking of the design of employment and social 
policies. The focus has shifted from measures of unconditional basic income support to 
measures based on the right and duties of every citizen to receive support if she/he falls 
in the condition of need (right and duties principle). Finally, it has been acknowledged 
that partial labour market liberalisations have increased the inequality in the treatment of 
workers with similar characteristics. A better governance of the labour market 
relationship requires reforms of the unemployment insurance system and of the dismissal 
rules aimed to limit the differences in the treatment of workers with similar 
characteristics but having different types of contracts.  
 
The Commission and the Member States have reached a consensus that flexicurity 
policies can be designed and implemented across four policy components5: 
– Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements through modern labour laws, 
collective agreements and work organisation;  
– Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies to ensure the continual adaptability and 
employability of workers, particularly the most vulnerable; 
– Effective active labour market policies that help people cope with rapid change, 
reduce unemployment spells and ease transitions to new jobs; 
 
5  European Commission Communication: “Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity”, COM (2007) 
359 final. 
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– Modern social security systems that provide adequate income support, encourage 
employment and facilitate labour market mobility.  
One of the key areas of reforms within the flexicurity approach is indeed to attract more 
people in the labour market and to make the underlying incentive structure in the tax and 
benefit systems supportive to employment. The aim of this policy objective,  known as 
'making work pay', is  to modernise tax and benefit systems so that they provide effective 
incentives to participate in training, take up jobs and remain in work, thereby shifting the 
focus away from passive income support towards active measures designed to get people 
back to work. Policies to 'make work pay' have largely targeted low-wage workers with 
the aim of increasing their take-home pay. Given that the labour supply of low-wage 
workers is estimated to be relatively more elastic, especially with reference to the 
decision of working/not working (the so-called 'extensive margin'), such targeted 
measures have become increasingly popular as they may have not only a redistributive 
property but also contribute to enhance labour market efficiency.    
3.2 Making Work Pay in the Integrated Guidelines 
Policies to improve financial incentives to work (or to "make work pay") are a key 
feature of the Integrated Guidelines (see box below) and were for many years central to 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and to the Employment Guidelines. A widespread 
consensus has emerged on the fact that policies in the field of tax and benefit systems 
(including unemployment insurance, social assistance, social security, 
incapacity/disability or sickness benefits) are key ingredients to mobilising more people 
into employment, although clearly remaining only one element of the comprehensive set 
of measures needed to raise labour utilisation and improve labour market performance.6  
Improving financial incentives to work and raising the employment rates of older workers – key 
elements in the Integrated Guidelines 
Increasing labour force participation, reducing unemployment and increasing employment have been 
identified as key challenges by a majority of the Member States.  
The importance of improving financial incentives to work is recognised in the following guidelines: 
• Guideline 2 indicates that "Member States should, in view of the projected costs of ageing populations, 
reform and reinforce pension, social insurance and healthcare systems to ensure that they are 
financially viable, socially adequate and accessible and take measures to increase labour market 
participation and labour supply amongst women, young and older workers, and promote a life-cycle 
approach to work in order to increase hours worked in the economy".  
• Guideline 5  states that "Member States should pursue labour and product markets' reforms that at the 
same time increase the growth potential and support the macroeconomic framework by increasing 
flexibility, factor mobility and adjustment capacity in labour and product markets. In particular, 
Member States should renew impetus in tax and benefit reforms to improve incentives and to make 
work pay …" 
• Guideline 18 calls for the Member States to "… promote a life-cycle approach to work through […] 
support of active ageing, including … adequate incentives to work and discouragement of early 
retirement and modern social protection systems, including pensions and healthcare, ensuring their 
social adequacy, financial sustainability and responsiveness to changing needs, so as to support 
participation and better retention in employment and longer working lives". 
                                                 
6  The broad consensus amongst policy makers is perhaps best reflected in the report on "Making Work 
Pay" of the Expert Group of Employment Committee (2003), and the conclusion of the Employment 
Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok in November 2003, which urged Member States to: “seek to end 
unemployment, inactivity and low-pay traps by adjusting the balance between tax and benefits”.  
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• Guideline 19 calls for the Member States to "… ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work 
attractiveness, and make work pay, through … continual review of the incentives and disincentives 
resulting from the tax and benefit systems, including the management and conditionality of benefits 
and a significant reduction of high marginal effective tax rates, notably for those with low incomes, 
whilst ensuring adequate levels of social protection …".  
• Guideline 22 calls for the Member States to "… ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments 
and wage-setting mechanisms, by … reviewing the impact on employment of non-wage labour costs 
and where appropriate adjust their structure and level, especially to reduce the tax burden on the low-
paid". 
3.3 The relevance of "Making Work Pay" policies 
In this section the economic arguments on the importance of financial incentives to work 
are briefly recalled.7  
The need to reconcile poverty alleviation with labour market efficiency is an old debate 
in the field of labour economics and also in the political debate.8 There is clearly a case 
for income support programs due to risk aversion, liquidity constrained agents and the 
lack of private insurance in this area. Unemployment insurance programmes help 
recipients make efficient job choices and sustain their consumption during a period of 
financial stress.9 They are also particularly relevant in the context of increasing global 
competition and technological change. Within this framework, there is a need for a 
policy design that is conducive to the full realisation of the opportunities offered by 
deeper international economic integration, while at the same time aiming at minimising 
unavoidable adjustment costs. The challenge here is about how to create well-designed 
policies, matching flexibility with fairness, which help to equip people with the skills, 
support and incentives they need to succeed in a changing world. A well designed social 
security net requires also a better conditionality and control over benefits and eligibility 
(employment services and search effort by the non-employed), in order to avoid 
disincentive effects.  
Whether the current welfare systems and their interactions with the tax system provide 
sufficient employment incentives, in particular for unskilled and low wage workers, has 
become an increasingly relevant policy issue.  A central part of many recent tax and 
welfare reform strategies is to reduce benefit dependency by making work an 
economically attractive and rewarding option relative to welfare. In combination with 
measures to improve people’s chances of finding employment and working the desired 
hours, maintaining and improving financial work incentives is an essential component of 
efforts to improve the functioning of labour markets. In-work benefit programmes are 
one of the tools that EU countries have used more recently in order to raise the financial 
returns to work. In order to minimise the budgetary impact of these measures (and avoid 
deadweight costs), a well-designed targeting has proved to be essential.  In order to help 
the transition from welfare to work, in-work benefits also need to be embedded in more 
comprehensive strategies, including adequate and affordable child care, efficient public 
                                                 
7  For a detailed analysis see Carone G. and A. Salomäki (eds.) (2005), “Indicators and Policies to Make 
Work Pay. Proceedings of the workshop organised by the European Commission (DG ECFIN)”, 
European Economy,  Special Reports No. 2, European Commission, and the report on "Making Work 
Pay" of the Expert Group of Employment Committee (2003). 
8     A clear discussion of the trade-off between equity and efficiency related to redistributive transfers (the 
so-called "leaky bucket" effect) is in Okun's book published in 1970. For a critical view see R. M. 
Blank (2002), "Can equity and efficiency complement each other?", NBER, WP. No 8820. 
9  Another goal of the unemployment insurance schemes is helping to stabilize the overall economy. 
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employment services and effective active labour market policies (especially job-search 
assistance or targeted training programmes tailored to local labour market needs).   
It must also be stressed that the incentive structure encompasses a broad range of features 
beyond the financial gains from work, such as eligibility rules for benefits, their duration, 
related activation and monitoring measures, as well as the enforcement of the systems. In 
order to ensure incentives and assistance to work, income support should be 
accompanied by an appropriate set of rights and duties.  
4 MAIN POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIELD OF TAXES AND BENEFITS 
Interventions in the field of taxes and benefits are key instruments to improve the 
financial attractiveness of work relative to welfare and to encourage beneficiaries to 
actively seek a job. The main areas for policy action can be grouped as follows. 
4.1 Labour taxation 
Taxes on labour put a wedge between product wage paid by firms and the consumption 
wage received by employees. Their effect on labour demand and labour supply depends 
on whether and to what extent the tax burden increases the total labour cost for the 
employer or is transferred on to the worker, translating into a lower net wage. When 
increasing the total labour cost, taxes on labour (notably in the form of employer's social 
security contributions) tend to reduce labour demand. On the labour supply side, taxes 
levied on wages (both direct taxation on labour income and employee's social security 
contributions) reduce the net income and drive a wedge between the marginal product 
of labour and the marginal value of leisure. They thus tend to discourage the availability 
to work, especially at the lower end of the wage scale.  
Typical employment-friendly tax reform packages involve tax-wedge reductions for the 
low income, including the extension of the tax-free range of income, coupled with tax 
credits and rebates of social security contributions for low-wage earners. Cuts in 
employers' social security contributions are also commonly used to boost labour demand 
and create incentives to hire specific target groups, especially among the groups with the 
highest difficulties to join the labour market. The success of these policy measures is 
heavily dependent upon their design and in particular the capacity to minimising the risk 
of substitution effects (where supported employment creation replaces non-subsidised 
jobs) or deadweight costs (supporting hires that would have in any cases taken place) and 
their limit lies in their usually short-term, non-structural nature. To overcome the 
disincentive effects embedded in joint-income tax systems for second-earners in a 
couple, and thus improve female labour market participation, Member States are also 
increasingly introducing the possibility to opt for split family taxation or for individual 
taxation on incomes. In countries operating joint income tax systems, second earners are 
in fact likely to face above-average income tax burdens when moving into work as the 
marginal tax rate is pushed up by the earnings of their partner. This mechanism is 
particularly relevant in the case of low-wage work. 
4.2 Unemployment benefits 
Economic theory and empirical research suggest that relatively high unemployment 
benefits and relatively long benefit duration, insofar as they reduce the gap between 
labour and non-labour income, reduce job-search incentives and the willingness of the 
unemployed to accept a job, because if an unemployed person finds a job the benefit is 
withdrawn. In addition, more generous unemployment benefits (in both level and 
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duration) may put upwards pressure on wages pushing up the minimum wage workers 
are ready to accept (so-called "reservation wage"). In both cases they worsen the 
employment chances of those looking for a job. On the other hand, as long as subsidised 
job-search allows job-seekers more time to find a better job, it can improve the matching 
between unemployed and vacancies, by allowing job seekers more time to find a job 
which matches their skills and thus maximising their productivity. 
Interventions on the level and duration of benefits nevertheless do not suffice to 
evaluate the capacity of the tax and benefit system to make work pay relative to staying 
on unemployment. The incentive structure of the benefit system encompasses in fact a 
broader range of features that do not appear to directly targeting the financial gains from 
work, such as eligibility and work-availability conditions, related activation and 
monitoring measures as well as the enforcement of the system. There is increasing 
empirical evidence that making the disbursement of unemployment benefits strictly 
conditional upon complying with eligibility rules (e.g. employment record needed to 
have access to benefits; waiting periods before unemployment benefits are paid out), 
work-availability conditions and job-search requirements, can offset the disincentive 
effects linked to these scheme and have a stronger impact on the decision to work than 
the level of benefits in itself. Also, since the threat of losing benefits if a job offer is not 
accepted tends to raise the incentive to work, a properly functioning system of 
monitoring in conjunction with sanctions should restore search incentives most 
effectively, thus allowing for higher benefits than otherwise. In order to ensure incentives 
and assistance, unemployment income support should therefore be accompanied by 
rights and duties. Since monitoring usually takes place through the public employment 
services (PES), the quality of services provided by the employment offices and the 
development of adequate synergies between the unemployment benefit providers and the 
PES are central to ensuring the enforcement of the job-search criterion.10  
4.3 Other welfare-related benefits 
Welfare-related schemes also include in-work benefits, means-tested benefits and family-
friendly policies. Besides these, other relevant policy fields the design of which can 
contribute to increasing the financial incentives to work are disability and sickness 
schemes. 
In-work benefit programmes are designed to create incentives to take up low-paid work, 
by raising the income from work above out-of-work income levels. EU countries have 
increasingly used these policy tools over the last years in order to raise the financial 
returns to work and to support the most recent reforms in the unemployment benefit 
systems. Their effects on the labour market can be diverse, also in the light of the great 
variety of measures they can include. In particular, since in-work benefits are phased-out 
as incomes increase, they may result in high marginal tax rates that generate low-wage 
traps in the low income/productivity segment and may create an incentive to resort to the 
shadow economy.  
In most countries, jobless persons who are searching for a job but are not eligible to 
unemployment benefits or who have exhausted their period of unemployment insurance 
can receive means-tested benefits. This is the typical situation of low-income families 
where one or both the spouses have never worked or are not entitled to unemployment 
 
10  This is largely reflected in the fact that in those countries where substantial welfare reform 
programmes were adopted in recent years, the modernisation of the unemployment benefit system 
regularly involved the development of strong complementarities between passive and active policies 
and the setting-up of close synergies between the unemployment benefits administration and the PES. 
 18
benefits or their eligibility to unemployment insurance has expired, and they thus only 
qualify for social assistance. Means-tested benefits (minimum-income/social assistance 
benefits, housing, etc.) granted to non-working families or individuals, often with the 
primary aim to reduce child poverty, can give rise to strong work disincentives, 
especially for lone parents, because of the cash benefit withdrawal which follows a 
transition from labour market inactivity to employment. Empirical research shows that 
the policy design of out-of-work benefits can play an even bigger role on work 
attractiveness than the level of benefits in itself. To partly overcome the disincentive 
effects embedded in these schemes, means-tested benefits are increasingly made 
conditional upon the participation of benefit recipients in activation and workfare 
measures (i.e. the requirement that a benefit recipient participate in some work 
activity/labour market programmes in exchange for benefits). This is particularly 
relevant, as the duration of means-tested social-assistance is generally very long and can 
create strong benefit dependency. 
Family-related benefits broadly include: family allowances, child benefits/tax credits 
and childcare benefits. Child benefits are of relevance for the determination of financial 
incentives to work in those few countries where they are related to the level of the 
taxpayer's (or family's) income. This is the case in Italy and UK, where means-tested 
child benefits may contribute to high average effective tax rates distorting female 
participation incentives. In most other countries, child benefits are universal, without any 
means-testing, and are paid for each dependant child. In these cases, the child benefit 
does not in itself create a problem for incentives to work but it may affect the level of 
earnings up to which social assistance is available to families with children. Given that 
numerous types of social transfers are specifically targeted towards low-income 
households, especially if children are present, parents in these households are particularly 
likely to face adverse work incentives.  
Finally, there is a wide consensus in the economic literature that badly designed 
disability schemes have played an important role in distorting the incentives to 
participate in the labour market. During the past decades, disability pensions awarded on 
the basis of labour market considerations were often offered to redundant or unemployed 
elderly workers in response to severe shocks in the labour market. More recently, this 
trend has been reversed and new employment and support allowances have started to be 
introduced, requiring incapacity claimants to have an active engagement with 
employment advisors and the construction of personal paths with the goal of facilitating 
people from inactivity to work. The sickness systems can also become a bridge to 
inactivity and an alternative pathway to early exit from the labour market.  In order to 
avoid a biased use of these schemes, in a number of countries they were recently 
reformed in the direction of a stronger insurance component. 
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5 INDICATORS ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO WORK (2001-2007) 
This section presents the latest estimates for quantitative indicators aimed at measuring 
progress towards the reduction of financial disincentives to work via reforms to both tax 
and benefit systems.11 Indicators of the implicit tax on retuning to work or METRs have 
been developed in co-operation by the Commission and the OECD using a micro-
simulation model for hypothetical households covering different standardized in- and 
out-of-work cases, different family types (single/married) and different wage levels. 
Since these indicators refer to the situation of tax and benefit systems in 2007, they do 
not incorporate the most recent reform measures as reported in the following section. 
However, given that these indicators have been collected since 2001, they can provide a 
useful basis for monitoring and commenting upon progress in the field of financial 
incentives to work over the last years. Drawing upon the 2008 Commission "Strategic 
report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: Keeping up the pace of 
change", the indicators are shown in parallel to the tax-benefit related country's specific 
recommendations (CSRs) and points to watch (PTW) (see Table 3). For full text of the 
CSRs and PTW see Annex 1. 
5.1 Measuring financial incentives to work  
The design of tax and benefit systems (individually and through their interaction) has an 
influence on all labour market transitions, that is labour market participation, the 
schooling/work choice, the early retirement decision and the duration of unemployment. 
More specifically, taxes and welfare schemes almost inevitably create a potential 
distortion in some segments of the labour market (notably persons with low earnings 
prospects and second earner in a couple) in the form of disincentives to work, thereby 
reducing the potential labour supply in terms of participation and/or hours worked. The 
impact of the tax and benefit systems is particularly relevant for low-skilled persons 
(with low earning prospect) and potential second earner in a couple (usually women)12.  
Three typical situations can be described: 
• If the level of unemployment benefit is high relative to earnings and its duration 
long, its effect on the participation decision of the unemployed is negative, 
discouraging or delaying the job search, because the benefit will be withdrawn 
when the unemployed person finds a job (this will give rise to a so-called 
'unemployment trap'). 
• Similarly, an 'inactivity trap' may arise where a high level of income-tested 
benefits, which is withdrawn when non-active persons accept a job, reduces the 
economic incentives to work.  
• Finally, a 'low wage trap' (or 'poverty trap') is the situation where the increase 
in earnings due to higher work efforts (working longer, shifting from part-time to 
 
11  For a detailed description of the methodology used and an analysis of the main results see Carone, G., 
A. Salomaki, H. Immervoll and Paturot,  D. (2003), "Indicators of Unemployment and Low-Wage 
Traps (Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Employment Incomes)”, OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Paper No. 18, OECD, Paris (also published as European Economy Economic 
Papers No. 197). Details of the METR indicator can also be found in European Commission (2005), 
"Indicators and policies to make work pay", European Economy Special Report N°2. 
12  But high marginal tax rates can have negative impact also on higher skilled persons as they could 
influence the hours of work decision (e.g. highly skilled women who prefer to work part-time), but 
also career / training decisions (giving the lower net returns on education). 
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full-time or moving to a better job) leads to either no, or only a very small 
increase in disposable income, owing to the combined effect of higher taxes and 
the withdrawal of means-tested benefits. 
As individuals' incentives to work largely depend on the shape of their budget constraint 
for a given hourly wage, we are interested in knowing the financial reward to doing any 
work, measured by some function of incomes in and out of work, and the incentive for 
those already in work to work harder or to progress in the labour market. A first measure 
of incentives to work can be provided by the net replacement rates. These indicators are 
obtained by calculating the ratio of net income when not working (mainly unemployment 
benefits if unemployed or means-tested benefits if on social assistance) to net income in 
work. A lower replacement rate is associated with a greater incentive to search for and 
take up a job when unemployed.  
On the tax side, the tax barrier to employment can be measured by the 'tax wedge', the 
proportional difference between the costs of a worker to their employer (wage and social 
security contributions, i.e. the total labour cost) and the amount of net earnings that the 
worker receives (wages minus personal income tax and social security contributions, plus 
any available family benefits). The indicator of the tax wedge on labour measures both 
incentives to work (labour supply side) and to hire persons (labour demand side) and 
takes into account the income tax and social security components. 
Finally, the indicators of the implicit tax on retuning to work , or marginal effective tax 
rates indicators (METRs) are more specific quantitative indicators of progress towards 
removing financial disincentives to work, since they provide information on how 
financially rewarding is for an employee to increase working hours or for an 
unemployed/inactive person to take up employment. They measure what part of a change 
in earnings is 'taxed away' by the combined operation of taxes, social security 
contributions and any withdrawal of replacement or means-tested benefits when a person 
moves from one labour market status to another or increases his/her work effort.  
In particular,  
• The implicit tax on retuning to work for unemployed persons or METR for the 
unemployment trap measures the part of the additional gross wage that is taxed 
away in the form of increased taxes and withdrawn benefits in the case where a 
person returns to work from unemployment. It is calculated as the change in net-
of-tax income over the change in gross earnings that results from taking up a job. 
The 'trap' indicates that the change in disposable income is small and, conversely, 
the work-disincentive effect of tax and benefit systems is large. 
• A similar indicator - the METR for the inactivity trap - measures the part of 
additional gross wage that is taxed away in the case where an inactive person (not 
entitled to receive unemployment benefits but eligible for income-tested social 
assistance) takes up a job – in other words the financial incentives to move from 
inactivity and social assistance to employment. In this case, social assistance (or 
other last-resort benefit) is the main component of out-of-work income, and thus 
replaces the unemployment benefits in the calculation.  
• Finally, the METR for the low-wage trap is defined as the rate at which taxes are 
increased and benefits withdrawn as earnings rise due to an increase in work 
effort. This kind of trap is most likely to occur at relatively low wage levels due to 
the fact that the withdrawal of social transfers (mainly social assistance, in-work 
benefits and housing benefits), which are usually available only to persons with a 
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low income, adds to the marginal rate of income taxes and social security 
contributions. 
The METRs and the other policy indicators mentioned above, however, do not reflect 
important features of the unemployment insurance - such as the benefit duration and job-
search and work availability requirements – that, as already mentioned, have a relevant 
impact on the incentive structure of the benefit system even if they do not directly target 
the financial gains from work. In particular, strict conditionality and work-availability 
criteria and their consistent enforcement increase job search and can counterbalance the 
negative effects of high unemployment benefits on job search behaviour. A measure of 
the strictness of availability criteria is provided by the 'Availability for work 
requirements' indicator, which has been developed by the Danish Ministry of Finance 
and lastly update in 200413 (see Table A12 in the Statistical Annex). 
5.2 Net income replacement for unemployed persons (NRRs) 
Graph 3  shows the evolution of net income replacement rates after 6 months and 5 
years of unemployment for a single person, previously working at a wage level 
equivalent to 67% of the average wage (see also Tables A9-A11 in the Statistical Annex 
for other family types). Most Member States register a substantial reduction of the NRRs 
over the unemployment spell. The EU 25 average NRR after 6 months of unemployment 
falls down to 51% at the end of the first year of unemployment spell, to drop further to 
41% in the long run (after 5 years of unemployment). Since 2001, many countries have 
reduced their NRRs, with the notable exception of Ireland and the Netherlands, where 
already high NRRs have been further increased over recent years to reach levels close to 
80% in 2007.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  Hasselpflug and Søren (2005): "Availability criteria in 25 countries", Danish Finance Ministry 
Working Paper, 12, 2005. 
Graph 3 - Net income replacement rates over different periods within the unemployment spell 
Single person without children, 67% of AW 
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5.3 Implicit tax on returning to work: unemployment traps  
The largest contribution to the METRut is generally provided by a withdrawal of 
unemployment benefits, followed by income taxes, social security contributions and the 
withdrawal of housing benefits, where available. 
Table 3 shows figures related to an unemployed person (a single without children) 
receiving unemployment benefits correlated to a previous job position where gross wages 
were equivalent to 67% of the average wage (AW)14. Taking up a new job at the same 
wage as before unemployment (that is 67% of AW), the marginal effective tax rate 
measuring the unemployment trap (METRut) remains over 70% in almost all countries in 
2007, and close to 90% in Denmark, Luxembourg and Latvia. This means that the net 
financial rewarding for taking up a job is about only 10% of the earnings in the latter 
group of countries. Obviously, taking up a job at a wage lower (higher)15 than the wage 
before unemployment implies even higher (lower) METRut in most Member States (see 
the case for a return to work with a re-entry wage equivalent to 50% of AW earnings16 in 
Table A1 of the statistical annex, the first row for each family type). Table 3 presents 
also a comparison with METRut in 2001 and shows the evolution intervened between 
2006 and 2007. We can see that over the last six years the largest reductions in the 
unemployment trap have been achieved by France, Slovak Republic, Finland, Sweden, 
Belgium and Denmark (plus the Czech Republic for one-earner couple with and without 
children, Austria for lone parents and one-earner couple with children; Ireland for lone 
parents with children, Spain for two-earner couple with and without children and UK for 
one-earner couple without children - See also Table A1 in the Statistical annex). In 
France, a significant decrease in unemployment traps, in particular over 2006-2007, was 
registered for all family types and wage levels above 50% of the AW. This decline 
followed the introduction of new measures in October 2006 that increased the earning 
disregards for RMI beneficiaries. Furthermore, for an unemployed single person who 
receives benefits correlated to a previous wage equivalent to 67% of AW and who takes 
up a new job with a correspondent wage of 50% of AW, the METRut has been reduced by 
12% over the period 2001-2006. This is largely due to targeted interventions made in 
recent years, including specific in-work benefits (Prime pour l'emploi, PPE), the 
extensive use of employers' social security reductions for low-wage employees and the 
development of various activation policies. In the Slovak Republic, a large increase in 
financial incentives to work, in particular for a single person and one-earner couple with 
and without children, was achieved by the combination of a reduction in social 
assistance, housing benefits and the introduction of in-work benefits. In-work benefits 
are indeed largely used to reduce METRut in some countries, in particular in the Slovak 
Republic and in Ireland (single person without children). In Finland, for all the 
considered family types, the higher earnings disregard for social assistance and income 
tax reductions strongly contributed to the reduction in the METRut, followed by the in-
work-benefits component. In Sweden a decline in the unemployment trap for all family 
 
14  Given that looking only at one point in the income distribution and one typology can not reflect the 
complex interaction of tax benefit systems, we have reported detailed tables in the statistical annex, 
showing the METRs for the return to work of unemployed people (eligible for unemployment 
benefits) for a few representative earnings levels (50%, 67%, 100%, 150% of the AW wage level) and 
for six household typologies. 
15  Obviously, the METRut decreases with a higher "post-unemployment" wage: the average METRut is 
63% for a new wage equivalent to 100% of AW and 56% for a new wage equivalent to 150% of AW. 
16  50% of the AW earnings can be considered as equivalent either to a level close to the minimum wage 
in many MSs or to a half-time job paying the average wage level. 
 24
types and income levels was mainly driven by the introduction of in-work benefits.  
In Belgium the unemployment insurance reform introduced in 2004, together with a 
reduction in income taxation, increased incentives to work. In the Czech Republic, the 
positive evolutions highlighted in previous years, mainly benefiting families with 
dependent children, were largely due to the effects of the new regulation of the 
unemployment benefits system introduced in 2004 and the increase of the average gross 
wage and minimum wage recorded over recent years, but also to the increased child 
allowances and social benefits associated with the lowest income band. Poland reduced 
the unemployment trap for all family types without children by reducing net replacement 
rates and social security contributions (paid by employee). 
Furthermore, some countries considerably reduced the unemployment trap for certain 
family types over the last year (2007), in particular France, Sweden and Poland (plus 
Spain for two-earner couple with and without children, Portugal and Latvia for single 
parent and one-earner couple with two children and the Netherlands for single parent 
without children - See also Table A1 in the statistical annex). With the reform of the 
personal income tax in 2007, Spain strongly reduced the METRut for two-earner couple 
with and without children by reducing income tax rates, in particular for the lowest 
income levels. A revision of family related benefits in Portugal in 2007 considerably 
reduced the METRut for single parent and one-earner couple with children. A reduction 
in the unemployment trap for these same family types was achieved also in Latvia, 
mainly by a revision of housing benefits and the reduction of income taxes. Graph 4 and 
Graph 5 present the components of METRut for a single person (with and without 
children) in 2001 and 2007 to illustrate the main sources of unemployment traps and their 
change over time.  
Table 3 - Structural Indicators on financial incentives to work, 2007   
% of APW
Council's 
Recommendation of 
Spring 2008*
2007 Change 2001-2007
Change 
2006-2007 2007
Change 
2001-2007
Change 
2006-2007 2007
Change 
2001-2007
Change 
2006-2007 2007
Change 
2001-2007
Change 
2006-2007 2007
Change 
2001-2007
Change 
2006-2007 2007
Change 2001-
2007
Change 2006-
2007
BE 83 -2.3 0.1 66 0.1 0.9 66 -0.5 1.2 59 2.3 0.4 47 4.9 0.6 74 -8.9 0.1
DK 90 -1.7 -0.7 88 -1.9 -0.3 93 -2.5 -0.8 56 -3.3 -1.5 89 -4.5 -1.6 85 -2.0 -1.1
DE CSR 74 -0.5 -1.2 66 0.4 -1.1 84 8.2 -1.0 57 3.9 -2.4 86 6.0 -2.2 59 -22.3 -1.4
GR PTW 59 2.3 1.8 19 2.0 1.1 16 0.1 0.0 23 4.1 2.2 16 0.1 -0.6 49 -14.2 1.5
ES PTW 82 1.7 1.3 44 1.6 0.3 52 -5.8 -0.8 26 1.2 -0.3 10 -18.0 -6.7 78 2.4 1.6
FR PTW 60 -20.5 -20.8 44 -20.0 -17.5 60 -20.4 -20.7 42 -1.9 -0.6 64 -4.9 -0.8 70 -13.3 -5.1
IE PTW 78 5.9 1.9 79 6.0 2.1 93 6.1 5.0 56 11.6 3.4 86 4.4 9.6 77 7.7 2.3
IT PTW 72 12.5 0.2 22 2.2 0.2 -8 -0.4 -0.4 34 4.2 0.1 11 -0.6 1.0 64 14.5 0.1
LU 88 0.0 0.3 68 0.3 0.6 89 0.4 0.0 51 7.7 1.0 110 14.6 0.5 85 0.3 0.2
NL 81 1.9 -5.1 84 3.8 -0.8 92 4.7 3.9 57 -4.9 -2.6 78 -3.3 0.1 73 -6.8 -7.2
AT PTW 68 0.6 0.2 64 -2.8 0.1 82 -6.9 1.5 38 3.1 0.8 65 -17.2 2.8 55 -12.7 0.0
PT 82 0.5 0.0 37 0.4 0.2 57 -0.1 -0.3 22 1.2 0.0 56 -1.5 -0.9 78 -7.9 0.0
FI PTW 75 -5.4 -1.8 73 -4.3 0.9 92 -5.7 0.3 62 6.7 6.3 100 4.0 0.3 67 -7.0 -2.0
SE PTW 82 -5.2 -4.8 73 -6.6 -4.0 90 -7.8 -4.7 47 -12.9 -7.8 80 -15.8 -8.1 76 -5.8 -5.5
UK 68 -0.6 -0.1 68 -0.6 -0.1 79 3.5 0.3 57 -0.9 -0.2 86 8.0 0.3 58 -6.0 -0.2
CY 61 -0.1 56 -0.9 104 -1.1 6 0.0 55 5.7 59 -0.1
CZ 72 4.7 8.5 66 3.5 13.3 85 -4.9 13.2 48 8.9 16.8 43 -38.6 -0.8 67 8.7 12.6
EE 63 -0.5 41 -0.2 55 2.8 24 -1.0 22 3.9 55 -0.9
HU 77 5.9 3.1 46 -4.5 3.1 59 1.6 -2.6 37 -4.6 4.7 37 9.1 4.7 73 7.9 2.6
LT PTW 80 1.0 38 1.0 74 3.0 30 0.0 57 5.5 74 1.0
LV PTW 86 -0.6 49 -3.4 77 -19.6 32 0.0 53 -37.5 82 -0.9
MT CSR 62 0.0 62 0.0 69 -0.1 20 -1.3 24 0.9 59 0.2
PL CSR and PTW 79 -1.5 -3.4 56 -4.1 -2.9 63 -3.8 -2.8 38 0.4 -3.0 72 -4.0 -4.1 70 2.5 -3.9
SK 54 -18.7 -0.5 28 -52.2 -0.4 38 -86.6 -0.3 23 -13.2 0.6 27 -93.0 0.7 61 -15.7 0.2
SI 81 -1.6 63 -1.5 83 -2.6 51 -0.6 62 -4.7 72 -2.3
RO 71 -5.6 10.0 30 1.9 -0.3 19 6.4 -0.3
BG 74 -0.9 -2.7 16 -5.6 -4.2 19 -56.9 -4.2
Net replacement rate
Unemployment and 
welfare related 
benefits Single (67% of average wage)
1 earner couple with 2 children 
(average 33-67% of AW)
*Flexicurity related country-specific recommendations (CSR) and points to watch (PTW).
AT, IE, IT, LV, LT, PL, ES have PTW in the area of childcare (e.g. availability of childcare, childcare provision, childcare infrastructure, access to childcare). In case of EL, a broad reference to female participation is made without specifying expected policy 
measures. FI has a PTW that is referring to high structural unemployment; however, no explicit measure to address this issue is specified. 
Unemployment trap (67%) Inactivity trap Low-wage trap indicator
Single (67% of average wage) Single (67% of average wage) 1 earner couple with 2 children (67% of average wage) Single (33-67% of average wage)
 
Source: Commission services, based on the joint EC-OECD METR project; Unemployment trap and NRRs refer to the 1st month of unemployment 
 
Table 4 - Tax wedge on labour for low-wage workers (67% of AW) and its components 
Labour 
taxation
Council's 
recommendat
ion of Spring 
2008*
Personal 
Income Tax
Social 
Security 
Contributions 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Austria 44.0 7.5 13.9 22.6 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0
Belgium CSR 49.5 16.6 10.4 22.5 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 -1.2 -0.8 0.4 -0.7
Bulgaria 31.1 1.5 10.0 19.5 -4.2 -0.9 0.5 -3.8 -4.9 -2.6 3.8 -6.0
Cyprus 11.9 0.0 5.9 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.2 -0.5 0.3 -5.0
Czech rep 40.5 5.3 9.3 25.9 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0
Germany CSR 47.3 13.4 17.3 16.7 -1.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.4
Denmark 39.2 26.6 11.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.3 -1.1 -0.1 -0.1
Greece CSR 36.7 2.3 12.5 21.9 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.3 0.1 0.1
Estonia 38.4 12.4 2.2 25.1 -1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 -0.2 2.2 0.3
Spain 35.5 7.4 4.8 23.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.0 -0.2
Finland 38.2 13.4 5.3 19.6 -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0 -3.2 -2.8 0.2 -0.6
France PTW 44.3 8.6 9.7 26.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -3.2 -0.2 0.1 -3.1
Hungary PTW 45.9 7.4 12.7 25.8 2.7 0.7 2.0 -0.1 -4.9 -6.0 3.4 -2.3
Ireland 15.0 2.9 2.5 9.7 -1.0 -1.1 0.1 0.0 -2.3 -4.5 0.4 1.8
Italy 42.0 10.4 7.0 24.6 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.2 -0.8
Lithuania 43.9 17.8 2.3 23.8 2.9 2.9 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg 31.3 6.8 12.5 12.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.1
Latvia 41.8 15.2 7.3 19.4 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.8 0.1 -1.3
Malta 18.4 4.3 7.0 7.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.1
Netherlands 40.1 4.0 22.3 13.9 -0.4 0.3 -0.7 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.9 -0.1
Poland 41.6 4.2 20.4 17.0 -0.9 0.1 -1.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.0
Portugal 32.5 4.4 8.9 19.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
Romania PTW 42.2 6.0 13.1 23.1 -0.3 0.7 0.2 -1.2 -3.0 0.6 4.1 -7.7
Sweden PTW 43.2 13.5 5.2 24.5 -2.7 -2.7 0.0 0.0 -4.6 -4.3 -0.1 -0.2
Slovenia 39.8 6.7 19.0 14.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 -1.2 -1.5 -0.1 0.4
Slovak rep 35.5 3.8 9.7 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.7 -0.7 0.4 -5.5
UK 30.7 14.2 7.7 8.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.2 0.6 1.0 0.6
*Flexicurity related country-specific recommendations (CSR) and points to watch (PTW).
Difference 2001 - 2007
Single person 
without 
children, 67% 
of AW
Total Tax 
Wedge 2007
Of which Difference 2006 - 2007
 
Source: OECD, Taxing wages report; Commission services 
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Graph 4 - Components of unemployment trap in 2001 and 2007 (1st month of unemployment) 
Source: Commission services. 
* First and second column refer to the METR in 2001 and 2007, respectively.  
Graph 5 - Components of unemployment trap in 2001 and 2007 (1st month of unemployment) 
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Source: Commission services. 
* First and second column refer to the METR in 2001 and 2007, respectively.  
5.4 Implicit tax on returning to work: inactivity traps  
In most countries, jobless persons who are searching for a job but are not eligible to 
unemployment benefits or who have exhausted their period of unemployment benefits 
may receive means-tested social assistance benefits. This can be a typical situation for 
low-income family types where one or both the spouses have never worked or are not 
entitled to unemployment insurance or their eligibility is expired, and thus they only 
qualify for social assistance. 
The METRit are used as indicators of inactivity trap. Table 3 reports estimates of the 
METRit faced by recipients of social assistance when they decide to take up a low-wage 
job (67% of AW). METRs for a move from inactivity to work at different gross wage 
levels are reported in the statistical annex (Table A3). According to the latest available 
data (2007), disincentives to work remain particularly relevant for one-earner couple with 
and without children, that is, the potential breadwinner of a jobless household with two 
young children and for single parents with two children entering employment at the 
lowest level of the income scale, while it is relatively lower for single persons. In the 
case of one-earner couple with two children, even when taking up a job with a wage 
equivalent to 67% of average wage, net disposable income in and out of work would be 
roughly the same (the METRit is close to or higher than 90%) in seven Member States: 
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Cyprus. In these 
countries, there appears to be a higher risk that social assistance recipients remain 
trapped in long-term benefit dependence. In most cases, this risk is even stronger for 
lower levels of entry wage (50% and 33% of APW) and for lower-income single parents 
with two children. 
When comparing 2007 and 2001 indicators (for details see Table 3 in the statistical 
annex), one can notice that several countries registered considerable reductions in the 
inactivity trap. In particular, for a one-earner couple with children with an entry wage 
level equivalent to 67% of APW, the METRit has been reduced by 20% in France, by 8% 
in Sweden, by 7% in Austria, by 6% in Spain and in Finland, by 5% in Czech Republic 
and as much as 87% in the Slovak Republic. The reduction is mainly due to changes in 
the social assistance scheme, followed by the introduction of in-work benefits (Slovak 
Republic and Sweden) and changes in housing benefits (Austria). France, Sweden, 
Finland and Slovak Republic (plus Poland, Denmark and Belgium) achieved also 
significant reductions in METRit for all other family types at different wage levels. 
Targeted reductions in inactivity traps for certain family types were achieved also in 
Hungary (for a two-earner couple with and without children), the UK (for one-earner 
couple), Italy (for two-earner couple with and without children) and Ireland (for two-
earner couple without children and single parents with children). These positive trends 
are confirmed when looking at the recent changes in METRit (2007), where reductions 
have been recorded in particular in France, Latvia and Sweden. A decline in the 
inactivity trap in France and in Latvia was driven by changes in the social assistance 
scheme and in Sweden by the introduction of in-work benefits. 
Graph 6 and Graph 7 present components of METRit for a single parent and two-earner 
couple with children (useful to assess disincentive to work for the second earner) in 2001 
and 2007. The source of the inactivity trap is different for the two family types: while the 
withdrawal of social assistance is driving the METRit for single parent with children, 
taxation tends to be the most important component of METRit for two-earner couple with 
children.  
Graph 6 - Components of inactivity trap in 2001 and 2007 
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Source: Commission services. 
* First and second column refer to the METR in 2001 and 2007, respectively.  
Graph 7 - Components of inactivity trap in 2001 and 2007 
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Source: Commission services. 
* First and second column refer to the METR in 2001 and 2007, respectively.  
5.5 Implicit tax on increasing work effort: low wage traps  
Table 3 also presents two structural indicators for low-wage traps (METRlw) and reports the 
average of METRlw over a larger range of earnings (from 33% to 67% of AW). This average 
can also be used to analyse the financial incentive to move from part-time to full-time work at a 
low wage level. The component that plays the biggest role in creating high implicit tax on 
increasing work effort is the withdrawal of social transfers. In most European countries, the 
various means-tested transfers (mainly social assistance, in-work tax credits and housing 
benefits) are already completely phased-out before people earnings reach 67% of the AW level. 
Thus, the monitoring of the range of income below 67% of AW appears the most relevant for 
assessing the presence of low-wage traps.  
Despite improvements in many countries over the period 2001-2007, most recent data confirm 
that in 2007 the risk of low-wage trap remained somewhat high in a number of countries, 
especially for couples with one earner and two children, mainly due to the withdrawal of social 
assistance (86% in Germany, 110% in Luxembourg, 100% in Finland, 86% in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, 80% in Sweden, but also 78% in the Netherlands). However, for some 
countries data for 2007 indicate a strong decline in the low wage trap for a one-earner couple 
with children, in particular in Latvia (by 38%), Sweden (by 8%), Spain (by 7%), Slovenia 
(5%), Poland and Bulgaria (by 4%). Over 2001-2007, large reductions in low-wage trap were 
achieved in the Slovak Republic (by 93%), Bulgaria (57%), the Czech Republic (by 39%), 
Spain, Austria and Sweden (by about 17%).17 A large cut in the METRlw in the Slovak 
Republic stems from the introduction of a flat tax-rate regime in 2004. 
6 RECENT REFORMS IN TAX AND BENEFIT SYSTEMS18 
This section draws upon information provided by Members of the EPC-LMWG on most recent 
reforms in the field of tax and benefits. Information on tax and benefit reforms recorded for 
2008 also refers to ongoing proposal for reforms of tax and benefit systems contained in draft 
budget laws for 2009 and other major planned reforms reported by Members of the EPC-
LMWG as of end August 2008. This will give a forward-looking view on ongoing reform 
activity. When considered useful, supplementary information was drawn from the LABREF 
database.19 
Increasing work attractiveness in general, and for specific target groups in particular, and 
rebalancing the incentives and protection mechanisms in the labour market appeared to be the 
main objectives of the reform activity conducted during 2008 in the EU27. Flexicurity, which 
had come to the forefront of the European reform agenda in 2007, has been at the centre of the 
policy debate in 2008, and its making-work-pay dimension continued to be a key element of 
national reform activity. Ongoing discussions in a number of countries seem to reveal a growing 
awareness of the need for more integrated strategies, encompassing EPL, life-long learning, tax 
                                                 
17  Reductions in METRslw at least for some family types at low to medium wage levels are also seen in Spain, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Hungary. 
18  This section covers information on reforms up to the end of August 2008. 
19  LABREF is the database of labour market reforms enacted in the EU Member States jointly run by DG 
ECFIN and the EPC. The database can be freely accessed at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8638_en.htm   
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and benefits systems and ALMPs into comprehensive reform packages aimed at smoothing the 
functioning of labour market and better combining security with flexibility. Yet, while the policy 
agenda of many countries presents broad and sometime far-reaching reform programmes, there 
has been only a limited number of concrete reform measures adopted so far. This calls for 
focused and more resolute action in order to ensure the implementation of such reform 
programmes.  
Reducing the tax burden on labour continued to be much used to stimulate both labour demand 
and labour supply. Further but limited effort was also undertaken in 2008 to improve the 
effectiveness of unemployment and welfare-related benefit systems and their capacity to 
contribute to improving the incentive structure of tax and benefits systems. Most interventions 
in the field of unemployment benefits focused on strengthening the eligibility and work 
availability requirements. Very limited or no action was recorded in the field of employment 
protection legislation (EPL), which can have strong interactions with tax and benefits systems 
because of their combined effects (together with other labour market institutions, notably active 
labour market policies) on labour market transitions.   
6.1 Fighting benefit dependency and improving employability  
Reforms efforts continued in 2008 to increase the effectiveness of unemployment and welfare-
related benefit schemes and their capacity to contribute to improving the incentive structure of 
the overall tax and benefit system.  
6.1.1 Unemployment insurance 
Over the last years, substantial reform programmes were initiated in the field of unemployment 
and welfare-related benefits. Policy action involved reducing the level and duration of benefits 
(France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands), strengthening the control mechanisms (Belgium), 
introducing stricter work availability criteria (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain) and 
streamlining the financing for active labour market policies and labour market subsidies with 
income support mechanisms (Germany, Hungary, France). The reform of the unemployment 
benefit system introduced in the Netherlands in 2005 involved a sharp cut in the 
unemployment benefit maximum duration (from five years to 38 months), a new system of 
calculation of the duration of the unemployment benefit on the basis of actual employment 
history and more stringent requirements. A tightening of the reintegration obligations was also 
imposed on benefit recipients. Also in Germany, the merger of the unemployment assistance 
scheme and the social assistance scheme into the Unemployment Benefit II Programme 
involved substantial cuts of unemployment benefits, approximately at the level of social 
assistance, and a standardised and integrated system of provision of welfare benefits and active 
assistance for job seekers at local level. To encourage the long-term unemployed to take a first 
step back to work, a new category of low-paying jobs was introduced to supplement welfare 
benefits, which are offered to the unemployed by the local PES against a small hourly 
compensation, without replacing the jobs offered on the labour market. If a job offer is not 
accepted, beneficiaries may loose or have reduced their social assistance. A renewed 
unemployment benefit scheme was also introduced in France in 2006. The benefit is granted 
for a reduced duration under tightened eligibility conditions and is calculated on the basis of a 
stronger link with the age and contribution history of the concerned person. 
Following the substantial reform programmes initiated over previous years, measures adopted 
in this area were rather marginal in 2008, often dealing with adjustment of previous broader 
interventions. Most reform measures in this field mainly involved a strengthening of eligibility 
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and work availability conditions (e.g. France, Portugal, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Bulgaria, planned in Belgium), but they also concerned the level and duration of benefits (only 
in Latvia), stricter controls (e.g. in Spain), stricter application of sanctions for refusal of 
suitable job offers (e.g. Czech Republic and Bulgaria), and reinforced complementarities with 
ALMPs. Increased investment in lifelong training and measures aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the job search structures were indeed introduced in most countries to underpin 
welfare reforms, notably with a view to better integrate activation policies and employment 
support services in such a way to effectively encourage people back to work.  
Tighter conditions on job acceptance for long-term unemployed were notably introduced in the 
Netherlands, where unemployed persons will now have to accept all job offers including those 
below their education or experience; those accepting a job with lower status or pay will be 
compensated by a wage insurance scheme that is expected to be introduced in 2009. In the UK, 
eligibility criteria have been tightened for lone parents whose youngest child is 12 years or 
older. Also Bulgaria tightened the eligibility criteria and sanctions. In Sweden, as of 2008, the 
unemployment benefits for part-time unemployed will be limited to 75 days, and the waiting 
period increased by two days. Similarly, in Austria a job seeker taking on a part-time work can 
still benefit from a part of the unemployment allowance, on the condition that she/he continues 
looking for a full-time job. Denmark reduced the maximum period for receiving 
supplementing unemployment insurance in 2008 to create a better stimulus to change from 
part-time to full-time employment. Malta launched in 2008 several measures to promote 
employment of individuals that are at the greatest risk to become long term unemployed. 
Furthermore, it established incentives to unemployed to take up temporary employment 
without loosing their eligibility for benefits. The unemployment insurance coverage was 
extended in Lithuania. 
In the Czech Republic, the government plans to shorten unemployment duration and increase 
benefit compensation, combined with stronger support for individual action plans and stricter 
sanctions. Applicants will be free to work as far as their average monthly wage is below 50% 
of the minimum wage. Also Hungary plans to intensify existing job search incentives.  
6.1.2 Means-tested benefits 
Means-tested benefits were the subject of a deep rationalisation effort in France, where the 
President announced in the 2008 the nationwide extension of the Active Solidarity Income 
(RSA) for excluded groups as of 2009. This measure, introduced in 2007 on an experimental 
basis, is aimed at reducing inactivity traps and the number of working poor. It will be 
complemented by reinforced personalised support services for job searching and by the 
introduction of a single subsidized job creation scheme, the so-called contrat unique d'insertion 
(CUI). A means-tested minimum income, amounting to 747 € pre tax per month, is envisaged 
to be implemented in Austria as of 2009 for those people who are impoverished and willing to 
take up or resume work. In both countries availability to work was put as condition for 
eligibility to these new means-tested benefits.  
In Bulgaria, with the introduction of the flat tax income rate, the previous tax reliefs for 
children were removed in 2008. The amount of the monthly child allowance and the average 
income threshold for receiving the allowance were both raised. The maximum duration for 
receiving social assistance benefits for unemployed was also shortened up to 12 months. 
A tightening of eligibility criteria for social assistance is envisaged in the Czech Republic. A 
reform of the social assistance system is also underway in Hungary, aimed at ensuring that all 
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claimants who are able to work are given the opportunity to earn the needed income from work 
and not from social assistance. 
To encourage a spouse to move into employment Denmark introduced "300 hours rule" which 
implies the loss of rights to social security payments for a spouse (in relationship where both 
partners are recipients) who has less than 300 hours of employment within the previous 2 years.  
6.1.3 In-work benefits 
In the area of in-work benefits, the UK introduced in 2008 an additional package of in-work 
support to help single parents, following the extension of existing in-work credits and working 
tax credits over previous years, while Spain launched specific in-work benefits for unemployed 
workers over 52 years in the textile sector. In Belgium, the amount of the allowance "guarantee 
of income", according to which a job seeker taking on a part-time work can still benefit from a 
part of the unemployment allowance, was increased in order to remove remaining job traps. 
6.1.4  Sickness and disability 
Quite extensive reform measures were adopted or planned in a number of countries in the field 
of sickness and disability schemes, aimed at improving working incentives and helping those 
with some working abilities to move into employment. 
The reform of the national sickness insurance system passed in Sweden in the second quarter of 
2008 introduced a new rehabilitation chain and clarifies the relevant benefit rules. At the latest 
after three months of sick leave, an assessment will be made of the ability of the insured person 
to perform work other than his/her normal tasks. At the latest after six months of sick leave an 
assessment will be made of whether the person insured is able to perform any work in the labour 
market. An opportunity is thereby given to the individual to transfer to unemployment insurance 
and receive support in returning to the labour market even if it is not possible to return to his/her 
previous workplace. Normally, those who have a capacity to work in the labour market will 
return to work or become registered jobseekers with the PES within the first 12 months. The 
sickness benefit will remain in place and will only be payable in exceptional cases for a period 
of more than 12 months. If work capacity is still reduced after this period, an ”extended sickness 
benefit” can be granted, for a maximum of 18 months and with a lower level of compensation 
(75% of previous income as compared with 80% in the sickness benefit). Early retirement 
pensions have been restricted to cases where the ability to work has diminished permanently. 
Following the experience of the "new start jobs" from 2007, "well again jobs" were also 
introduced in 2008 for people receiving sickness benefits, rehabilitation benefits, sickness or 
activity compensation for at least one year, involving a twice as high rebate in employer’s social 
security contributions as for the "new start jobs". Also the policy changes passed in Hungary at 
the end of 2007 put an emphasis on rehabilitation. The new disability benefit system that came 
into effect on January 2008 aims to encourage the return to the labour market of new claimants 
who have been assessed as having remaining work capacities. These individuals have to 
participate in a rehabilitation plan designed by the employment office and to accept any job offer 
received through the employment authority during the course of the plan. A transitory 
rehabilitation benefit has replaced the disability pension, and the duration of the rehabilitation 
benefit is commensurate to the length of the rehabilitation process – albeit capped to three years. 
The new rehabilitation system also involves a focus on training. The broad pension reform 
passed in the Czech Republic foresees the implementation of three levels of disability as of 
January 2010, to allow for a better evaluation of the level of disability and support economic 
activity. In the UK, the Incapacity Benefit for new claimants will be replaced, starting from late 
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2008, by a simplified and integrated "Employment and Support Allowance", with clearer rights 
and responsibilities, and will be accompanied by a Work Capability Assessment. A partial 
sickness allowance was introduced in Finland in 2007, to encourage employees to return to 
working life  
In the Netherlands, the government has tabled a reform of the disability benefit scheme for 
young people. Under the new rules, a definitive assessment of earning capabilities will take 
place at age 27 (as opposed to age 18) for those applicants that are deemed to possess at least 
some capacities to work. Young people with disabilities will in principle not receive a welfare 
benefit, but will instead receive extensive support to find and keep jobs, including training and 
counselling by job coaches. People with severe disabilities that rule out a perspective on labour 
market participation will not be affected by the new rules. The new scheme is planned to take 
effect on 1 January 2010 and will apply to new cases only. The introduction of a new formula 
for the calculation of disability pensions, based on a funded pension mechanism is being 
discussed in Poland. It is also envisaged to raise the allowed additional earning limit for 
workers receiving disability pension, in order to reduce the inactivity trap. Between 2009 and 
2011, Cyprus will implement a new system to assess the work abilities of disabled persons 
together with their training and employment needs.  
6.1.5 Family-related schemes 
As already in recent years, also in 2008 a growing number of countries stepped up their efforts 
to facilitate the labour market participation of women, by means of an improved set of 
allowances and policies to reconcile work and family life.  
Austria introduced a new child care benefit allowing parents to choose between three 
withdrawal periods (36, 24 and 18 months) and corresponding monthly grants (€436, €624 and 
€800). In Slovenia, from September 2008 a higher number of families will be exempted from 
paying kindergartens for their second and more children. In Greece, means-tested child-care 
benefits were introduced and the maternity leave prolonged 6 months, with a benefit at the level 
of minimum wage. In the Czech Republic, changes were introduced in the parental leave 
regulations to promote return to work after extended periods of childcare at home.  
In the Netherlands, as of July 2008 female self-employed workers will get a legal right to paid 
pregnancy leave of a minimum of sixteen weeks. The publicly funded self-employed and 
pregnant (ZEZ) benefit is based on previous earnings of the self-employed up to the statutory 
minimum wage. Furthermore, in addition to the universal child allowance, left unchanged, an 
income-tested child benefit was introduced in 2008, to replace the previous child benefit income 
tax credit that did not benefit those low-income households which were exempt from paying 
income taxes. In Latvia, a parent's benefit was introduced in January 2008 to replace the 'child 
raising benefit' for socially insured persons with children below one year of age. The benefit 
amounts to the previous net working wage, with no upper limit, to promote father’s participation 
in family life. In Portugal, a new means-tested parenthood benefit was introduced in 2008 
allowing families earning a per-capita income below 80% of the Social Insertion Income to 
receive social transfers for events such as child birth, adoption and legally protected abortion. 
With a view to reducing child poverty, the universal family benefit was increased in Hungary 
by 4.5 % for every family-type (in families with three or more children, and single parent 
families by 6.1-7.9 %). For the same reason, starting from 2009 the UK will provide a higher 
financial support to families and withdraw the child benefit from the calculation of Housing and 
Council Tax Benefit. 
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6.2 Reviewing the incentives to work embedded in the tax system 
Given the potentially adverse effect of high tax wedges on employment and on labour market 
efficiency, including via their influence on the size of the shadow economy, interventions in the 
field of labour taxation remained a major tool to stimulate both labour demand and labour 
supply over recent years (see Table 4), there including in 2008, which is the focus of this 
section. 
The share of social security contributions was modified in favour of the employer in Bulgaria 
(from 65% to 60% for the employer and up from 35% to 40% for the employee) and in the 
Netherlands in 2008. Spain reduced social security contributions for self-employed workers in 
specific sectors (e.g. the textile) and for employers offering permanent contracts. Social security 
contributions paid by employers and employees were also cut in Germany, Poland and 
Romania. Austria reduced the unemployment insurance contributions paid by employers and 
raised by one year to 57 the age limit for the relief of these contributions. In Belgium, the 'work 
bonus', consisting in a digressive reduction of individual social security contributions, was 
reinforced, in favour of the lowest-income workers. In Slovenia, the decline in the payroll tax 
continued in 2008 and the tax will be completely eliminated in 2009.  
Social security contributions are expected to decline in the Czech Republic. On the opposite 
direction, but starting from a very low tax wedge, the reform package presented in Cyprus in 
2008 envisages seven phased increases in contribution rates on insured income, by 1.3 pp each 
time, every 5 years from 2009, with the aim of ensuring the long-run sustainability of public 
budget. 
In view of the entry into force of the new Labour Code, a general reduction of employers' social 
security contributions on open-ended contracts is planned in Portugal, along with an increase in 
social security contributions paid on fixed-term contracts. Moreover, social security 
contributions paid by employers will be reduced by 50% during 3 years in the case of former 
self-employed workers who are offered a permanent contract. This incentive applies only for 
hires carried out in the 6 months following the entry into force of the new Labour Code. 
Temporary reduction in social security contributions paid by employers was introduced in 
Malta (for self-employment of long-term unemployed above the age of 45 and disabled persons) 
and in Sweden (for new hires of persons receiving sickness or rehabilitation benefit for at least a 
year). Finally, the French government proposed the introduction of a conditionality clause over 
the reduction of social security contributions on low-wages employees in order to ensure that 
companies and sectors fulfil their obligations in terms of pay negotiations. One of the aims of 
the measure is to inject some dynamism to the social partners' negotiations on pay and to keep 
under control and rationalise the evolution of the statutory minimum wage.  
In order to improve the net earnings of low income workers, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland and Malta extended the basic tax-free range of income in 2008. Tax allowances were 
granted in Finland on earned income and on a second house for work purposes, and in Austria 
on commuting and mileage - both to promote labour mobility. Tax allowances were also 
introduced in Belgium (on professional expenses to support R&D), in Lithuania (for parents, 
depending on the number of children) and in Latvia. Denmark introduced (under certain 
conditions) lump-sum tax reduction for 64 years old tax-payers and a basic personal allowance 
for old-age pension recipients who wish to work. The UK increased the personal allowance to 
compensate individuals affected by changes introduced in the number and level of tax brackets 
and Bulgaria came up with a compensation for those workers in the budgetary sector that were 
adversely affected by the newly introduced flat-tax rate (10%) which replaced the previous 
progressive tax scale in 2008.  
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To reduce the tax pressure on the lowest tax brackets, the earned income tax credit was raised in 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, along with tax rebates for the second earner and a 
reduced tax credit for earners in households with children in the latter country. Spain enacted a 
400 Euros tax break in the income tax, while Slovenia introduced a one-off income dependent 
tax relief as a response to relatively high inflation in 2007. The income tax of wage earners was 
reduced in Finland by raising the allowance on earned income and by relaxing the income tax 
scale. 
Estonia reduced the personal income flat tax rate from 22% to 21% in January 2008, while a 
reduction in the flat tax rate from 15% to 12.5% (along with a decline in tax deductions) is 
planned in the Czech Republic for 2009. Lithuania reduced personal income tax rates from 
27% to 24% in 2008 (last phase of the income tax reform launched in 2005), while tax reform 
measures adopted in Greece in 2008 stipulate a reduction of tax rates from 29% to 27% and 
from 39% to 37%. In Denmark, from 2009, the third tax bracket (out of four) will be raised. 
Conversely, the Netherlands slightly increased the tax rate for earnings between € 17,579 and 
€ 31,589, while the tax wedge of low-wage workers was moderately increased in Hungary, as 
a result of the abolition of the supplementary tax refund and the simplification of tax refund. A 
flat tax rate of 10% for the part of the wage linked to productivity or extra hours worked was 
introduced in Italy on an experimental basis from the second half of 2008, applying to private 
sector employees only. 
6.3 Modernising job protection  
Most planned reforms in the field of employment protection legislation (EPL) remained at the 
stage of proposals in 2008.  
In Portugal, the long-lasting debate on the reform of labour relations, started in 2006, reached 
a crucial phase in June 2008 with the agreement between the government and the social 
partners on a series of legislative proposals. The main goals of the reform are to increase the 
adaptability of companies in the field of working time, parental leave and vocational training, 
to reform the legal system governing redundancies, to promote collective contractual 
regulations and finally to combat segmentation and precariousness, by adapting and better 
articulating labour law, social protection and employment policies. This reform was preceded 
in 2007 by the redefinition of the legal framework for temporary work agencies, aimed at 
enforcing the duties and responsibilities of temporary work agencies, increasing the rights and 
guarantees of the workers and at improving the control and supervision of temporary work.  
In France, the agreement on the modernisation of the labour market, signed by the national 
social partners in January 2008 and transposed into Law in June, involved a rather 
comprehensive, but still incomplete reform of labour regulation, including an easing of open-
ended labour contracts with the creation of a conventional firing mechanism, the introduction 
of a new fixed-term contract for the realisation of specific projects with duration between 18 
and 36 months and improved conditions for benefiting from lay-off allowances. In line with a 
ruling based on an ILO convention ratified by France, the CNE (Contrat Nouvelles 
Embauches), which had been introduced in August 2005, was abolished in 2008. Following the 
change in the fiscal regime of overtime work introduced in 2007 (TEPA Law), the possibility 
to convert holidays into pay was also introduced in 2008. In Italy, the new Government 
introduced greater flexibility for the renewal of fixed-term contracts after 36 months of 
duration and reduced the administrative burden for the authorisation of extra worked hours. 
Moreover, Italy’s Ministry of Labour published a Green Paper for consultation, to open a 
debate on welfare system and labour market institutions. To raise employment, the Green Paper 
considers removing legal disincentives to work more important than introducing financial 
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incentives. Moreover, it argues that Social Partners should play a greater role in agreeing 
bilaterally in the funding or provision of social or training services. 
In Slovenia, following an agreement by the social partners at the end of June 2007, the 
dismissal procedure was simplified and the notice period shortened. The most important 
changes in the Employment Relationships Act include greater flexibility of hours worked; 
clearer and more efficient regulation of dismissal; more flexible regulation of working time; 
and incentives for reconciliation of working and family life.  
In Estonia, a proposal to modernise labour law was agreed by the social partners in April 2008. 
The draft regulates for the first time new forms of work such as temporary agency work and 
telework and reduces severance payments and notice periods. Along the lines of the flexicurity 
approach, it also proposes a strengthening of the social security of employees in periods of 
unemployment and the development of vocational training and job counselling system. Labour 
market services and unemployment insurance will be merged into one single body. In Poland, 
proposal were brought forward at the beginning of 2008 to modernise the Labour Code, 
increase the flexibility in the labour market, decrease labour costs and facilitate a work-life 
balance. Labour market policy initiatives included completing the reform of the social 
insurance system and the development of a National Lifelong Learning Strategy.20 
The 2008 Commission "Strategic report on the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs: 
Keeping up the pace of change" shows countries with recommendations (CSRs) and points to 
watch (PTW) in the field of employment protection legislation.21 The table and graphs below 
show the change in the EPL indicators calculated by the OECD between the 2003 and 2006. As 
it is clear from the picture, the regulatory framework of both permanent and temporary 
contracts has recorded only very modest changes over recent years.  
                                                 
20  Source on Poland: EEO, Quarterly Report, April 2008. 
21  For full text concerning flexicurity related country's specific recommendations and points to watch in the 
2008 Commission Report see Annex 1. 
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Table 5 – Employment protection legislation 
                             Index scale of 0-6 from least to most restricitve 
2003 2006 2003 2006
BE 1.7 1.7 2.63 2.63
DK 1.5 1.5 1.38 1.38
DE 2.7 2.7 1.75 1.75
GR CSR 2.4 2.4 3.25 3.25
ES PTW 2.9 2.9 1.75 1.75
FR CSR 2.5 2.5 3.63 3.63
IE 1.6 1.6 0.63 0.63
IT 1.8 1.8 2.13 2.13
LU 2.6 2.6 4.75 4.75
NL 3.1 2.6 1.19 1.19
AT 2.4 2.4 1.50 1.50
PT CSR 4.2 4.2 2.75 2.75
FI 2.2 2.2 1.88 1.88
SE 2.9 2.9 1.63 1.63
UK 1.1 1.1 0.38 0.38
CY
CZ CSR 3.3 3.1 0.50 1.13
EE PTW
HU 1.9 1.9 1.13 1.13
LT
LV
MT
PL 2.2 2.2 1.25 1.75
SK 2.5 2.5 0.38 0.38
SI CSR
RO
BG
Council's 
recommendation of 
Spring 2008*
Job protection Regular employment Temporary employment
 
Source: Commission services, OECD, Going for Growth, 2007 
*Flexicurity related country-specific recommendations (CSR) and points to watch (PTW) 
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Source: OECD, Going for Growth, 2008 Edition
 Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
Index scale of 0-6 from least to most restrictive
A. Restrictiveness of protection legislation on regular employment
B. Restrictiveness of protection legislation on temporary employment
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7 TRENDS IN LABOUR MARKET POLICY EXPENDITURE 
This section illustrates the evolution of public spending on labour market policies since 2000. 
Looking at the distribution of social protection expenditure among passive income support and 
active labour market policies in the various Member States can provide useful insights on 
recent trends in policy strategies in the field of making work pay. The datasets used hereafter 
have been extracted from ESSPROS and the Labour Market Policy (LMP) database22, with the 
former providing complete time series on the overall social protection expenditure up to 2005, 
and the latter providing recent data on total expenditure, passive income support and active 
labour market interventions up to 2006.  
 
In 2006, the countries of the European Union spent on average 1.9% of their GDP on targeted 
LMP interventions. Of the total expenditure on LMP, 57% was devoted to unemployment 
benefits, more than 26% to active labour market programmes and 11% to labour market policy 
services for jobseekers. Training interventions still accounted for more than 41% of the 
expenditure for active labour market programmes, but employment incentives (typically wage-
subsidies or exemptions to employer's social contributions) were increasing in importance 
(24%). 
 
Graph 8 - Public expenditures on LMP, as a % of GDP, 
2006 
 
Graph 9 - The structure of public expenditures on LMP, 
2006 
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Source: Eurostat (LMP database), Commission services. 
* Expenditures on labour market policies (LMP) include expenditures for services provided by public employment services (category 1), active 
interventions (such as training, job rotation/sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-
up incentives - categories 2-7) and passive supports (unemployment benefits and early retirement - categories 8-9).   
 
The majority of EU countries thus devoted the highest share of GDP to passive supports 
(unemployment benefits and early retirement) in 2006, followed by active interventions 
(training, job rotation/sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and 
rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives) and by services provided to 
jobseekers by the public employment agencies. Passive support exceeded 70% of total LMP 
                                                 
22  The Eurostat Labour Market Policy (LMP) database classifies LMP interventions into three main groups: 
services, measures and supports. LM services cover the costs of providing services for jobseekers together 
with all other expenditure of the public employment services (PES) in each country. LMP measures cover 
active interventions to help the unemployed and other disadvantaged groups (training, supported employment 
and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives). LMP supports include out-of-work income 
maintenance and support and early retirement and largely relate to unemployment benefits. 
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expenditure in CY, MY, DE and PT. A few countries spent the highest share of total LMP 
budgets on active interventions (SE, BG and LT) and on services provided to jobseekers 
(notably the UK, thus reflecting the policy approach of this country to help jobseekers through 
active job-search assistance rather than placement in traditional full-time measures). These 
same countries spent less than half of total LMP budgets on passive support, in particular close 
to one-third (BG, UK and LT) and 42% (SE). These large variations of unemployment-related 
expenditure across the EU countries are also reflected in the large variation of total public 
expenditure on LMP.23 
 
An additional insight into the relative importance of passive supports versus active 
interventions across countries can be provided by comparing expenditure per beneficiary of 
passive supports with expenditure per beneficiary of active interventions across the EU. This 
indicator controls for different composition of expenditure per persons wanting to work and 
thus improves the comparability of labour market policy expenditures across countries. 
Available data for old Member States show that Continental and Mediterranean countries (ES, 
IT, LU, AT, PT, NL, FR and DE), except GR, spend relatively more per beneficiary of passive 
supports than per beneficiary of active interventions, while the opposite is the case in Nordic 
and Anglo-Saxon countries (in DK, FI, IE, SE and UK). Among the newly acceded Member 
States, Baltic countries (EE, LV and LT) have the lowest relative expenditures per beneficiary 
of passive supports.  
 
Graph 10 - LMP support (8-9) per beneficiary (8-9) vs. LMP measures (2-7) per (2-7) beneficiary* 
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Source: Eurostat (LMP database), Commission services. 
*The change from 1998 is available for seven countries (DK, DE, IE, FR, NL, FI and SE), from 1999 for GR, ES and UK, from 2000 for IT and 
AT, from 2002 for LU, from 2003 for EE, LV, PT and RO, from 2004 for EU15, BG, BE, CZ, LT and SK, from 2005 for EU 27, PL and SI. No 
change is depicted for CY and MT as the data are available only for 2006. 
 
Apart from the fact that public expenditure on passive support measures exceeded the level of 
spending on active interventions in almost all countries, the structure of labour market policy 
                                                 
23  Note that unemployment-related expenditures (from the ESSPROS database) cannot be directly compared to 
the passive supports (from the LMP database) and to other LMP interventions, thus implying that the graphs 
should be read carefully (in particular the comparison of Graph 11 and Graph 8 as well as Graph 12 and 
Graph 13). In this paper, the ESSPROS database is primarily used to illustrate the development of expenditure 
over time (due to its longer and complete time series), while the LMP database is used to present the 
breakdown of LMP expenditures in terms of passive supports, active interventions and services provided by 
the public employment services.  
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expenditure varied considerably across countries between 2000 and 2005.24 Roughly two 
groups of countries can be identified according to the size of unemployment-related 
expenditure as a % of GDP in 2005. The first group includes both countries that have 
unemployment-related expenditure at above the EU15 average (1.7% of GDP), in particular in 
the range between 1.9% and 3.5% (BE, DK, ES, FI, FR, DE and SE), and countries that have 
unemployment-related expenditure levels below the EU15 average and still above 1% (AT, 
NL, PT, IE, MT, GR and LU). The second group has unemployment-related expenditure levels 
up to 1% of GDP and includes the newly acceded Member States (except MT), IT and the UK. 
Passive support measures accounted for 64% and 52% of all LMP expenditure respectively in 
the first and second group of countries, while services provided by the public employment 
agencies accounted respectively for 8% and 18% of all LMP expenditure. Both groups of 
countries spent about an equal share of LMP budgets on active interventions.  
 
Graph 11 - Unemployment-related expenditures, as a % of GDP, 2000-2005* 
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Source: Eurostat, (ESSPROS), Commission services. 
*Unemployment-related expenditures include cash benefits (full and partial unemployment benefits, early retirement benefit for labour market 
reasons, vocational training allowance, redundancy compensation and other cash benefits) and benefits in kind (mobility and resettlement, 
vocational training and other benefits in kind).  
**database ESSPROS contains data up to 2005.  
 
The period 2000-2005 did not see any convergence in the level of unemployment-related 
expenditure. While newly acceded Member States (except MT) reduced or kept unchanged the 
share of unemployment-related expenditure as a % of GDP, old Member States saw either an 
increase (in particular BE, PT, LU and AT) or a decrease (in particular DK, DE, GR and SE) of 
public spending on unemployment-related benefits. It is particularly difficult to attribute such 
changes to a specific factor as these diverse trends reflect, at least in part, a wide range of 
variables, such as cyclical or structural changes in the functioning of labour markets (as 
reflected in the number of persons who are unemployed or would like to work), or reforms of 
the benefit systems (as reflected in changes in the replacements rates, in the benefits duration, 
entitlement conditions, eligibility criteria, benefits take-up rate or tax structure).25 
                                                 
24  To notice that this variation is also linked to the extent of non-targeted support in come countries, i.e. of 
policies which do not target exclusively unemployed and other groups with difficulties in the labour market 
and that, for this reason, are not included in the coverage of the LMP data collection. 
25  See e.g. European Economy (2005): "The 2005 projections of age-related expenditure (2004-50) for the EU 
Member States: underlying assumptions and projections methodologies". 
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Large differences in the evolution of unemployment-related expenditure across the EU remain 
even once these expenditures are calculated per person wanting to work.26 Graph 12 shows the 
level and evolution of this indicator (as a % of GDP per person employed) over 2000-2005. 
Newly acceded Member States, along with IT and UK, continued to record considerably lower 
unemployment-related expenditure levels per person wanting to work than the remaining old 
Member States (4 and 15% of GDP per person employed on average, respectively). However, 
also old Member States - in particular SE, DE, DK and BE - generally saw a large decline in 
the respective indicator over 2000-2005, reflecting the extensive reform measures taken in this 
period.  
 
Graph 12 - Unemployment-related expenditures per person wanting to work, % of GDP per person employed, 2000-2005* 
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Source: Eurostat, (ESSPROS), Commission services. 
*Unemployment-related expenditures include cash benefits (full and partial unemployment benefits, early retirement benefit for labour market 
reasons, vocational training allowance, redundancy compensation and other cash benefits) and benefits in kind (mobility and resettlement, 
vocational training and other benefits in kind).  
**database ESSPROS contains data up to 2005.  
 
To conclude, a shift of resources from passive to active policies can be observed in a number of 
countries over the period under consideration, in particular in the newly acceded Member 
States. A majority of countries experienced indeed a decline in passive supports in overall LMP 
expenditure per person wanting to work in 2004-2006. In the recently-acceded Member States, 
this decline reflects an increasing importance of active interventions and services to jobseekers. 
In the old Member States, the decline in the level of passive support (per person wanting to 
work) was particularly evident in NL, SE, BE, FR and the UK, and was in some countries 
accompanied also by a fall in the level of expenditure on active interventions per person 
wanting to work (NL, SE and UK).  
                                                 
26 Persons wanting to work include unemployed according to the LFS (Labour Force Survey) and labour 
reserve. Labour reserve is represented by inactive population wanting to work and includes persons that are 
seeking employment but are not LFS unemployed and persons that would like to work, however they are not 
seeking employment for various reasons.   
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Graph 13 - LMP expenditure per person wanting to work, as a % of GDP per person employed, 2004-2006 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
DK LU PTBE NL DE FRSE FI AT IE ES BG LT PL HU CZRO IT SI SK UK LV EE
LMP services LMP active interventions LMP passive support
 
The first column refers to 2004 and the second column to 2006.  
Source: Eurostat (LMP database), Commission services. 
* Expenditures on labour market policies (LMP) include expenditures for services provided by public employment services (category 1), active 
interventions (such as training, job rotation/sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-
up incentives - categories 2-7) and passive supports (unemployment benefits and early retirement - categories 8-9).   
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8 ANNEX 1: FLEXICURITY RELATED COUNTRY'S SPECIFIC 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND POINTS TO WATCH  
  Full text in the Commission's Strategic Report 2008 
Council 
Conclusions 
2008 
AT 
Among the strengths shown by the 2007 Austrian Implementation Report are: good practices 
to boost innovation, such as the innovation voucher; increased budgets for R&D in line with 
the 3% target; the creation of a climate and energy fund; the successful implementation and 
further development of its flexicurity model. Positive points 
AT 
In addition, it will be important for Austria to focus over the period of the National Reform 
Programme on the following challenges: strengthening the fiscal adjustment in order to achieve 
a balanced budget before 2010; increasing competition in services, in particular, in professional 
services; strengthening entrepreneurship education; identifying further emission reduction 
policies and measures; tackling the gender segregation of the labour market, including by further 
improving the availability of childcare. Points to watch 
AT 
Further improve incentives for older workers to continue working by implementing a 
comprehensive strategy including enhanced job-related training, adaptation of working 
conditions and tightening the conditions for early retirement and improve education outcomes 
for vulnerable youth. Recommendation 
BE 
Continue efforts to further reduce the tax burden on labour towards the average of its 
neighbouring countries, especially by reducing the tax wedge on low skilled workers, while 
strengthening fiscal consolidation. Recommendation 
BE 
Reinforce the policy measures to improve the performance of its labour market through a 
comprehensive strategy, in accordance with an integrated flexicurity approach, to enhance 
labour market participation, lower regional disparities and increase participation in lifelong 
learning. Recommendation 
CZ 
Among the strengths shown by the 2007 Czech Republic Implementation Report are the 
coherent strategy to improve the regulatory framework for enterprises, reforms to make work 
pay, reforms of the curricula for primary and secondary education, to increase participation in 
tertiary education and the adoption of the lifelong learning strategy. Positive points 
CZ 
Within an integrated flexicurity approach, further modernise employment protection, including 
legislation; improve the efficiency and equity of education and training, especially its 
responsiveness to labour market needs; provide incentives to invest in training particularly for 
older workers and the low-skilled and increases the diversification of tertiary education supply. Recommendation 
CZ 
In addition, it will be important for the Czech Republic to focus over the period of the National 
Reform Programme on the following challenges: improving the protection of intellectual 
property rights; speeding up progress in the ICT area, including by implementing and 
monitoring a fully enabled legal environment for e-government; improving access to finance for 
innovative companies, in particular through further developing the venture capital market; 
increasing the coverage of entrepreneurship education; better integrating disadvantaged groups 
into the labour market; reducing regional disparities; reconciling work and family life; tackling 
the gender pay gap; and implementing the active ageing strategy. Points to watch 
FI 
It will be important for Finland over the period of the National Reform Programme to focus on 
the following challenges: continue reforms to improve competition and productivity in services, 
and create the necessary leverage to reduce high price levels; implement announced measures to 
reach its Kyoto target; continue reforms to address bottlenecks in the labour market, with a 
particular view to tackling high structural unemployment, especially unemployment of low 
skilled workers, including young people, and taking into account the contribution economic 
migration can make. Points to watch 
DE 
Tackle structural unemployment by maintaining the path of the reforms outlined in the 
National Reform Programme. Focus should be placed on integrating the low skilled into the 
labour market through a flexicurity approach combining better access to qualifications with the 
implementation of the announced comprehensive tax and – benefit reform and more effective 
employment services for unemployed recipients of basic income support. Recommendation 
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DE 
Among the strengths shown by the 2007 German Implementation Report are: the consolidation 
of public finances; the strengthening of high-class research and innovation; the progress in 
tackling youth unemployment and the determined approach to increasing childcare facilities. Positive points 
DE 
Tackle structural unemployment by maintaining the path of the reforms outlined in the 
National Reform Programme. Focus should be placed on integrating the low skilled into the 
labour market through a flexicurity approach combining better access to qualifications with the 
implementation of the announced comprehensive tax and – benefit reform and more effective 
employment services for unemployed recipients of basic income support. Recommendation 
EE 
It will be important for Estonia over the period of the National Reform Programme to focus 
on the following challenges: improving macro-economic stability and containing inflation 
through adequate structural reforms and determined fiscal policy; reinforcing efforts to ensure 
that R&D results are translated into innovative services or products; encouraging closer 
cooperation between universities and enterprises; launching the new immunity and leniency 
programme and strengthening competition enforcement; reinforcing active labour market 
policies and increasing the supply of skilled labour by implementing a comprehensive lifelong 
learning strategy that responds to labour market needs; reducing labour market rigidities by 
urgent progress towards labour law modernisation and by promoting flexible forms of work. Points to watch 
EL 
Amongst the strengths shown by the 2007 Greek Implementation Report are: good progress 
made to consolidate public finances, promoting female employment, implementing internal 
market legislation, and improving the business environment. There are promising signs of 
progress to fix a timetable to implement pension reforms designed to improve long-term fiscal 
sustainability. Positive points 
EL 
In addition, it will be important for Greece over the period of the National Reform Programme 
to focus on the following challenges: contain inflationary pressures and the current account 
deficit; accelerate efforts to set up a research and innovation strategy and increase investment in 
R&D; improve further the transposition of internal market legislation; speed up progress 
towards meeting the SME policy targets set by the 2006 Spring European Council; strengthen 
competition in the area of professional services; protect the environment by prioritising 
effective solid and water waste management and curb greenhouse gas emissions; encourage 
further female participation in employment; reduce early school leaving and put in place a 
coherent active ageing strategy Points to watch 
EL 
Within an integrated flexicurity approach, modernise employment protection including 
legislation, reduce the tax burden on labour, strengthen active labour market policies and 
transform undeclared work into formal employment. Recommendation 
ES 
Among the strengths shown by Spain’s 2007 Implementation Report are: a faster than targeted 
reduction of government debt; good progress on implementation of the R&D and innovation 
plan; and satisfactory progress towards the employment rate objective, in particular for female 
employment. Positive points 
ES 
In addition, it will be important for Spain over the period of the National Reform Programme 
to focus on the following challenges: contain the current account deficit and inflationary 
pressures and monitor developments in the housing market; raising competition in professional 
services and retail markets; improving the regulatory framework; implementing environmental 
measures, in particular to reduce CO2 emissions; further modernise employment protection, 
including legislation, in order to foster flexicurity in the labour market to counter segmentation 
and promote the attractiveness of part-time work; raising productivity by raising skill levels and 
innovation; integrating immigrants into the labour market; further increase of access to 
childcare; and implement pension and healthcare reforms so as to improve long term fiscal 
sustainability. Points to watch 
FR 
It will be important for France over the period of the National Reform Programme to focus on 
the following challenges: further strengthening competition in regulated trades and professions, 
further enhancing better regulation policies by including impact assessments; continuing to 
increase labour supply and making work pay. Points to watch 
FR 
Within an integrated flexicurity approach, improve the efficiency of lifelong learning and 
modernise employment protection, in order notably to combat labour market segmentation 
among contract types, and make it easier to switch between fixed term contracts and permanent 
contracts. Recommendation 
 48
FR 
Among the strengths shown by French 2007 Implementation Report are: the reform of R&D 
and innovation strategies; the concrete results of measures in the area of ICT; the announced, 
comprehensive set of measures to improve the functioning of the labour market, including 
through changes in legislation. Positive points 
HU 
Among the strengths shown by the 2007 Implementation Report are: strong improvements on 
fiscal consolidation, the adoption of various structural reform steps, the shortening of the 
setting-up time for businesses and the efforts to reduce administrative costs, the introduction of 
further incentives to work and to remain on the labour market and the transformation of 
undeclared work into formal employment. Positive points 
HU 
In addition, it will be important for Hungary over the period of the National Reform 
Programme to focus on the following challenges for the future: further reforming the public 
research system, increasing the effectiveness of public R&D expenditure and improving 
linkages between public and private R&D; reducing and redirecting state aids; improving the 
regulatory environment through further reducing administrative burden and legislative 
simplification; introducing further incentives to work and to remain in the labour market; 
ensuring better reconciliation of work and private life; completing the establishment of the 
integrated employment and social services system; transforming undeclared work into formal 
employment and implementing the lifelong learning strategy. Points to watch 
IE 
It will be important for Ireland over the period of the National Reform Programme to focus on 
the following challenges for the future: speeding up progress in formulating concrete measures 
to reform pension arrangements; an intermediate target for R&D investment should be set for 
2010; accelerating progress in increasing labour market participation, including by establishing a 
comprehensive childcare infrastructure; further developing the policy framework for the labour 
market and social integration of migrants and placing a particular emphasis on support to older 
and low-skilled workers. Developments in the housing market, affecting short and medium-
term growth, should be carefully monitored Points to watch 
IT 
In addition, it will be important for Italy to focus over the period of the National Reform 
Programme on the following challenges: increasing R&D investment and efficiency, where 
despite welcome policy developments, further efforts are needed to reach the 2010 target and to 
enhance the efficiency of public spending; increasing efforts to meet the CO2 emission 
reduction targets; improving the quality of regulation by strengthening and fully implementing 
the system of impact assessment, notably for SMEs; implementing plans to improve 
infrastructure; increasing childcare provision with a view to reconciling work and family life and 
fostering labour market participation of women; putting in place a consistent active ageing 
strategy to increase employment of older workers with a view to improving pension adequacy. Points to watch 
IT 
Improve the quality and labour market relevance of education, promote lifelong learning, 
tackles undeclared work and ensures the efficient operation of employment services, within a 
flexicurity approach and with a view to reducing regional disparities. Recommendation 
LV 
It will be important for Latvia over the period of the National Reform Programme to focus on: 
improving further the regulatory environment, notably by means of an explicit better regulation 
policy and improving access to childcare. Points to watch 
LT 
It will be important for Lithuania to focus over the period of the National Reform Programme 
on the following challenges: improving macro-economic stability and containing inflation; 
increasing foreign direct investment; improving the efficiency of regulatory environment with 
particular focus on legislative simplification; improving youth employability; expanding 
entrepreneurship education; increasing the availability of childcare and strengthening 
occupational health and safety. Points to watch 
LU 
Among the strengths shown by the Luxembourg's 2007 Implementation Report are: 
investments to integrate the economy into the international context, efforts to develop an 
extensive simplification policy focussed on business needs, the development of childcare 
infrastructures, reform of professional training and the introduction of new forms of 
employment. Positive points 
MT 
Step up efforts to attract more people into the labour market, particularly women and older 
workers; maintain efforts to tackle undeclared work and take further action on the benefit 
system to make declared work more attractive. Recommendation 
NL 
Among the strengths of the National Reform Programme and its implementation are: the 
efforts to reduce administrative burden and to improve the business climate; the ambitious 
plans in the area of energy and climate change and incentives to improve childcare provision. Positive points 
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PL 
With a view to developing an integrated flexicurity approach, increase the level and efficiency of 
active labour market policy, notably for older persons and groups vulnerable to poverty, review 
benefit systems to improve the incentive to work, put in place the lifelong learning strategy and 
modernise education and training systems in view of labour market needs. Recommendation 
PL 
In addition, it will be important for Poland over the period of the National Reform Programme 
to focus on the following challenges: upgrading transport infrastructure; speeding-up the 
business registration process; ensuring timely implementation of the e-government 
programmes; improve the transposition of internal market legislation; and increasing the 
provision of childcare facilities. Points to watch 
PL 
Among the strengths shown by the 2007 Poland's Implementation report are: the attention paid 
to developing entrepreneurship; initial steps to bring down the tax burden on labour; the 
priority and funding allocated to active labour market measures; and the strong linkage of the 
National Reform Programme priorities with EU funding. Positive points 
PT 
Continue efforts to modernise employment protection, including legislation to reduce the high 
levels of labour market segmentation, within the flexicurity approach. Recommendation 
RO 
Implement an integrated approach to increasing employment, activity rates and productivity 
levels, especially by accelerating reforms of the education system to respond better to labour 
market needs, by reducing early school leaving, by significantly increasing adult participation in 
education and training and by transforming subsistence/semi-subsistence farming into 
sustainable employment. Recommendation 
RO 
The programme's strengths include initiatives aimed at implementing a medium-term 
expenditure framework, reducing non-wage labour costs and reforming research structures. Positive points 
RO 
In addition, it will be important for Romania over the period of the National Reform 
Programme to focus on: taking further measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of public 
finances, in particular with regard to potential risks in terms of adequacy and sustainability of 
pensions; reinforcing measures to tackle fragmentation of the research base whilst ensuring that 
planned increases in public research funding yield effective returns by vigorously implementing 
the national R&D and innovation strategy and by regularly monitoring its results; pursuing a 
more integrated approach to infrastructure development and roll-out of ICT; intensifying 
efforts to tackle undeclared work; improving the effectiveness and geographical scope of public 
employment services, particularly to assist vulnerable groups. Points to watch 
SE 
Among the strengths shown by the 2007 Sweden's Implementation Report are: the action plan 
for regulatory simplification and the commitment to improve the impact assessment system; the 
progress with increasing labour supply and reducing unemployment; the sustainable use of 
energy and the progress made on increasing public investment in R&D. Positive points 
SE 
It will be important for Sweden to take further regulatory measures to increase competition, 
notably in services and to focus on the implementation and impact evaluation of recent reforms 
to increase work incentives; to tackle youth unemployment; to raise the employment rate of 
immigrants and to reintegrate people on sickness-related schemes. Points to watch 
SI 
Within an integrated flexicurity approach, promote more flexible contractual arrangements and 
improve the effectiveness of employment services, particularly in relation to persons with low 
employment prospects, in order to counter labour market segmentation mainly affecting young 
people. Recommendation 
SK 
Among the strengths shown by the 2007 Slovak Implementation Report are: the foreseen 
reduction of the public finance deficit to below 3% of GDP in 2007; the adoption of a number 
of strategy documents in the area of R&D and innovation, energy efficiency and renewably 
energy; the partial implementation of a one-stop-shop for start-up companies; the revision of 
employment legislation; the adoption of the lifelong learning strategy and efforts to revise active 
labour market policies to better comply with labour market developments. Positive points 
9 ANNEX 2: MAIN FEATURES OF RECENT TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS - BASED ON LABREF 
Reforms of welfare-related benefits 
2006 In-work benefits Means-tested, sickness 
and family-related 
benefits 
UB Coverage UB Duration UB Entitlement UB 
Net replacement rate 
Austria Integrating allowances and 
employment projects to support 
people re-entering into the 
labour market. Unemployed 
returnees are supported by 
specially trained consultants at 
all local PES. 
     
Belgium UB recipients and those on 
invalidity benefits can continue 
receiving increased family 
allowances for an increased 
period of two years (instead of 
six months) when finding a new 
job, subject to an income 
ceiling. The eligibility 
conditions for receiving the 
income supplement when going 
back to work are also eased. 
     
Bulgaria Giving persons who start work 
without intermediation of PES 
employment subsidies for 12 
months 
A) Limiting access to monthly 
social benefit for unemployed 
people in working age to 18 
months, after that they are out of 
social assistance for 1 year; B) 1) 
Fixing at 180 BGN the amount of 
the benefit for childrearing up to 
2 years of age of the child. 2) 
Increasing the length of maternity 
leave from 135 to 315 days, 45 of 
which before childbirth. The 
maternity benefit shall correspond 
to 90% of the daily average 
Introducing a 
benefit of maximum 
30 months of 
duration for long-
term unemployed 
under the following 
conditions: have 
been unemployed 
for at least 12 
months; are older 
than 60 for men and 
57 for women and 
have an insurance 
  Setting the minimum amount of 
the UB at 90 BGN and the 
maximum amount at 180 BGN. 
 51
remuneration or of the insurance 
income during the previous 6 
calendar months and cannot 
exceed the average daily net 
remuneration for the period of 
reference and be less than the 
minimum wage. 
career up to 60 
months less than the 
minimum required 
by law; have not 
been granted a 
pension; do not 
practice any labour 
activity.  
Czech 
Republic 
Introducing a job-search bonus 
scheme and strengthening in-
work benefits 
A) Reforming the sickness 
insurance scheme: 1) employers 
(not anymore the state) will pay 
wage compensation for the first 
14 days of sick leave; 2) lowering 
the level of employers' health 
insurance contributions from 
3.3% to 1.4%; 3) Ensuring greater 
proportionality between the level 
of sickness insurance benefits and 
employers' contributions; 4) 
strengthening the protection 
against abuses. B) Doubling the 
one-off grant on the birth of each 
child up to CZK 17.50 and 
introducing a new one-off 
allowance for families with 
children going to the first year of 
primary school. C) Changing the 
definition of subsistence 
minimum so that additional 
members of a household count for 
less than 1 and introducing a new 
'minimum living' for persons in 
working-age. 
    
Estonia     Extending to 3 years the 
requirement of 12 months 
working period during the 
previous two years in 
order to be entitled to UB. 
Additionally, recipients of 
UB will no longer loose 
their employment record 
during the period they 
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claim assistance, so that 
they are incited to take 
short-term or temporary 
work in order to fulfil the 
necessary qualification 
period for insurance 
benefits. 
Finland Keeping the housing allowance 
of long-term unemployed 
returning to work during the 
first three months of 
employment. 
Introducing a voluntary partial 
daily sickness allowance. 
Employees may return to their 
own job on a part-time basis after 
60 days of daily allowance sick 
leave. 
    
France 1) Supplement to wage for 
unemployed persons who 
accept to work for a salary at 
least 15% lower than the daily 
salary which had been used as a 
reference for the UB and who 
are either aged at least 50 or 
have been receiving the UB for 
at least 12 months. 2) 
Unemployed people who accept 
an occasional or reduced job 
(maximum 110 hours per month 
with a wage of up to 70% of 
previous reference salary) can 
continue to receive fully or in 
part the aide au retour à 
l'emploi during a period of 
maximum 15 months. This 
fifteen-month limit does not 
apply to people aged 50 or 
more. 3) Beneficiaries of 
solidarity minimum income 
(RMI) working more than 78 
hours per month are allowed to 
cumulate wage and allowance 
during the first three months of 
work. 
  Reduced duration of the 
reformed UB, which 
following the age and the 
contribution history of the 
concerned person goes 
from a minimum of 7 
months for a person 
having paid contribution 
to the unemployment 
insurance for 6 months 
during the previous 22 
months to a maximum of 
23 months. The maximum 
duration is up to 36 
months for unemployed 
persons aged 50 years or 
more. Special conditions 
apply to unemployed aged 
60 years. It is estimated 
that the tightening of the 
prior insurance period 
will save UNEDIC € 474 
million over a three-year 
period. 
Tightening eligibility 
conditions, especially for 
long-term unemployment. 
The new allocation d'aide 
au retour à l'emploi is 
granted to those 
unemployed persons who: 
1) had been working for 
at least 6 months during 
the last 22 months prior to 
unemployment, 2) are 
actively and regularly 
looking for a job or are 
enrolled in a training 
programme in the 
framework of the projet 
personnalisé d'accès à 
l'emploi and do not refuse 
adequate offers, 3) are 
aged less than 60.  
Calculating the benefit on the 
basis of the previous daily salary 
and varies according to the age 
and contribution history of the 
concerned person. The benefit 
amounts either to 40,4% of the 
daily reference salary (DRS) plus 
a fix amount, or to 57,4% of the 
DRS. It cannot be lower than 
€25.51 per day, nor higher than 
75% of the DRS. 
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Germany  New tax allowances covering the 
cost of child care for all parents. 
Up to the age of 14, two thirds of 
the costs of childcare can be 
deducted from income up to the 
amount of €4,000. 
  Introducing rapid offers 
(unemployed entrants to 
be offered jobs or training 
courses immediately in 
order to test their 
willingness to accept 
work) and sanctions 
(recipients of UB will lose 
60% of their benefits if 
they reject more than two 
jobs offers in a year; this 
will also affect rent 
allowances). 
 
Hungary  Evaluating the eligibility to the 
main social benefits on the base 
of the equivalent family income 
rather than the per capita 
household income. The benefits 
will act as a top up of the family's 
income so that the equivalent 
income would reach the minimum 
pension. Also, eligibility to a 
reduced benefit can be retained, 
during the first six months of re-
entrance into employment, unless 
the employment is temporary. 
    
Ireland A) Introduction of a tapered 
withdrawal rate for Disability 
Allowance and Blind Pension 
recipients who engage in 
employment of a rehabilitative 
nature or self-employment. B) 
Reduction in the qualifying 
period for Jobseeker's benefit 
recipients  to qualify for the 
Back to Work allowance 
programme for the self-
employment and employee 
strands from 3 to 2 and 5 to 2 
years respectively.  
Increasing the upper income limit 
for the one Parent Family 
Payment by 28% to €375 a week.  
   . 
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Italy  Extraordinary plan to set up an 
integrated system of 
kindergartens, so as to reach 
coverage of 33% of national 
territory by 2010. 
 Making permanent the 
longer duration of 
ordinary UB which had 
been introduced on a 
provisional basis in 2005 
only for the year 2006 
(from 6 to 7 months for 
workers aged under 50 
and from 9 to 10 months 
for workers aged 50 or 
more). 
 Making permanent the higher 
levels of ordinary UB introduced 
on a provisional basis in 2005 only 
for the year 2006. The level of the 
ordinary UB is now permanently 
raised from 40% to 50% of 
reference salary for the first 6 
months and is set at 40% during 
the 7th month for workers aged 
less than 50. The level is raised to 
50% of reference wage (from 
40%) for the first 6 months and is 
set at 40% for the following 3 
months and 30% during the 10th 
month for workers aged over 50. 
Latvia  Increase in reference state-support 
income from LTL 155 (€45) to 
LTL 165 (€ 48). The state-support 
income is used in the calculations 
of the size of social benefits/ 
allowance paid to families with 
low earnings. 
    
Lithuania  A) Social assistance is extended 
to all those who are registered at 
the local PES and: 1) are in age 
off pre-retirement (no more 5 
years till retirement pension); 2) 
are senior who graduated school; 
3) have a disability of group III; 
4) are mothers/ fathers raising at 
home a child over 3; 5) had fixed-
term, seasonal, temporary 
contracts of employment; 6) are 
nursing a family member; 7) had 
returned from correctional 
institutions. B) Improving the 
delivery of social services to 
families at risk and families with 
disabled, elderly people or other 
people who need care.  
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Malta  Granting vouchers as a subsidy to 
the surcharge on utility bills to 
low-income families who are on 
social benefits. 
    
NL  Welfare benefits-recipients doing 
voluntary work as a part of a 
reintegration scheme, are allowed 
to receive €1500 annually (€750 
previously)  without no 
consequences for their welfare 
benefits 
 1) Cut in UB 
maximum duration 
from 5 years to 38 
months; 2) 
Determination of 
the duration of the 
UB on the basis of 
actual employment 
history, with one 
month's benefit for 
each year worked 
(after the third 
month of 
unemployment). 
This criterion will 
apply gradually. 
1) More stringent employment-
history requirements: in order to 
be eligible for short-term 3 
months benefits, UB claimants 
must have worked for 26 weeks 
over the last 36 weeks (against 
26 weeks out of the last 39 
before). To claim benefits 
longer than 3 months, claimants 
must have worked for at least 4 
out of the last 5 years.  2) As of 
01-01-2007: Tightening the 
reintegration obligations 
imposed on UB-recipients 
during the first 3 months of 
benefit.  3) As of 01-10-2006: 
Informal in-family healthcare 
workers and voluntary workers 
claiming UB can be exempted 
from job application duty under 
certain conditions. 4) In order to 
receive UB, employees no 
longer have to legally challenge 
the decision of the employer to 
make him/her redundant. 
Increase of first 2 months of UB 
levels: unemployed will receive 
benefits at 75% of the last-earned 
wage for the first two months and 
then 70% for any following 
months (it used to be 70% for the 
whole duration). 
Portugal  Eligibility criteria to social 
allowances will take into account 
household income of the last 
month (or 3 months average if 
variable), instead of 12 months.  
 1) Reinforcing the 
mechanisms to 
promote the 
activation of 
beneficiaries; 2) 
introducing stricter 
rules concerning 
beneficiaries 
obligations and 
clarification of the 
concept of 
“convenient job”; 3) 
changing the 
 Abolishing the increased benefit 
amount previously granted to 
unemployed beneficiaries with 
children and very low incomes. A 
clause now states that the net 
benefit amount cannot be higher 
than the net wage previously 
earned. 
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eligibility 
conditions for 
access to 
unemployment 
insurance, to 470 
days of 
contributions in the 
previous 2 years; 4) 
Strengthening the 
link between PES 
and social security. 
Romania      Redundant workers receive an 
amount representing the net 
average wage (registered in 
January in the year of laying-off), 
UB and an additional monthly 
income depending on the working 
stage of each person. 
Slovak 
Republic 
 Increase of allowance for the first 
born child from SK 11000 to SK 
15460 
  Those employed for a short-
term period can receive UB for 
4 months, if they have been 
insured against unemployment 
for at least 2 years within the 
last 4 years. Also possible to 
receive UB for 6 months, if 
insured for at least 3 years 
within the last 4 years. 
.  
 
Spain  Establishing on a permanent basis 
the active integration income 
scheme (it was previously 
regulated on an annual basis); 
access to this scheme becomes a 
subjective right for those 
fulfilling the requirements 
(previously conditional on the 
existence of budget resources). 
Social security contributions will 
be paid by the PES on behalf of 
the beneficiaries. The scheme is 
targeted to unemployed workers 
with special economic needs and 
Extending the 
contributory UB to 
the following 
groups: unemployed 
over 45 years 
without family 
responsibilities; 
temporary hiring by 
co-operatives; 
workers with 
permanent contracts 
with zero hours 
worked due to 
reduction of 
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difficulties in finding a job. It 
provides an income and requires 
participation in actions aimed at 
increasing employability. 
production for 
cyclical reasons. 
Temporary workers 
can now also benefit 
from the Wages 
Guarantee Fund. 
Sweden Introducing an annual in-work tax 
credit of SEK 5.000 – 11.000 
depending on the municipal tax 
rate, with the purpose of making 
work economically more 
rewarding relative to 
unemployment or inactivity. For 
those aged 65 or more, a higher 
credit worth SEK 13 000-18 000 
is granted. 
1) Lowering the ceiling in the 
sickness insurance system. 2) 
Abolishing the responsibility of 
employers for co-financing 
sickness benefit costs for 
employees who are on full-time 
sick leave. 
 Shorter benefit 
duration – 
maximum of 300 
days, except for 
those with 
dependent children 
who will be able to 
claim UB for 450 
days. When the 
benefit period ends, 
the person will be 
transferred to a job 
and development 
guarantee with a 
gross replacement 
rate of 65%. 
Requiring longer work tenure to 
qualify for the benefits. Studies 
will no longer qualify for 
benefits 
Fixing the maximum UB level at 
SEK 680 a-day (before the 
maximum was SEK 730 a-day 
during the first 100 days and 680 
afterwards). The gross 
replacement rate will decline 
from 80% to 70% after the first 
200 days. The basis for 
calculation of the level of UB 
passed from the last 6 months’ 
income to the last 12 months. 
When the benefit period ends, the 
person will be transferred to a job 
and development guarantee 
scheme with a gross replacement 
rate of 65%.  
 
2007 In-work benefits Means-tested and 
family-related 
benefits; sickness 
schemes 
UB Coverage UB Duration UB Entitlement UB 
Net replacement rate 
Austria  Making the childcare benefit 
scheme more flexible in terms 
of benefit payments and period 
of benefit eligibility, with the 
introduction of three options: in 
addition to the current option of 
receiving monthly payments of 
€ 436 for a period of 30 months 
one may opt for payments of 
€800 or €624 for a period of 15 
or 20 months respectively.  The 
maximum amount of additional 
Extending social insurance 
coverage to self-employed, in 
particular those that are 
considered 'economically 
dependent'. Self-employed 
people working under the 
same conditions as employees 
will be obligatory covered by 
unemployment insurance or, 
like genuine self-employed 
people, may opt for this 
scheme on a voluntary basis. 
 Maximum commuting time is 
set at 2 hours per day. 
Minimum working time has 
increased from 16 to 20 hours. 
Sanctions for undeclared work 
by unemployed are tightened. 
It will be obligatory for 
unemployed persons to accept 
job offers from external 
partners of the PES and it will 
be possible to place them in 
jobs in socio-economic 
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earnings on top of the childcare 
benefit payments has been 
increased from €14,60 to € 
16,200 annually. 
enterprises. 
Cyprus  Improving support for single-
parent families, individuals 
undergoing detoxification, 
people with sight impairment 
and other people with 
disabilities. Additional student 
subsidy for families with three 
children and extension of the 
existing annual subsidy beyond 
the minimum regular period 
required to complete a 
programme. 
    
Czech 
Republic 
 1) Expanding child tax credits 
(bonuses deducted from tax, not 
from tax base); 2) Lowering the 
income eligibility threshold for 
child benefits. 
  Lowering welfare support for 
inactive long-term unemployed 
people. 
 
Estonia  1) Investing 1.4 billion kroons 
(EUR 0.09 billion) in the 
creation of new childcare places 
and increasing the wages of the 
teachers in kindergartens over 
2008-2012. The state will 
support investments by local 
municipalities aimed at building 
up childcare facilities, 
renovating the existing ones and 
increasing the wages of teachers 
in kindergartens. 2) Fathers will 
have the right to receive family 
benefits when the child is 70 
days old instead of the current 6 
months requirements. 
    
France Introduction of an Active 
Solidarity Income 
(Revenu de solidarité 
active, RSA) on a trial 
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basis in 25 ‘departments’ 
or geographic districts. 
The RSA is designed to 
prevent those on social 
benefits earning less when 
they return to 
employment. 
Germany  Introduction of a tax free 
Parental Allowance on top of 
existing child-care allowances 
or other benefit. Parents who 
work no longer than an average 
of 30 hours a week during the 
first 14 months of their child's 
life receive a parental allowance 
amounting to 67% of the labour 
income earned one year before 
the birth (at least €300, at most 
€1,800), also if the parents did 
not work prior to the birth. In 
the case of incomes below 
€1,000/month the allowance is 
between 67% and 100% of the 
labour income earned one year 
before the birth. Parents receive 
the allowance for 12 months 
only; exceptions for single 
parent families. 
    
Greece  Setting up a National Social 
Cohesion Fund (ETAKS) 
providing targeted assistance. 
The Fund is expected to operate 
a variety of integrated income 
support programmes, including 
subsidies for the purchase of 
heating oil by households below 
the poverty line, so as to n view 
to improve the cost-
effectiveness of the national 
income support for the weakest 
groups of population. 
Setting up a Special Fund for 
Social Solidarity (ETKA) to 
provide increased incomes 
and social protection to long-
term unemployed people aged 
over 50, previously working 
in sectors or regions facing 
decline and confronted with 
the danger of social 
exclusion. Beneficiaries must 
meet the following two 
conditions: be insured with 
the Social Insurance 
Foundation-Unified Insurance 
 Introducing new work 
availability conditions and 
sanctions for UB recipients: the 
refusal of suitable work or to 
participate in employment 
programme will imply an 
automatic full benefit stop. In 
order for the sanctions to apply, 
the benefit recipient must refuse 
offers twice, while the distance 
from the job may not be in 
excess of 30km. 
Increasing UB from €311 to 
€404, along with the scheduled 
yearly benefits indexation. 
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Fund for Employees (IKA-
ETAM); and have at least 
7,500 days of insurance 
contributions. The new fund 
finances income support 
measures for the unemployed 
participating in (re)training 
activities. The support granted 
to workers consists of either 
80% of pay at the time the 
employment relationship is 
terminated or a sum of up to € 
900 for people taking part in 
training and retraining 
programmes.  
Hungary 1) Introducing the 
possibility to cross over 
from assistance to public 
work: if a local authority 
employs the recipient of 
assistance, it may draw 
the amount of benefit 
from the state budget and 
convert it into wages; 2) 
people in public work 
may receive the 
difference between their 
wage and previous 
assistance, if the latter is 
lower. 
1) Fixing the maximum amount 
of total regular social benefit 
granted to one family at the 
level of the net minimum wage; 
2) strengthening the child 
poverty reduction effects of the 
universal family benefit. The 
benefit was raised in every 
family-type by 4,5 %; in the 
case of family types with the 
highest poverty risk (families 
with three or more children and 
single parent families) it was 
the raised by 6,1-7,9 %. 
    
Latvia  Introducing a new parent's 
benefit, replacing the 'child 
raising benefit' for socially 
insured persons with children 
below one year of age. The 
mother or father of a newborn 
baby will receive a benefit 
amounting to 70% of the 
previous wage. The minimum 
payment is LVL 50 per month, 
with no upper limit.  
 Making the UB 
duration depend on 
volume and duration 
of social insurance 
contribution: for 1-9 
years of contributions, 
the UB will be 4 
months, for 10-20 
years – 6 months, 
over 20 – 9 months. 
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Lithuania   Extending the unemployment 
insurance coverage. All 
persons getting 
compensations for specific 
working conditions would get 
unemployment insurance 
benefit. 
  Modifying the way the maximum 
unemployment insurance benefit 
is calculated to take account of 
the state support income  
Luxembo
urg 
 Introduction of a child bonus of 
€ 922.50 per year for tax-
exempt households. 
    
Malta  Reforming the Children’s 
Allowance benefit scheme: 
entitling every child below the 
age of 16 to at least €250 every 
year, regardless of parental 
income. 
    
Netherlan
ds 
 Giving single parents on 
minimum wage an income-
based child tax credit which 
will be converted into an extra 
allowance payable from the 
‘parents’ budget’. This is 
expected to increase the 
incentive to accept work for 
single parents and single-
income households with 
children who are claiming 
social assistance benefit. Lone 
parents on welfare with children 
up to the age of 5 no longer 
need to search for work but will 
be compelled to participate in 
education. 
    
Portugal  Abolition of the clause that 
allowed for an increased 
amount of family benefits to be 
given to beneficiaries of UB 
with children and very low 
income, which was conditional 
to the unemployed situation. 
1) Defining more accurately 
non-voluntary unemployment, 
in order to determine the right 
to UB. Unemployment is non-
voluntary when the employer 
terminates the employment 
contract. Exceptions: a 
Making the length of 
the benefit depend not 
only on the 
beneficiary’s age, but 
also on the period of 
time s/he has 
contributed to the 
1) Clarification of the concept 
of “convenient job”, which now 
refers to job offers that cannot 
be refused by UB recipients. If 
the unemployed refuse a job 
offer which is compatible with 
the worker’s capacities and 
The amount of the benefit cannot 
any more be higher than the net 
value of the previous earned 
income. The daily amount of UB 
is based on 65% of the 
unemployed person’s gross 
monthly wage, calculated on the 
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dismissal based on ‘fair 
reason’ (justa causa) invoked 
by the employer; expiration of 
a contract based on ‘fair 
reason’ invoked by the 
employee; expiration of a 
contract without the provision 
of pension entitlements. 
Unemployment is also 
considered non-voluntary 
when the contract ends by 
mutual agreement between 
the employer and the worker 
in the case of company 
restructuring, or when 
companies are faced with 
financial difficulties. 
Collective dismissals also fall 
into the category of non-
voluntary unemployment. 2) 
In case of restructuring, 
restricting the number of 
workers in each company 
who are entitled to UB when 
the employment contract ends 
by mutual agreement, 
depending on the company’s 
size: in companies with less 
than 250 workers, a 
maximum of 25% of the 
workforce are entitled to 
receive UB up to 3 years 
following dismissal; in 
companies with more than 
250 workers, up to 20% of the 
workforce with a limit of 80 
workers are entitled to UB. 
social security system. 
Different age brackets 
are to be considered: 
unemployed younger 
than 30 years who 
have worked for less 
than 2 years are 
entitled to 9 months’ 
UB. For those who 
have worked more 
than 2 years, the 
entitlement can be up 
to 360 days, plus an 
extra 30 days per five 
years worked. 
Unemployed persons 
who are older than 45 
years are entitled to 
up to 2 years of UB 
where they have 
worked 6 years, or up 
to 900 days if they 
have worked for more 
than 6 years; they are 
entitled to extra 30 
days for each five-
year period of social 
security contributions 
made. 
skills, and which meet certain 
wage conditions, they risk 
losing their UB; 2)  New 
criteria for awarding UB: only 
those who have worked at least 
450 days in the two years 
preceding unemployment are 
entitled to receive UB. 
basis of a 30-day month. 
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Romania  1) Allowing widowers in 
receipt of a public pension 
below the threshold of RON 
364 (EUR 100) to receive a 
state-budget financed benefit 
equal to 25% of the deceased 
spouse’s pension; 2) 
Introducing a universal, fixed 
amount benefit of RON 700 
(EUR 206) for the newly 
married couples, provided it is 
their first wedding. 
    
Slovakia  1) Increase of social allowances 
for single-parent families. 2) 
Parental benefits until the 
children are three years old 
have also increased. 3) A 
monthly bonus on top of child 
benefits will be provided to 
pensioners taking care of 
children. 
    
Spain  1) One-off allowance for child 
birth or adoption; 2) Creation of 
around 50,000 new places in 
public nursery schools. 
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Sweden  Implementing a 'rehabilitation 
chain' with fixed points during 
sick leave for reviewing a 
person's capacity to work, to 
facilitate the re-entry into the 
labour market of people on 
long-term sickness. Introduction 
of a rehabilitation guarantee 
improvement of occupational 
health services. Employers can 
deduct double employer's social 
security contributions when 
they employ people who have 
been receiving sickness benefit, 
rehabilitation cash benefit or 
sickness or activity 
compensation for at least a year 
("Well Again Jobs" measure).  
  Introduction of a further two 
qualifying days for receiving 
UB, reduction of income 
replacement rates and 
shortening of benefit duration. 
Part-time workers will receive 
UB for a maximum of 75 days, 
as opposed to the previous 
maximum of 300 days. Single 
parents will still be 
compensated over an extended 
period of more than 75 days 
through the ‘job and 
development guarantee’.  Under 
the previous system, after 300 
days, the unemployed person 
could choose to continue 
working part-time without 
receiving UB or to resign from 
part-time work and, if the 
necessary conditions were met, 
obtain compensation based on 
the income received from part-
time work. 
 
UK 1) Extending the In-
Work Credit for lone 
parents. A £40 benefit is 
paid to lone parents for 
the first 6 weeks of work 
to ease the transition 
from benefits back into 
employment. In London, 
the payment will be £60. 
Where training is 
required, a budget is 
available for the first 
year. Lone parents are 
also guaranteed job 
interviews if they take 
steps to find work, 
including participating in 
sessions with employers 
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that will help them 
develop the skills 
required to find a job. 2) 
Changes in Income 
Support, to encourage 
lone parents to actively 
seek employment. 
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Reforms of labour taxation 
2006 Employees' 
SSC 
Employers' SSC Income taxation 
Belgium  Introducing a special SSC on certain complementary allowances in the framework 
of the execution of the Solidarity Pact between Generations. 
1) Increasing deductible lump-sum expenses from personal 
income tax. Increasing the first bracket of these expenses 1.1% 
in 2006. Another increase of 1.1% has been introduced in 2007. 
As a result, the worker receives higher net earnings. 2) Raising 
the rate of the partly exemption from payment of withholding 
tax on premiums for shift and night work from 5.63% to 10.7%. 
Bulgaria  Changing the distribution of SSC to 60% for the employer and 40% for the 
employee. The level of contributions for employers will thus be of 20.65% and 
13% for the employee. 
1) Increasing the tax-free allowance to BGN 200 (from BGN 
180 in 2006); 2) Increasing the deductible income from the 
taxable income by BGN 60 for one child (up to BGN 420), 
BGN 60 for two children (up to BGN 840) and BGN 120 (up to 
BGN 1260) for three or more children. 
Cyprus  SSC relief for employers employing persons with disabilities.  
Estonia   Doubling the minimum monthly rate for self-employed people 
from January 2007. This follows a previous increase in January 
2006. Another increase is planned for 2008. In 2007 self-
employed people will have to pay at least 905EEK (€58) per 
month and this will increase to almost 1300 (€81) in 2008. 
Finland   Further reductions in taxation supporting the income 
agreement. Reduction of taxation on earned income by an 
annual amount of €840 and inflation adjustment of 2% made in 
the central government income tax scale. 
Hungary 1) Employees' 
contributions increase 
by 2,5%; 2) 
introducing a 
minimum SSC of 
HUF 125,000 
(131,000 from 2007) 
for self-employed 
Employers may claim a 50% reduction on SSC for particular groups of employees 
(long-term unemployed, persons returning back from child care, low-skilled and 
older workers). 
Increase in income tax for those with earnings above HUF 6 
million (€ 21,000) creating a new income tax threshold of 40%. 
Ireland 1) Increasing the 
threshold for the 
payment of the 2% 
health levy;  
 1) Increasing the employee credit and the personal credit to 
ensure that the minimum wage remains outside the tax net; 2) 
Increasing the standard rate band to ensure that the average 
wage is not liable to tax at the higher rate. 
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2) increasing the 
employee entry point 
to PRSI to ensure that 
minimum wage 
earners are fully 
exempt from PRSI, 
thus keeping 100% of 
earnings. 
Italy Increasing the level of 
SSC up to 23% for 
those working as 
bogus self-employed 
who have no other 
forms of coverage and 
are not retirees; fixing 
at a higher 16% the 
level of SSC for all 
other economically 
dependent workers. 
A. New employers' social security cuts for each new employee hired - either full-
time or part-time - on an open-ended basis, in the form of: 1) a deduction of € 
5,000 per worker and per year (€ 10,000 in the South of Italy); 2) employers' social 
security deductions per newly hired worker with an open-ended contract, equal to 
50% of total taxable amount in the first half of 2007 and to 100% of total taxable 
amount from July 2007; 3) cuts in the fees linked to apprenticeships, to vocational 
training contracts and to hiring people with disabilities; 4) state support to paying 
employer's SSC for workers whose contract has been transformed from bogus self-
employment to standard work contract. B. Fixing at 10% the employer's SSC for 
apprentices and for companies employing less than 10 people, varying with the 
length of employment contracts. 
1) Reduction of the tax wedge by five percentage points on 
average, 3% of which will benefit enterprises and 2% will 
benefit workers; 2) new income tax rates, along with new 
deductions and provisions for families. 
Latvia   Increase in the tax free allowance threshold from €45 to €57 
per month, and in the tax relief for dependent persons from €3 
to €40 per month. The new tax free allowance threshold 
equates 15% of the current gross monthly average wage (€382) 
and 44% of the minimum wage (€128). Gradual increase of the 
tax relief for special social groups, targeted to disabled persons, 
politically repressed persons and the members of national 
resistance movement to ensure that increase of the applicable 
tax relieves is in line with the gradual increase of the basic 
income tax allowance. (1) The increase tax relief for disable 
persons is of: 1) LVL 720 per annum (LVL 60 per month) for 
disable persons (I and II invalidity group); 2) LVL 564 per 
annum (LVL 47 per month for disable persons (III invalidity 
group); (3) LVL 720 per annum (LVL 60 per month) for 
politically repressed persons and the members of national 
resistance movement. 
Lithuania   Increasing the basic tax-exempt amount of income from 290 
LTL (€ 84) to 320 LTL (€ 92.6). Extending the individual tax-
exempt amount of income (when calculating taxable income 
either the basic tax-exempt amount of income or an individual 
tax-exempt amount of income is applied) to further 5 categories 
of individuals (e.g. individuals with 3 or more children).   
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Luxembourg  Reduction of employer's SSC in case of hiring job seekers.  
Malta   1) Introduction of a tax credit of € 1.600 for 2 consecutive 
years for women who return to work after being absent for 5 
years. 2) Tax deductions in respect to childcare facilities. 3) 
Extension of lower tax on part-time work to spouses working 
only part-time where their spouse is in full-time employment.  
4) Possibility for spouses in the family business to register as 
an employee with the business. 
Romania  Reducing employer’s SSC by 1.5 percentage points as of 12/2008; reducing the 
employer’s contribution for unemployment by 1% beginning with January 2008 
and further diminishing it with 0.5 percentage points beginning with 12/2008. 
 
Slovenia   Replacement of the previous 5 tax rates (from 16% to 50%) on 
personal income tax by 3 tax rates (from 16% to 41%) 
Spain  1) 0.25% reduction of the employer's contribution to UB for permanent contracts 
starting July 2006 and another 0.25% reduction starting July 2008. 2)  1% 
reduction for temporary contracts through temporary agencies, from July 2006. 3) 
Additional 0.2% reduction for all contracts, starting July 2006. 4) Halving the 
employer's contribution to the Wages Guarantee Fund which ensures payment of a 
minimum level of socially acceptable wages and compensation to workers made 
redundant by enterprises in a state of crisis or considered to be insolvent. 5) The 
Employment Promotion Plan, establishing rebates for permanent hires from the 
groups with the greatest difficulties in joining the labour market, is extended to 
other typologies of employment (unemployed male aged 16 to 30; female hired 
after 5 years of inactivity) and the length of deductions increased from 2 to 4 years. 
Proportional rebates on employer’s SSC are replaced by a flat rebate amount in 
order to boost permanent hiring of lower-wage workers; 6) Further rebates in the 
employer's SSC for permanent hires, as follows: a) 0.25% reduction in the 
employer's contribution to UB for permanent contracts starting July 2006 and 
another 0.25% reduction starting July 2008; b) 0.2% reduction in the employer's 
contribution to the Wages Guarantee Fund which ensures payment of a minimum 
level of socially acceptable wages and compensation to workers made redundant 
by enterprises in a state of crisis or considered to be insolvent. 7)  Extraordinary 
Conversion Plan for fixed-term contracts that are converted into permanent ones 
before 31-12-2006. 1) Existing social security rebates for persons over 60 on 
permanent contracts who have been working for the employer for at least 5 years 
are extended to workers aged 55 to 59 employed in the textile sector; 2) Specific 
rebates for permanent hires, additional to the ones included in the Job Creation 
Programme, are established for unemployed workers affected by layoffs in the 
textile sector. Employers’ from any sector can benefit from those rebates. 
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Sweden  1) Employers' SSC abolished for people who have been receiving social welfare 
allowances for more than one year (new start jobs). 
A special wage tax for persons aged over 65 and born after 
1937 has been abolished. 
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2007 Employees' SSC Employers' SSC Income taxation 
Belgium  Changes in the tax reduction foreseen for the 
employment of workers aged 50 and over, in the form of 
greater time limits given to the employer to register with 
the PES. Increase in the bonus paid to employees from 
EUR 172.31 to EUR 175.76 per month. 
 
Bulgaria Increasing the insurance thresholds, i.e. 
the average minimum income on the basis 
of which social insurance contributions 
are calculated, for 50 of the 73 economic 
activities by between 27% and 44%. The 
increase in the minimum social security 
threshold is most significant for highly-
skilled workers. For low-skilled 
employees, the insurance threshold is 
close to the minimum wage rate. 
1) 3% reduction in SSC, along with the 6% reduction 
already introduced at the beginning of 2006; 2) more 
stringent controls and increased penalties for employers 
who violate the law; 3) change in the proportion of SSC 
paid by the employer and ensured persons in favour of 
the employer  - from a ratio of 65:35 to 60:40 
Rise in non-taxable monthly income from BGN 180 (€43) to BGN 
200 (€102).  
Czech 
Republic 
Working pensioners continue to pay 
health and SSC. 
 1) Introduction of an unusual flat personal income tax rate (applied to 
the so-called ‘super gross wage’, including employer contributions); 
2) Abolishing joint taxation of married couples and allowing parents 
to choose different combinations of entitlement, length and benefit 
level for parental allowances (but keeping the quantitatively more 
important spouse tax deduction); 3) Introduction of tax credits for 
retirees. Working pensioners will receive the same tax credit 
(deducted from tax, not tax base) as anyone else (namely 24,840 
CZK per year). In 2007, a working pensioner had no tax credit at all.  
Denmark   Continued tax freeze combined with 10 billion Dkr. tax reduction in 
2004 and 9,5 billion Dkr. tax reduction in 2010. Aim of the measure 
is to ensure that no tax will increase and to reduce taxes when fiscal 
scope is available in order to increase incentive to work. Lower taxes 
on income are accompanied by higher taxes on households' energy 
consumption. 
Estonia   Increasing the monthly base rate for social tax. The number people 
for whom the state pays social tax based on their remunerations will 
be expanded. 
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Finland  Extending the experiment to reduce SSC to Eastern and 
Northern Finland involving a 30% reduction in labour 
costs during the first year and 15% in the second year. 
Over 100 new municipalities will participate in the 
experiment. 
 
France   Introducing tax cuts to promote work and jobs: 1) reducing the ‘tax 
shield’, which sets a maximum income tax rate, from 60% to 50%; 2) 
students’ earnings will not be taxed up to the equivalent of three 
times the national minimum wage; 3) creating a tax credit on 
mortgage interest for the purchase of an individual’s main residence, 
amounting to 40% in the first year and 20% for each of the four 
following years. In this regard, a ceiling of €3,750 has been set for 
single people and €7,500 for couples. 
Germany Reduction of unemployment insurance 
contributions (from 2.1% to 1.65%) for 
both employers and employees. 
  
Greece   Extension of the tax-free range of income for wage-earners by €1000 
to €12.000 and abolition of tax stamp (previously 3.6% on house rent 
amount). Gradual reduction of labour income taxes, so that the 
middle-income earners will end up paying a tax rate of 25%. 
Hungary Reducing SSC (by 15% and 7%) for 2 
years for mothers going back to work 
from child subsidies. Mothers receiving 
child subsidies will be allowed to work.  
  
Latvia   Raising the untaxed income threshold from LVL 50 to 80 (€71 to 
114), in line with rise of minimum wage; raising the tax allowance 
for a dependant from LVL 35 to 56 (€ 50 to 80). Introducing a sliding 
scale of reliefs for a variety charges and payments such as transport 
or housing, and in the long term (2011) a guaranteed minimum 
consumption threshold. 
Lithuania   1) Extending the tax-free range of income; 2) reducing the personal 
income tax rates from 27% to 24% as of 2008 (last phase of the 
income tax reform launched in 2005) 
Netherlands Reducing the unemployment contribution 
for employees from 3.85% to 3.5% in 
2008. In 2009 the contribution will be 
reduced to 0%. 
 The Income-Based Supplementary Combination Tax Credit aimed at 
lowering the marginal tax rate of the partner with the lowest level of 
income (often women) and to stimulate labour participation 
(especially of married women) and labour tax credit will be raised in 
2008 and tax credits for working people will be dependent on 
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individual income.  The individual transferable tax reduction will be 
abolished over a 15 year-period. 
Poland   Introduction of tax exemptions for families as a component of family 
policy laws package. 
Portugal  5.9% increase in SSC for 2008 Continuing the gradual convergence of pension income taxation to 
labour income taxation began in 2006, through a cut in the deduction 
of pension income for tax purposes (an amount that is deducted from 
the annual income, both for pension income and labour income. This 
amount is bigger in the case of pension income, which implies an 
average tax rate for pension income lower than for labour income). 
This convergence can contribute to decrease incentives to retirement 
and therefore disincentives to work. 
Slovenia   Replacing the 5 tax rates from 16-50% with a 3 tax rates from 16-
41%, thus reducing the progressiveness of the tax system. 
Sweden  'New start job' initiative involving a reduction in the 
payroll tax for employers who hire an unemployed 
person. Persons that have been unemployed or on sick-
leave benefits for one year or more (6 months for young 
people) are eligible. An employer hiring an eligible 
person is credited between 50% and 200% of the 
employers SSC (32% at present), depending on the 
characteristics of the persons hired. 
Introducing an income tax deduction implying an average tax rate 
reduction for labour income by 1.5%. 
 
Source: European Commission, LABREF (DG ECFIN) -  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/labref/
STATISTICAL ANNEX: POLICY INDICATORS DESCRIBING FINANCIAL 
INCENTIVES TO WORK 
Table A1 - Unemployment trap (1st month of unemployment) 
Marginal effective tax rate for an unemployed person 
(previous work= 67% of the APW wage level) returning to work at (2007)
Family Type % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP
50% 90 106 83 69 97 79 97 81 107 93 75 101 88 99 78 80 80 76 89 97 104 74 95 63 96 85 90
67% 83 90 74 59 82 60 78 72 88 81 68 82 75 82 68 61 72 63 77 80 86 62 79 54 81 71 73
100% 74 77 68 53 64 51 62 61 73 69 60 66 64 66 56 45 62 50 72 63 68 54 64 46 67 57 57
150% 69 73 63 46 54 48 56 56 65 62 56 57 59 61 49 39 53 41 66 52 56 51 53 47 59 51 48
50% 81 104 86 73 96 69 100 76 102 95 84 89 90 100 78 94 79 76 88 97 100 85 77 62 96 82 88
67% 75 90 74 61 78 51 103 68 96 92 74 79 87 85 68 72 71 62 75 80 82 67 80 49 86 68 71
100% 67 76 66 54 61 44 77 58 73 76 65 60 73 68 56 52 61 50 71 63 66 58 64 39 73 54 55
150% 63 70 58 48 51 39 62 54 61 66 59 51 65 63 49 44 52 41 65 52 54 48 54 42 63 46 46
50% 80 106 97 52 92 75 59 84 103 88 81 105 79 99 40 80 76 76 85 97 108 25 71 88 96 85 93
67% 75 90 85 46 77 53 52 74 85 77 72 85 68 82 38 61 64 63 73 80 89 25 62 73 80 71 74
100% 68 75 75 44 61 46 45 62 69 67 63 68 60 66 36 45 52 50 70 63 70 26 52 59 67 57 58
150% 65 70 66 41 52 42 38 56 61 60 58 57 56 61 36 39 46 41 64 52 57 32 46 49 59 49 48
(with 2 children % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP
50% 86 103 88 84 96 80 -16 89 115 86 82 90 90 99 68 44 82 76 82 93 97 81 79 52 95 62 79
67% 79 90 85 67 77 66 9 65 89 84 72 79 84 86 74 72 77 63 71 77 80 65 94 47 87 59 76
100% 71 81 75 58 61 52 36 60 71 72 63 64 75 74 67 52 68 50 70 62 64 57 78 41 79 54 58
150% 67 78 66 50 52 45 36 59 63 65 58 56 66 67 57 44 57 41 64 51 53 53 61 43 69 46 49
50% 78 91 88 87 96 70 100 89 101 92 95 63 90 100 76 108 79 76 77 97 92 86 100 51 100 60 85
67% 73 90 84 69 77 64 93 61 104 91 82 61 92 90 79 82 69 62 67 80 77 69 87 42 83 60 87
100% 66 80 73 59 60 51 82 58 76 77 70 59 82 73 73 59 58 50 68 63 62 60 74 33 80 54 66
150% 63 75 62 51 50 43 65 57 63 69 62 51 71 66 60 49 50 41 63 52 52 54 61 38 68 46 54
50% 80 104 102 59 95 78 64 87 107 87 87 104 86 99 44 94 88 76 77 97 93 35 82 88 96 88 93
67% 75 92 89 51 79 55 55 79 88 78 77 84 73 82 41 72 77 63 67 80 77 34 67 73 84 73 74
100% 68 76 77 47 62 47 47 69 72 69 66 68 63 66 39 52 61 50 66 63 62 34 55 59 69 58 59
150% 65 71 66 43 52 41 40 61 63 63 60 57 58 61 38 44 51 41 61 52 52 37 48 49 61 49 49
Change 2001 - 2007
Family Type % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP
50% -6 -2 0 0 0 -9 10 12 0 2 -1 0 -2 -5 0 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 -2 -26 0 1 1
67% -2 -2 0 2 2 -21 6 13 0 2 1 1 -5 -5 -1 0 5 0 6 0 0 0 -2 -19 0 0 1
100% -2 -2 -1 5 1 -15 4 8 0 5 1 1 -4 -4 0 0 8 0 7 0 0 0 -1 -11 0 0 2
150% 0 -2 -2 2 1 -9 2 7 -1 4 0 2 -4 -3 0 0 7 0 5 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 1 3
50% -7 0 -2 0 0 -12 0 10 0 2 -1 0 -7 0 -4 0 -20 0 8 0 0 0 -21 -43 0 -3 2
67% -2 -2 -1 2 1 -24 16 11 8 5 -1 0 -3 -8 -10 0 -11 0 5 0 0 0 -2 -48 0 -5 2
100% -2 -1 -1 5 1 -16 10 5 5 8 1 0 -5 -6 -6 0 -8 0 6 0 0 0 -1 -35 0 -4 3
150% -1 -2 -1 2 1 -11 8 5 3 6 0 1 -4 -4 -4 0 -3 0 5 0 0 0 -1 -17 0 -3 3
50% -4 -2 -1 -5 -5 -21 5 9 1 -2 -1 1 -3 -5 -1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 -2 2 0 0 -1
67% -2 -2 -1 -2 -3 -27 4 10 1 -1 1 1 -4 -5 -1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 -2 3 0 0 0
100% -2 -3 -1 3 -2 -19 3 6 1 3 2 2 -3 -4 0 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 -2 4 0 0 1
150% 0 -3 -2 0 -1 -14 1 5 1 2 1 1 -3 -3 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 -1 2 0 0 2
(with 2 hildren) % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP
50% -3 3 -7 3 -2 -6 -15 16 0 -6 -9 2 -4 -4 9 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 -53 0 5 -6
67% 3 -2 1 2 -2 -19 -11 12 0 -2 -7 2 -3 -5 7 0 7 0 8 0 0 0 24 -42 0 2 -5
100% 1 -3 0 5 0 -14 -1 7 3 4 -4 3 -5 -5 3 0 1 0 9 0 0 0 12 -29 0 0 -2
150% 2 -2 0 2 0 -9 -1 7 1 5 -3 3 -4 -3 1 0 -3 0 7 0 0 0 4 -16 0 -2 0
50% -5 0 -2 2 -2 -7 5 12 0 0 -5 2 -10 0 5 0 -21 0 6 0 0 0 1 -55 0 2 0
67% 0 -2 2 2 -1 -21 6 7 8 4 -7 0 -6 -8 4 0 -21 0 4 0 0 0 1 -69 0 3 2
100% -1 -2 1 5 0 -15 10 5 7 8 -4 0 -6 -7 1 0 -16 0 7 0 0 0 -2 -55 0 -2 3
150% 0 -2 0 2 1 -9 9 4 5 8 -3 1 -5 -4 0 0 -16 0 6 0 0 0 -1 -32 0 -3 3
50% -4 -3 -2 -6 -5 -17 -2 7 1 -2 0 1 -5 -5 0 0 4 0 -3 0 0 0 0 2 0 -5 -5
67% -2 -3 -2 -3 -3 -23 -1 10 1 0 2 1 -5 -5 0 0 1 0 -2 0 0 0 -2 -2 0 -4 -3
100% -2 -4 -2 2 -2 -16 -1 7 1 6 2 2 -4 -4 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -2 0 0 -3 1
150% 0 -3 -2 0 -1 -11 -1 7 1 6 1 1 -3 -3 1 0 -1 0 2 0 0 0 -4 -6 0 -2 2
Change 2006 - 2007
Family Type % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP
50% 0 -1 -1 1 1 3 4 0 0 -7 0 0 -2 -5 0 0 3 0 3 1 -1 0 -4 -1 -2 0 0
67% 0 -1 -1 2 1 -21 2 0 0 -5 0 0 -2 -5 0 0 8 0 3 1 -1 0 -3 0 -2 0 0
100% 0 0 -1 1 1 -15 1 0 1 -4 0 0 -1 -4 0 0 10 -1 3 1 0 -2 -3 0 -3 0 1
150% 0 0 -1 -1 1 -9 0 1 1 -2 0 0 -1 -3 0 0 7 -1 2 0 0 -1 -3 0 -3 0 1
50% 0 0 -2 1 0 7 0 -2 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 -3 3 3 1 -2 1 -4 -1 0 0 0
67% 0 -1 -1 2 0 -25 2 -1 0 2 1 -1 1 -4 0 0 -1 2 3 1 -1 0 -3 -1 2 0 0
100% 0 0 -1 1 0 -17 3 -2 1 -1 1 0 0 -4 0 0 2 1 3 1 -1 0 -3 0 0 0 0
150% 0 0 -1 -1 0 -12 2 -1 1 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 2 0 2 0 -1 -2 -3 0 -2 0 1
50% 0 -1 -2 2 -5 7 2 0 0 3 0 0 -1 -5 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 -1 -4 1 0 0 1
67% 0 -1 -2 3 -3 -27 2 1 0 2 0 0 -1 -5 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 -1 -4 1 0 0 1
100% 0 0 -1 1 -2 -18 1 1 1 1 0 0 -1 -4 0 0 0 -1 3 1 0 -2 -3 0 -1 0 1
150% 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -14 0 1 1 1 0 0 -1 -3 0 0 0 -1 2 0 0 -1 -3 0 -2 0 1
(with 2 hildren) % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI US JP
50% 0 0 0 1 -1 7 -3 4 0 2 0 -10 -1 -5 1 1 12 0 5 2 -3 0 -2 0 0 0 -6
67% 2 -1 -1 1 -3 -20 -3 2 0 4 0 -8 -1 -4 0 26 9 0 3 1 -16 0 -4 0 2 0 -8
100% 1 0 -1 0 -1 -13 0 1 1 0 0 -5 -1 -4 0 0 6 -1 3 1 -10 1 -7 0 0 0 -5
150% 1 0 -1 -2 0 -9 0 3 1 0 0 -3 -1 -2 0 0 3 -1 2 1 -7 -2 -7 0 -1 0 -3
50% 0 0 0 1 -1 7 3 0 0 1 2 -11 0 0 0 -1 -5 3 4 4 -8 0 0 0 0 0 0
67% 0 -1 -1 1 -1 -21 5 0 0 4 1 -8 0 -5 0 0 -3 2 3 3 -20 0 -2 0 -3 0 0
100% 0 0 -1 0 -1 -14 4 1 1 0 1 -5 0 -4 0 0 -6 1 3 2 -13 1 -5 0 3 0 0
150% 0 0 -1 -2 0 -10 3 1 1 0 1 -4 0 -2 0 0 -4 0 2 1 -9 -2 -5 0 -2 0 0
50% 0 -2 -2 2 -6 12 1 8 0 3 0 0 -1 -5 -1 0 1 0 4 1 1 -1 1 1 0 0 1
67% 0 -1 -2 2 -3 -24 1 8 0 2 0 0 -1 -5 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 -1 -4 1 0 0 1
100% 0 -1 -1 1 -2 -16 1 7 1 1 0 0 -1 -4 0 0 0 -1 3 1 0 -3 -4 0 0 0 1
150% 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -11 0 6 1 1 0 0 -1 -3 0 0 1 -1 2 0 0 -2 -3 0 -1 0 1
1 earner 
couple with  2 
children
2 earners 
couple with 2 
children*
Single
1 earner 
couple 
2 earners 
couple *
Single parent, 
2 children
1 earner 
couple with  2 
children
2 earners 
couple with 2 
children*
Single
1 earner 
couple 
Single
1 earner 
couple 
2 earners 
couple *
Single parent, 
2 children
2 earners 
couple *
Single parent, 
2 children
1 earner 
couple with  2 
children
2 earners 
couple with 2 
children*
 
The wage level of first earner is fixed at 67% of the AW, while the wage level of the second earner is indicated in each column. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Table A2 - Net replacement rates for unemployed persons (1st month of unemployment) 
Net Replacement Rates for unemployed persons 2007
Earnings level  
as % of AW: 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 81 74 55 41 70 66 50 38 85 80 69 57
DK 90 85 62 47 84 86 63 48 95 92 75 63
DE 67 59 59 56 82 65 59 56 91 88 85 79
GR 63 49 36 25 68 52 38 27 75 67 56 45
ES 74 78 62 43 71 75 64 44 86 86 76 60
FR 75 70 66 69 82 67 67 67 89 84 80 77
IE 97 77 56 42 138 106 75 55 82 74 63 50
IT 58 64 64 47 55 61 66 48 83 83 78 64
LU 88 85 87 77 103 95 84 76 92 91 89 83
NL 94 73 73 58 97 89 74 60 84 84 82 71
AT 62 55 55 42 80 65 56 43 83 81 77 64
PT 76 78 84 84 73 75 78 78 91 91 92 90
FI 83 67 52 45 89 84 63 49 83 79 72 64
SE 84 76 53 40 100 80 56 42 90 88 72 60
UK 73 58 40 28 73 58 40 28 67 59 49 38
CY 61 59 58 61 75 70 66 67 83 79 75 74
CZ 70 67 61 53 92 67 60 53 81 77 72 68
EE 56 55 54 53 55 57 56 54 81 77 73 68
HU 71 73 63 45 75 76 65 47 87 87 79 65
LT 79 74 69 47 79 74 69 47 91 87 81 64
LV 80 82 84 85 76 79 81 83 94 93 92 91
MT 72 59 45 33 82 65 52 36 66 59 49 41
PL 93 70 48 33 76 73 51 34 83 73 59 46
SK 58 61 64 66 60 58 58 62 85 84 82 79
SI 88 72 62 44 80 82 73 52 88 86 77 62
US 63 62 54 38 69 61 54 37 84 81 73 57
JP 73 67 54 45 79 65 53 44 90 84 73 63
Change 2001 - 2007
Earnings level  
as % of AW: 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE -1 -9 -8 -5 -9 -17 -21 -20 15 7 10 12
DK -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -7 -14 -16 12 2 -1 0
DE -33 -22 -2 -5 -6 -24 -26 -23 8 4 7 9
GR -21 -14 -9 -7 -14 -22 -23 -23 8 -6 7 10
ES 1 2 -9 -6 -2 -13 -20 -22 14 9 1 -3
FR -20 -13 -4 -1 -4 -25 -16 -12 8 -7 2 8
IE 10 8 6 5 68 35 16 8 -56 -15 -9 -2
IT 11 15 12 1 -10 -16 -5 -15 28 26 17 4
LU -12 0 1 -10 2 5 -4 -12 -12 -12 0 -7
NL 3 -7 2 -3 17 4 -9 -14 -12 -5 6 6
AT -23 -13 0 -13 0 -15 -20 -29 3 -16 1 -2
PT -37 -8 6 1 -3 -19 -10 -10 18 6 16 12
FI 0 -7 -9 -3 1 3 -12 -17 -7 -20 -13 -1
SE -14 -6 -25 -16 10 -11 -31 -28 -10 -12 -10 0
UK -4 -6 -5 -3 -1 -6 -12 -14 -6 -17 -22 -15
CY
CZ 3 9 9 3 41 -10 -11 -14 5 -14 -2 1
EE
HU 7 8 16 10 -5 -5 -3 -10 -5 14 23 20
LT
LV
MT
PL 3 2 2 1 11 -3 -11 -14 28 -17 -7 -5
SK -39 -16 0 20 -22 -24 -20 -2 11 -23 -24 5
SI
US -3 0 -5 -3 -16 -20 -21 -22 2 19 14 15
JP -5 -7 -10 -17 -5 -23 -27 -31 13 -3 2 2
Change 2006 - 2007
Earnings level  
as % of AW: 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150% 50% 67% 100% 150%
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 0 -1 -1 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 0
DE -2 -1 -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -2
GR 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 0
ES -1 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 -3 -2 -2 -1
FR -1 -5 -1 1 3 -3 0 0 -1 -2 0 -1
IE 4 2 2 1 7 5 3 2 1 1 1 1
IT 0 0 1 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 0 0 0
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
NL -1 -7 4 4 1 2 4 4 2 2 2 2
AT 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FI 2 -2 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 0
SE -5 -5 -8 -6 0 -5 -6 -4 -2 -3 -5 -4
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CZ 11 13 11 3 12 0 4 2 0 0 0 0
EE -1 -1 -1 0 2 1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0
HU 0 3 1 0 3 2 1 0 2 1 1 0
LT 1 1 1 -4 1 1 1 -4 1 0 0 -3
LV -1 -1 -1 0 -2 -2 -1 -1 0 0 0 0
MT 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0
PL -5 -4 -3 -2 -4 -4 -3 -2 -2 -2 -1 -1
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI -1 -2 -4 -4 -2 2 -3 -4 0 0 -3 -3
US 0 0 -2 -2 -1 0 -2 -2 0 0 -1 -1
JP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Single 1 earner couple 2 earner couple 
Single 1 earner couple 2 earner couple 
Single 1 earner couple 2 earner couple 
 
Source: : Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Table A3 - Inactivity trap 
 
Marginal effective tax rate when moving from social assistance to work
at a wage level equivalent to: (2007)
Family Type % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
33% 73 95 76 16 63 66 100 9 85 100 91 52 84 100 78 107 85 58 55 46 67 106 48 60 76
50% 67 103 72 16 47 57 97 14 80 97 71 41 86 87 78 73 72 46 48 41 55 74 64 27 73
67% 66 88 66 19 44 44 79 22 68 84 64 37 73 73 68 56 66 41 46 38 49 62 56 28 63
100% 62 76 63 26 39 40 63 27 60 71 58 36 64 60 56 42 58 35 51 35 43 55 48 28 55
150% 61 72 59 29 37 40 56 33 56 63 54 37 58 57 49 37 50 31 52 34 39 51 43 35 52
33% 82 95 76 16 80 62 100 9 73 100 100 55 84 100 78 92 118 68 81 77 70 117 71 78 100
50% 68 95 80 16 55 62 100 9 86 99 84 56 90 100 78 105 92 51 68 61 57 80 59 46 81
67% 65 83 70 19 47 45 103 18 84 95 74 54 87 85 68 80 81 44 61 53 51 63 66 38 75
100% 60 71 63 26 41 40 77 25 65 78 65 44 73 68 56 58 67 38 61 46 44 56 55 31 66
150% 59 67 56 29 38 37 62 31 55 68 59 40 65 63 49 48 56 33 58 40 40 47 48 37 58
33% 35 53 47 16 18 2 0 18 19 29 20 14 14 18 15 6 30 24 2 16 26 17 30 17 46
50% 42 53 48 16 17 13 2 24 22 31 24 18 20 23 21 6 27 24 13 21 28 25 31 21 42
67% 47 50 49 19 22 7 9 29 25 35 29 20 24 25 24 6 27 24 20 23 29 25 31 23 40
100% 49 48 50 26 24 15 16 32 29 38 35 24 30 28 27 9 28 24 34 25 30 26 32 26 40
150% 52 52 49 29 27 21 19 36 35 41 39 28 36 36 30 15 30 24 40 27 31 32 32 27 41
(with 2 hildren) % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
33% 93 95 85 16 90 55 63 -4 80 100 100 55 67 67 61 56 89 64 64 87 100 61 59 72 100
50% 80 95 88 16 62 65 -16 -3 88 77 79 58 63 62 68 56 79 51 56 68 97 80 51 35 81
67% 74 84 85 16 52 55 9 -4 69 77 71 55 64 59 74 81 75 44 52 58 80 64 73 33 77
100% 68 76 75 24 44 45 36 14 58 68 62 48 61 55 67 59 66 37 57 49 64 56 64 32 72
150% 65 75 66 27 40 40 36 28 55 62 57 45 57 54 57 48 56 33 55 43 53 52 52 38 64
33% 86 95 85 16 90 54 100 -4 67 100 100 59 84 100 73 92 127 90 81 91 100 110 51 74 100
50% 69 95 88 16 62 65 100 -3 82 94 95 58 90 100 76 137 100 66 65 89 92 87 68 46 100
67% 66 93 84 16 52 60 93 -8 89 92 82 57 92 90 79 104 85 55 59 74 77 69 63 38 83
100% 61 82 73 24 43 48 82 11 66 78 70 56 82 73 73 74 69 45 62 60 62 60 58 31 80
150% 60 77 62 27 39 41 65 27 56 69 62 49 71 66 60 58 57 38 59 50 52 55 50 37 68
33% 35 65 48 16 20 2 47 29 17 34 23 14 31 22 43 6 40 24 -3 16 3 27 48 17 72
50% 42 64 48 16 15 11 33 35 18 36 25 18 31 26 40 6 36 24 10 21 12 35 47 21 60
67% 47 62 49 19 20 5 33 41 22 40 31 20 32 27 38 6 38 24 17 23 17 34 41 23 57
100% 49 56 50 26 23 14 32 43 27 43 35 25 36 29 37 9 35 24 32 25 22 34 38 26 51
150% 52 58 48 28 26 19 30 44 33 46 39 28 40 37 37 15 34 24 39 27 25 37 36 27 49
Change 2001 - 2007
Family Type % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
33% -2 -1 -3 0 2 -7 0 -1 -8 4 -9 0 -16 0 0 0 -2 0 -4 0 0 0 -7 -64 0
50% -3 -2 1 0 0 -8 10 -2 1 5 -6 0 -1 -7 0 0 -1 0 -6 0 0 0 -5 -71 0
67% 0 -2 0 2 2 -20 6 2 0 4 -3 0 -4 -7 -1 0 4 0 -5 0 0 0 -4 -52 0
100% -1 -2 0 5 1 -15 4 1 1 6 -1 1 -3 -5 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 -3 -33 0
150% 1 -2 -1 2 1 -9 2 2 -1 5 -1 2 -3 -3 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 -3 -17 0
33% -7 -1 -10 0 2 -8 0 2 -12 4 0 0 -16 0 -7 0 18 0 -15 0 0 0 -14 -47 0
50% -6 -1 1 0 2 -14 0 2 -8 5 -1 0 -7 0 -4 0 -7 0 -8 0 0 0 -29 -78 0
67% -1 -2 2 2 2 -26 16 5 2 7 -1 -1 -3 -8 -10 0 -1 0 -8 0 0 0 -8 -74 0
100% -2 -1 1 5 2 -18 10 1 1 9 1 -1 -5 -6 -6 0 -1 0 -3 0 0 0 -6 -52 0
150% -1 -2 0 2 1 -12 8 2 1 7 0 1 -4 -4 -4 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 -4 -29 0
33% -7 1 0 0 -1 -23 -12 -10 0 -1 -1 0 -10 -8 3 0 -5 0 -20 0 0 0 -1 0 0
50% -6 -2 -1 0 -1 -18 -13 -8 0 -1 0 1 -7 -6 2 0 -4 0 -14 0 0 0 -1 2 0
67% -4 -2 -1 2 0 -24 -9 -3 0 -1 1 1 -6 -6 2 0 -3 0 -11 0 0 0 -1 3 0
100% -3 -4 -1 5 0 -17 -6 -2 0 3 2 2 -5 -5 2 0 -1 0 -4 0 0 0 -1 4 0
150% -1 -3 -1 2 0 -13 -5 -1 1 3 1 1 -4 -3 1 0 1 0 -2 0 0 0 -1 2 0
(with 2 hildren) % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
33% 0 -1 -2 0 1 -8 12 -3 -11 6 0 0 -3 -10 -9 0 -11 0 15 0 0 0 -33 -53 0
50% -1 -1 2 0 -1 -6 -15 -3 1 -5 -11 2 -2 -4 9 0 -3 0 19 0 0 0 -22 -90 0
67% 4 -4 7 0 -1 -20 -11 -2 1 -1 -8 1 -2 -4 7 0 5 0 13 0 0 0 7 -69 0
100% 2 -5 5 4 0 -15 -1 -2 4 4 -5 3 -4 -5 3 0 -1 0 13 0 0 0 1 -48 0
150% 2 -3 3 1 1 -9 -1 1 2 5 -4 3 -3 -3 1 0 -4 0 9 0 0 0 -4 -28 0
33% -6 -1 -2 0 -10 -8 0 1 -15 4 0 3 -16 0 -17 0 27 0 31 0 0 0 -10 -51 0
50% -6 -1 7 0 -8 -6 5 1 -10 2 -5 2 -10 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 -6 -79 0
67% -1 -3 8 0 -6 -20 6 0 0 5 -7 0 -6 -8 4 0 -5 0 2 0 0 0 -4 -87 0
100% -1 -2 5 4 -4 -15 10 0 2 9 -4 0 -6 -7 1 0 -5 0 6 0 0 0 -5 -67 0
150% -1 -2 3 1 -2 -9 9 1 1 8 -3 1 -5 -4 0 0 -9 0 5 0 0 0 -3 -40 0
33% -7 -5 0 0 1 -22 14 -8 3 3 2 0 -9 -9 -1 0 0 0 -25 0 0 0 -5 -22 0
50% -6 -4 -1 0 -1 -17 4 -9 4 3 1 1 -6 -6 0 0 -9 0 -18 0 0 0 0 -13 0
67% -3 -3 -1 2 1 -23 4 -3 3 4 3 1 -6 -6 0 0 -9 0 -13 0 0 0 -3 -13 0
100% -3 -5 -1 6 0 -15 2 -1 3 8 3 3 -4 -5 1 0 -6 0 -6 0 0 0 -3 -7 0
150% -1 -3 -1 2 1 -11 1 1 2 8 1 2 -4 -3 1 0 -5 0 -3 0 0 0 -5 -11 0
Change 2006 - 2007
Family Type % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
33% 1 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 -1 0 1 0 0 -2 10 1 1 2 -7 1 -4 0 -2
50% 1 0 -1 0 -1 7 4 0 0 -1 0 0 2 -4 0 -1 10 0 3 1 -4 0 -3 -1 -2
67% 1 0 -1 1 0 -17 2 0 1 -1 0 0 1 -4 0 -1 13 0 3 1 -3 0 -3 0 -1
100% 1 0 -1 1 0 -13 1 0 1 -1 0 0 1 -4 0 -1 13 0 3 1 -2 -2 -3 0 -3
150% 0 0 -1 -2 0 -8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -1 9 -1 2 0 -1 -1 -3 0 -3
33% 2 0 0 0 1 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -8 18 -2 1 2 -8 1 1 0 0
50% 1 0 -2 0 1 9 0 3 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 -2 11 2 3 1 -6 1 0 -1 -2
67% 1 -1 -1 1 0 -24 2 3 0 3 1 0 1 -4 0 -1 10 1 3 1 -4 0 0 -1 0
100% 1 0 -1 1 0 -16 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 -4 0 -1 9 1 3 1 -3 0 -1 0 -2
150% 1 0 -1 -2 0 -11 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -1 6 0 2 0 -2 -2 -1 0 -3
33% 0 1 -1 0 0 17 0 -5 1 -6 0 0 -1 -5 0 0 7 -1 3 2 0 -1 -2 3 -4
50% 0 0 -1 0 -2 11 -3 -4 1 -4 1 0 0 -4 0 0 5 -1 4 1 0 -1 -2 1 -3
67% 0 0 -1 1 0 -24 -2 -3 1 -3 0 0 -1 -4 0 0 4 -1 4 1 0 -1 -2 1 -2
100% 0 0 -1 1 0 -16 -2 -1 1 -2 0 0 0 -3 0 0 3 -1 4 1 0 -2 -2 0 -3
150% 0 0 -1 -2 0 -12 -2 -1 1 -2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 2 -1 3 0 0 -1 -2 0 -3
(with 2 hildren) % of APW BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
33% 2 0 0 0 1 6 5 -3 0 0 0 0 1 -5 1 0 7 7 1 6 0 -9 3 1 0
50% 1 0 0 0 -1 8 -3 -3 0 0 1 0 1 -4 1 0 12 4 5 4 -3 -1 1 0 -3
67% 3 -1 -1 0 -2 -19 -3 -3 0 3 1 0 1 -4 0 25 9 3 3 3 -16 -1 -2 0 0
100% 2 0 -1 -1 -1 -12 0 -3 1 -1 1 0 0 -3 0 -1 6 2 3 2 -10 0 -5 0 -1
150% 1 0 -1 -2 0 -9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -1 3 1 2 1 -7 -3 -6 0 -2
33% 2 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -8 27 2 -10 0 0 0 -1 0 0
50% 1 0 0 0 -1 8 3 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 -2 16 4 -4 4 -8 0 -1 0 0
67% 1 -1 -1 0 -1 -21 5 0 0 4 1 0 0 -5 0 -1 13 3 -3 3 -20 0 -3 0 -3
100% 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -14 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 -4 0 -1 4 2 -1 2 -13 1 -5 0 3
150% 1 0 -1 -2 0 -9 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 -2 0 -1 3 1 0 1 -9 -2 -6 0 -2
33% 0 -2 -2 0 1 24 5 1 1 -8 0 -1 -1 -4 -1 0 -13 -1 3 2 -8 -1 -6 3 15
50% 0 -1 -1 0 -2 17 0 -5 2 -5 1 0 0 -3 -1 0 -9 -1 4 1 -6 -1 -5 1 0
67% 0 -1 -1 1 0 -20 0 -1 2 -4 0 0 0 -3 0 0 -7 -1 4 1 -4 -1 -9 1 0
100% 0 -1 -1 0 0 -14 0 1 2 -3 0 0 0 -3 0 0 -5 -1 4 1 -3 -3 -7 0 0
150% 0 0 -1 -2 0 -10 0 2 2 -2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 -3 -1 3 0 -2 -2 -5 0 -1
1 earner 
couple with  2 
children
2 earners 
couple with 2 
children*
Single
1 earner 
couple 
2 earners 
couple*
Single parent, 
2 children
2 earners 
couple*
Single parent, 
2 children
1 earner 
couple with  2 
children
2 earners 
couple with 2 
children*
1 earner 
couple with  2 
children
2 earners 
couple with 2 
children*
Single
1 earner 
couple 
Single
1 earner 
couple 
2 earners 
couple*
Single parent, 
2 children
 
* The wage level of first earner is fixed at 67% of the AW, while the wage level of the second earner is indicated in each column. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Table A4 - Inactivity trap 
 
2007
Single parent with 2 children
% of AW
Components METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC
BE 92.8 79% 0% 7% 0% 6% 0% 79.8 52% 0% 5% 0% 15% 8% 74.4 39% 0% 5% -3% 19% 14% 68.1 26% 0% 4% -2% 26% 14% 65.0 17% 0% 2% -1% 32% 14%
DK 94.8 75% 0% 0% 0% 3% 17% 94.7 78% 0% 0% 0% 3% 14% 83.8 62% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12% 76.5 42% 5% 0% 0% 19% 11% 75.0 28% 7% 0% 0% 30% 10%
DE 84.9 45% 27% -10% 0% 2% 21% 88.3 36% 22% 0% 0% 10% 21% 85.4 31% 19% 0% 0% 14% 21% 74.7 21% 13% 9% 0% 11% 21% 65.5 14% 9% 6% 0% 20% 18%
GR 16.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 16.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 16.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 23.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 16% 27.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% 12%
ES 89.9 84% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 61.5 55% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 51.6 41% 0% 4% 0% 0% 6% 44.1 28% 0% 3% 0% 7% 6% 40.0 18% 0% 2% 0% 13% 6%
FR 54.6 31% 11% 0% -9% 8% 14% 65.0 31% 18% 0% -6% 8% 14% 54.7 12% 22% 0% 0% 8% 14% 45.0 8% 15% 0% 0% 9% 14% 39.7 5% 10% 0% 0% 12% 13%
IE 63.4 0% 54% 9% 0% 0% 0% -16.0 0% 36% 23% -75% 0% 0% 9.1 0% 27% 29% -49% 1% 3% 35.7 0% 18% 38% -29% 3% 5% 36.5 0% 12% 25% -19% 13% 5%
IT -3.6 0% 0% -13% 0% 0% 9% -3.4 0% 0% -13% 0% 0% 9% -4.3 0% 0% -18% 0% 4% 9% 14.0 0% 0% -8% 0% 12% 9% 28.0 0% 0% -2% 0% 20% 9%
LU 79.9 62% 6% 0% 0% 0% 12% 87.8 70% 7% 0% 0% 0% 11% 69.2 52% 5% 0% 0% 0% 12% 57.6 35% 3% 0% 0% 6% 13% 54.6 23% 2% 0% 0% 16% 13%
NL 100.0 92% 0% 0% -5% 0% 12% 76.8 68% 3% 0% -4% 2% 8% 77.1 50% 13% 0% -3% 4% 14% 67.5 34% 8% 0% -2% 13% 14% 62.3 23% 6% 0% -1% 24% 11%
AT 100.0 60% 23% 0% 0% -1% 18% 79.4 41% 16% 0% 0% 4% 18% 70.7 31% 12% 0% 0% 10% 18% 62.3 21% 8% 0% 0% 15% 18% 57.1 14% 5% 0% 0% 21% 17%
PT 55.5 44% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 57.6 44% 0% 2% 0% 0% 11% 54.6 40% 0% 2% 0% 2% 11% 48.0 27% 0% 1% 0% 9% 11% 45.0 18% 0% 1% 0% 15% 11%
FI 66.8 45% 7% 0% -6% 14% 7% 63.3 30% 14% 0% -4% 16% 7% 64.4 22% 19% 0% -2% 19% 7% 61.1 15% 16% 0% -1% 25% 7% 56.8 10% 11% 0% -1% 30% 7%
SE 67.4 27% 22% 0% -5% 16% 7% 61.6 18% 21% 0% -4% 20% 7% 58.8 13% 20% 0% -4% 22% 7% 55.3 9% 19% 0% -3% 24% 7% 54.2 6% 12% 0% -2% 33% 5%
UK 61.2 28% 18% 0% 0% 9% 6% 68.1 19% 24% 5% 0% 13% 8% 73.5 14% 23% 13% 0% 16% 8% 67.4 9% 20% 11% 0% 18% 9% 56.5 6% 13% 7% 0% 23% 7%
CY 56.3 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 56.3 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 81.3 49% 26% 0% 0% 0% 6% 58.8 33% 17% 0% 0% 2% 6% 48.2 22% 11% 0% 0% 8% 6%
CZ 88.9 38% 45% 6% 0% -13% 13% 79.0 25% 35% 11% 0% -5% 13% 74.8 19% 30% 14% 0% 0% 12% 66.2 13% 20% 16% 0% 6% 13% 55.6 8% 13% 10% 0% 11% 13%
EE 64.3 30% 22% 0% 0% 10% 3% 50.6 20% 14% 0% 0% 14% 3% 43.9 15% 11% 0% 0% 16% 3% 37.3 10% 7% 0% 0% 18% 3% 32.9 7% 5% 0% 0% 19% 3%
HU 64.2 47% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 55.7 31% 0% 2% 0% 6% 17% 51.7 23% 0% 1% 0% 10% 17% 56.7 16% 1% 1% 0% 22% 17% 55.5 10% 1% 1% 0% 27% 17%
LT 87.2 76% 0% 0% 0% 8% 3% 67.7 50% 0% 0% 0% 14% 3% 58.2 38% 0% 0% 0% 17% 3% 48.9 25% 0% 0% 0% 21% 3% 42.6 17% 0% 0% 0% 23% 3%
LV 100.0 91% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 96.8 52% 29% 0% 0% 7% 9% 80.3 38% 22% 0% 0% 11% 9% 64.3 26% 14% 0% 0% 15% 9% 53.4 17% 10% 0% 0% 18% 9%
MT 60.7 0% 1% 51% 0% 0% 8% 79.9 6% 1% 65% 0% 0% 8% 63.8 4% 1% 51% 0% 0% 8% 56.4 3% 3% 37% 0% 5% 8% 52.1 2% 4% 27% 0% 10% 8%
PL 59.1 24% 12% 0% 0% 0% 23% 51.0 16% 12% 0% 0% 0% 23% 73.2 12% 12% 26% 0% 0% 23% 64.0 8% 15% 17% 0% 0% 23% 51.9 5% 10% 12% 0% 1% 23%
SK 72.2 41% 34% 0% -16% 0% 13% 34.7 27% 23% 0% -29% 1% 13% 33.5 20% 17% 0% -22% 5% 13% 32.3 13% 11% 0% -15% 9% 13% 37.6 9% 8% 0% -4% 11% 13%
SI 100.0 78% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 81.2 54% 0% 5% 0% 0% 22% 77.0 40% 10% 4% 0% 1% 22% 72.3 27% 10% 9% 0% 5% 22% 64.1 18% 7% 9% 0% 9% 22%
NO 107.0 44% 52% 0% 0% 3% 8% 104.1 40% 46% 0% 0% 10% 8% 86.8 30% 35% 0% 0% 14% 8% 70.4 20% 23% 0% 0% 19% 8% 61.9 13% 15% 0% 0% 25% 8%
SZ
US 26.7 13% 0% 41% -35% 1% 8% 34.7 20% 0% 27% -18% -3% 8% 38.3 18% 0% 20% -8% 1% 8% 40.2 12% 0% 13% 0% 7% 8% 36.6 8% 0% 9% 0% 12% 8%
JP 81.2 55% 0% 14% 0% 0% 12% 85.2 63% 0% 9% 0% 1% 12% 80.8 54% 5% 7% 0% 3% 12% 61.4 36% 3% 4% 0% 5% 12% 51.4 24% 2% 5% 0% 9% 12%
Inactivity trap indicator for jobless persons Change 2001-2007
Moving from social assistance to work, at a wage equivalent to :
Single parent with 2 children
% of AW
Components METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC
BE 0.3 -2% 0% 0% 0% 6% -4% -0.5 -1% 0% 0% 0% 6% -5% 4.2 -1% 0% 2% 0% 2% 1% 2.2 -1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 2.4 0% 0% 1% 0% 2% 0%
DK -0.9 2% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -0.9 1% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -4.4 -1% -2% 0% 0% 0% -1% -4.7 -1% -2% 0% 0% -1% -1% -3.2 0% -1% 0% 0% -1% -1%
DE -1.7 5% 1% -10% 0% 2% 0% 2.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 7.4 5% 1% 0% 0% 2% 0% 4.5 3% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 2.7 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
GR 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 1.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% -3%
ES 1.0 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1.0 1% 0% -2% 0% 0% 0% -1.3 1% 0% -1% 0% -1% 0% -0.1 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
FR -8.0 0% -3% 0% -5% 0% 0% -6.0 0% -2% 0% -5% 0% 0% -19.7 -20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -14.6 -13% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% -9.4 -9% -1% 0% 0% -1% 1%
IE 12.5 0% 3% 9% 0% 0% 0% -14.9 0% 2% 8% -23% -2% 0% -10.9 0% 2% 6% -15% -4% 0% -1.3 0% 1% 6% -6% -3% 0% -0.7 0% 1% 4% -4% -2% 0%
IT -2.7 0% 0% -2% 0% -1% 0% -2.7 0% 0% -2% 0% -1% 0% -1.7 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% -2.5 0% 0% -2% 0% -1% 0% 1.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
LU -10.8 -9% -2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1.3 3% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.1 2% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3.8 1% -1% 0% 0% 3% 0% 1.6 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
NL 5.9 -5% 6% 0% -3% 0% 8% -4.6 -1% -1% 0% -3% 0% 0% -1.1 0% 3% 0% -3% 1% -1% 4.4 0% 2% 0% -2% 4% 1% 5.3 0% 1% 0% -1% 3% 2%
AT 0.0 3% -3% 0% 0% 0% 0% -11.3 -7% -6% 0% 0% 2% 0% -8.5 -5% -5% 0% 0% 2% 0% -4.6 -4% -3% 0% 0% 2% 0% -3.6 -2% -2% 0% 0% 2% -1%
PT 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2.1 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 3.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 3.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0%
FI -2.7 -2% 4% 0% -2% -2% 0% -1.6 -2% 3% 0% -1% -2% 0% -1.7 -1% 3% 0% -1% -3% 0% -3.6 -1% 0% 0% -1% -2% 0% -3.1 -1% 0% 0% 0% -2% 0%
SE -10.1 -2% 0% 0% -5% -4% 0% -3.7 -1% 3% 0% -4% -2% 0% -4.5 -1% 2% 0% -4% -2% 0% -4.9 -1% 0% 0% -3% -1% 0% -2.9 0% 0% 0% -2% -1% 0%
UK -8.9 -37% 18% 0% 0% 8% 1% 9.4 -24% 2% 5% 21% 5% 1% 7.1 -18% 1% 13% 6% 4% 1% 2.8 -12% 0% 11% 0% 3% 1% 1.3 -8% 0% 7% 0% 3% -1%
CY
CZ -11.1 -50% 45% 6% 0% -13% 0% -3.0 -44% 35% 11% 0% -5% 0% 4.9 -33% 28% 12% 0% -2% 0% -1.0 -22% 14% 7% 0% 0% 0% -3.7 -15% 8% 1% 0% 2% 0%
EE
HU 14.7 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 18.8 7% 0% 2% 0% 6% 4% 12.9 5% -1% 1% 0% 3% 4% 12.8 3% 0% 1% 0% 4% 5% 9.4 2% 0% 1% 0% 2% 4%
LT
LV
MT
PL -33.0 -31% 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% -22.4 -21% 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% 6.9 -15% 0% 26% 0% -2% -2% 1.0 -10% 0% 17% 0% -4% -2% -3.7 -7% 0% 9% 0% -5% -2%
SK -53.1 -47% 9% 0% -16% 0% 1% -89.5 -58% -2% 0% -29% 0% 1% -69.4 -44% -6% 0% -22% 1% 1% -47.6 -29% -4% -3% -15% 3% 1% -27.8 -19% -3% -5% -4% 2% 0%
SI
NO 9.2 10% 1% 0% 0% -2% 0% -0.2 7% -5% 0% 0% -2% 0% -5.6 3% -7% 0% 0% -1% 0% -3.3 2% -5% 0% 0% 0% 0% -3.3 1% -3% 0% 0% -1% 0%
SZ
US -7.1 0% 0% -11% 5% -1% 0% -4.0 2% 0% -12% 9% -3% 0% -4.9 -3% 0% -9% 7% 1% 0% -4.2 -2% 0% -6% 3% 1% 0% -4.9 -2% 0% -4% 0% 1% 0%
JP -0.2 -16% 0% 14% 0% 0% 2% -0.3 -11% 0% 9% 0% 0% 2% 0.0 -9% 0% 7% 0% 0% 2% 1.2 -6% 0% 4% 0% 1% 2% 1.8 -4% 0% 3% 0% 1% 2
150
33 50 67 100 150
33 50 67 100
%  
The contributions of social assistance (SA), housing benefits (HB), family benefits (FB), in-work benefits (IWB), income tax (IT) and social security contributions (SSC) to METR. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Table A5 - Low wage trap 
 
Average of marginal effective tax rate at different wage levels (= METR as wage increases by 33% of the APW wage level)
2007
Household Earnings BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
 as % of APW
Single
From :33% TO: 67% 59 56 57 23 26 42 56 34 51 57 38 22 62 47 57 6 48 24 37 30 32 20 38 23 51
From :67% TO: 100% 55 52 54 40 29 32 28 39 44 45 45 34 44 34 33 13 41 24 62 30 32 32 33 30 39
From :100% TO: 133% 59 64 53 34 33 40 42 42 48 43 48 35 48 52 32 26 34 24 53 30 32 43 33 32 43
From :133% TO: 167% 59 63 48 37 32 42 46 49 48 52 41 45 49 55 41 30 37 24 53 30 32 43 33 29 51
1 earner couple 
From :33% TO: 67% 49 71 63 23 15 47 102 25 92 86 49 52 86 69 57 24 45 22 39 30 32 12 39 23 51
From :67% TO: 100% 50 48 49 40 29 30 25 39 27 45 45 23 44 34 33 13 39 24 62 30 32 30 33 17 48
From :100% TO: 133% 55 60 41 34 31 31 26 42 34 43 48 31 48 52 32 26 34 24 53 30 32 26 33 32 43
From :133% TO: 167% 59 57 37 37 32 30 43 49 41 52 41 34 49 55 41 30 37 24 53 30 32 38 33 29 45
2 earners couple*
From :67%+33% TO: 67%+67% 58 48 50 23 26 38 17 39 31 40 38 25 33 32 33 6 25 24 37 30 32 22 33 30 35
From :67% +67 TO: 67%+100% 55 43 53 40 29 32 28 39 38 45 45 35 44 34 33 13 29 24 62 30 32 29 33 30 39
From :67+100% TO: 67+133% 59 61 48 34 33 30 26 40 45 43 48 34 48 52 32 26 34 24 53 30 32 43 33 30 43
From :67+133% TO: 67+167% 58 63 44 37 32 39 36 49 48 52 41 35 49 55 41 30 37 24 53 30 32 43 33 29 51
Lone parent, 2 children
From :33% TO: 67% 58 73 85 16 10 61 64 16 58 49 42 52 63 51 86 57 61 24 39 30 60 59 38 23 51
From :67% TO: 100% 55 62 53 39 29 25 67 51 35 48 45 34 54 48 54 13 45 24 65 30 32 41 33 30 49
From :100% TO: 133% 59 76 47 34 32 29 34 54 48 49 48 36 48 52 32 26 34 24 53 30 32 37 25 32 40
From :133% TO: 167% 59 63 46 37 32 30 46 57 48 58 41 47 49 55 44 30 40 24 53 30 32 45 33 29 48
1 earner couple with  2 children
From :33% TO: 67% 47 89 86 16 10 64 86 11 110 78 65 56 100 80 86 55 43 22 37 57 53 24 72 27 62
From :67% TO: 100% 50 59 49 39 25 24 52 50 21 50 45 54 60 38 58 13 36 24 66 30 32 41 38 17 65
From :100% TO: 133% 55 71 42 34 31 26 26 55 34 49 48 32 48 52 32 26 30 24 53 30 32 37 33 32 39
From :133% TO: 167% 59 57 37 37 32 29 43 58 41 58 41 36 49 55 44 30 29 24 53 30 32 45 33 29 44
2 earners couple with 2 children*
From :67%+33% TO: 67%+67% 58 58 50 22 20 34 17 51 27 46 38 26 33 32 33 6 31 24 37 30 31 30 31 30 37
From :67% +67 TO: 67%+100% 55 43 52 40 29 30 28 48 38 51 45 36 44 34 36 13 29 24 62 30 32 35 32 30 37
From :67+100% TO: 67+133% 58 61 45 33 33 30 26 45 45 51 48 34 48 52 35 26 30 24 53 30 32 43 33 30 41
From :67+133% TO: 67+167% 58 63 39 39 32 31 38 49 48 58 38 35 49 56 41 30 38 24 53 30 32 43 33 29 46
Change 2001 - 2007 BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
Single
From :33% TO: 67% 2 -3 4 4 1 -2 12 4 8 -5 3 1 7 -13 -1 0 9 0 -5 0 0 0 0 -13 0
From :67% TO: 100% -2 -3 -2 12 0 -5 0 0 1 2 3 3 -2 -3 1 0 14 0 8 0 0 0 -1 5 0
From :100% TO: 133% 2 -2 -5 -6 1 4 -2 2 -3 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 -1 2 0
From :133% TO: 167% 4 0 -5 4 0 1 -1 5 -3 3 -3 6 -4 1 1 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -6 0
1 earner couple 
From :33% TO: 67% 5 -4 13 4 2 -7 30 5 16 7 -1 -1 4 -15 -13 0 -19 0 -2 0 0 0 2 -73 0
From :67% TO: 100% -3 1 -1 12 1 0 -2 -7 -2 2 3 0 -8 -3 1 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 -1 -6 0
From :100% TO: 133% -1 -3 -3 -6 2 0 0 2 -1 0 0 5 -1 1 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 0 -1 2 0
From :133% TO: 167% 4 -6 0 4 0 0 11 4 1 3 -3 -1 -4 1 1 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -5 0
2 earners couple*
From :67%+33% From :67%+33% 0 -5 -1 4 1 2 -6 3 -1 0 3 1 -3 -3 1 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 -1 7 0
From :67% +67 From :67% +67 -1 -7 -2 12 0 -2 0 0 1 2 3 6 -2 -3 1 0 3 0 8 0 0 0 -1 5 0
From :67+100% From :67+100% 3 -1 -4 -6 1 -5 0 0 2 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 -1 0 0
From :67+133% From :67+133% 3 0 0 4 0 2 -2 7 0 3 -3 0 -4 1 1 0 7 0 3 0 0 0 -1 -6 0
Lone parent, 2 children
From :33% TO: 67% 5 -6 13 0 -8 -7 7 1 12 -13 -16 3 0 1 9 0 19 0 11 0 0 0 -4 -55 0
From :67% TO: 100% -2 -5 -2 13 2 -4 15 4 9 5 3 6 -7 -6 -6 0 -17 0 10 0 0 0 -6 4 0
From :100% TO: 133% 3 0 -3 -6 3 2 1 9 -3 5 0 1 -1 1 0 0 -5 0 3 0 0 0 -9 4 0
From :133% TO: 167% 4 0 0 4 1 0 -1 10 -3 8 -3 6 -4 1 -1 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 -4 -26 0
1 earner couple with  2 children
From :33% TO: 67% 5 -4 6 0 -18 -5 4 -1 15 -3 -17 -1 4 -16 8 0 -39 0 9 0 0 0 -4 -93 0
From :67% TO: 100% -3 -2 -1 13 1 -4 18 6 5 5 3 -1 -7 -4 -3 0 -7 0 11 0 0 0 -9 -27 0
From :100% TO: 133% -1 0 -3 -6 2 2 0 8 -1 5 0 6 -1 1 0 0 -24 0 3 0 0 0 -1 3 0
From :133% TO: 167% 4 -6 1 4 2 1 11 9 1 8 -3 -1 -4 1 -1 0 -7 0 2 0 0 0 -1 -3 0
2 earners couple with 2 children*
From :67%+33% TO: 67%+67% 0 -2 -1 4 0 4 -6 11 3 5 3 2 -3 -3 1 0 -22 0 -2 0 0 0 -3 4 0
From :67% +67 TO: 67%+100% -1 -7 -2 14 0 0 0 4 1 7 3 6 -2 -3 4 0 -1 0 8 0 0 0 -2 5 0
From :67+100% TO: 67+133% 3 -1 -3 -7 1 0 0 5 2 7 0 -1 -2 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 -3 -20 0
From :67+133% TO: 67+167% 3 0 0 9 1 -6 -3 5 -1 6 -4 0 -4 2 -6 0 8 0 3 0 0 0 -1 -6 0
Change 2006 - 2007 BE DK DE GR ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK CY CZ EE HU LT LV MT PL SK SI
Single
From :33% TO: 67% 0 -1 -2 2 0 -1 3 0 1 -3 1 0 6 -8 0 0 17 -1 5 0 0 -1 -3 1 -1
From :67% TO: 100% 0 1 -1 -1 0 -4 0 1 2 -1 0 0 0 -3 0 -1 12 -1 2 0 0 -4 -2 0 -5
From :100% TO: 133% 0 0 -1 -6 0 4 -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -5
From :133% TO: 167% 0 0 -1 -3 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -1 3 0 0 0 -4 0 0
1 earner couple 
From :33% TO: 67% 1 -1 -2 2 0 7 6 2 1 0 2 0 2 -8 0 6 1 4 5 0 0 1 -3 0 0
From :67% TO: 100% 0 1 -2 -1 0 0 3 -5 1 -3 0 0 0 -3 0 -1 7 -1 2 0 0 0 -2 1 -5
From :100% TO: 133% 0 -1 -1 -6 0 -1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 -6 -2 0 -5
From :133% TO: 167% 0 0 -1 -3 0 -1 -1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -1 3 0 0 -2 -2 0 -4
2 earners couple*
From :67%+33% From :67%+33% 0 -1 -1 2 0 -3 -5 0 1 -1 1 0 0 -3 0 0 1 -1 5 0 0 -1 -2 4 0
From :67% +67 From :67% +67 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 1 2 -1 0 0 0 -3 0 -1 0 -1 2 0 0 -4 -2 0 -5
From :67+100% From :67+100% 0 1 -1 -6 0 -6 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -5
From :67+133% From :67+133% 0 0 -1 -3 -1 2 -3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -1 3 0 0 0 -2 0 0
Lone parent, 2 children
From :33% TO: 67% 2 -1 -3 -1 -9 -5 -1 -2 0 -2 1 0 0 -2 0 -1 11 -1 5 0 -30 -1 -7 1 0
From :67% TO: 100% 0 0 -1 -2 2 0 4 5 4 -3 0 0 -1 -2 -1 -4 -3 -1 2 0 0 2 -13 0 -3
From :100% TO: 133% 0 0 -1 -6 2 -1 -1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -1 0 0 0 -8 -10 0 -3
From :133% TO: 167% 0 0 -1 -3 0 -1 -1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 -1 3 0 0 -3 -2 0 -4
1 earner couple with  2 children
From :33% TO: 67% 1 -2 -2 -1 -7 -1 10 1 0 0 3 -1 0 -8 0 6 -1 4 5 5 -38 1 -4 1 -5
From :67% TO: 100% 0 0 -2 -2 0 0 3 4 3 -3 0 0 1 -2 -1 -1 -14 -1 2 0 0 2 -11 1 7
From :100% TO: 133% 0 0 -1 -6 2 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 -8 -12 0 -6
From :133% TO: 167% 0 0 -1 -3 0 -1 -1 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 3 0 0 -3 -2 0 -4
2 earners couple with 2 children*
From :67%+33% TO: 67%+67% 0 -1 -1 1 -2 -2 -5 15 3 -1 1 0 0 -3 0 0 0 -1 5 0 -1 -1 -13 4 -6
From :67% +67 TO: 67%+100% 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 6 2 -1 0 0 0 -3 1 -1 0 -1 2 0 0 -5 -3 0 0
From :67+100% TO: 67+133% 0 1 -1 -7 1 -1 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 -2 0 -3
From :67+133% TO: 67+167% 0 0 -1 -1 0 -5 -3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 3 0 0 0 -2 0 -4  
* The wage level of first earner is fixed at 67% of the AW, while the wage level of the second earner is indicated in each column. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Table A6 - Low wage trap 
 
Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of AW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of AW
% of AW
Components METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC
BE 42.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 2% 60.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 32% 54.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 54.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 41% 14% 58.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 45% 13%
DK 59.4 0% 17% 0% 0% 35% 8% 59.4 0% 17% 0% 0% 35% 8% 49.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 32% 17% 43.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 8% 63.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 55% 8%
DE 49.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 21% 49.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% 21% 50.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 21% 46.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 34% 12% 36.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 0%
GR 16.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 16.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 40.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 24% 16% 40.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 24% 16% 39.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 39% 0%
ES 6.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 28.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 6% 32.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 26% 6% 32.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 26% 6%
FR 26.6 0% 0% 0% -1% 14% 14% 43.2 0% 0% 0% 16% 14% 14% 27.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 14% 30.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 12% 30.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 12%
IE 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 4% 26.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 6% 46.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 41% 6%
IT 20.3 0% 0% 11% 0% 0% 9% 50.1 0% 0% 11% 0% 30% 9% 50.5 0% 0% 11% 0% 30% 9% 46.9 0% 0% 8% 0% 30% 9% 49.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 9%
LU 14.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 28.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 14% 34.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 14% 41.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 14% 48.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 34% 14%
NL 28.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 27% 52.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 41% 52.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 41% 49.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 41% 9% 57.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 52% 5%
AT 18.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 47.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 18% 44.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 18% 48.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 18% 37.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 38% 0%
PT 21.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 11% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 11% 34.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 11% 34.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 11% 34.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 24% 11%
FI 24.4 0% 0% 0% 4% 14% 7% 33.5 0% 0% 0% 1% 26% 7% 43.5 0% 0% 0% 1% 36% 7% 44.3 0% 0% 0% 1% 37% 7% 48.6 0% 0% 0% 1% 41% 7%
SE 31.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 26% 6% 31.9 0% 0% 0% -4% 30% 6% 30.9 0% 0% 0% -3% 28% 6% 52.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 46% 6% 57.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 57% 0%
UK 33.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 11% 33.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 11% 33.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 11% 39.7 0% 0% 7% 0% 22% 11% 41.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 1%
CY 6.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 25.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 19% 6% 29.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 6%
CZ 36.9 0% 0% 14% 0% 10% 13% 29.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 12% 29.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 12% 29.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 12% 34.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 13%
EE 24.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 3% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 3% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 3% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 3% 24.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 3%
HU 17.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 40.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 17% 40.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 17% 53.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 17% 53.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 36% 17%
LT 30.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 3% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 3% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 3% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 3% 30.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 27% 3%
LV 13.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 9% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 31.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 9% 31.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 9%
MT 91.6 0% 75% 8% 0% 0% 8% 31.6 0% 0% 8% 0% 15% 8% 31.6 0% 0% 8% 0% 15% 8% 33.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 8% 43.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 35% 8%
PL 35.3 0% 12% 0% 0% 0% 23% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 23.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 32.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 23% 32.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 23%
SK 29.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 13% 29.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 13% 29.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 13% 29.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 13% 28.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 12%
SI 51.4 0% 17% 0% 0% 12% 22% 34.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 22% 34.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 22% 34.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 22% 43.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 22%
NO 25.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 18% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 35.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 28% 8% 44.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 37% 8% 44.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 37% 8%
SZ #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF!
US 28.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 8% 28.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 8% 28.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 8% 28.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 8% 38.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 31% 8%
JP 19.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 12% 20.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12% 20.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 12% 22.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 12% 30.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 26% 5%
Low-wage trap indicator Change 2001-2007
Marginal effective tax rate and its main components, at different wage levels, as wage increase by 1% of the AW wage level
Two-earner couple with 2 children. Principal earner with 67% of AW. Secondary earner earnings from 0 to 200% of AW
% of AW
Components METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC METR  = SA + HB + FB + IWB+ IT  + SSC
BE -7.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% -12% 0.3 0% 0% 0% 0% -18% 18% -0.8 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% -0.8 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% 2.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% -1%
DK -1.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -1.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -4.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -4% -1% -6.7 0% 0% 0% 0% -6% -1% -0.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% -1%
DE 0.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% -1.2 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% -1.7 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% 0% -10.0 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% -8% -2.1 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% 0%
GR 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 24.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 24% 0% 11.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 9.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0%
ES 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -20.1 0% 0% 0% 0% -20% 0% -4.3 0% 0% 0% 0% -4% 0% 3.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% -0.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FR 1.8 0% 0% 0% 3% -1% 0% 13.9 0% 0% 0% 15% -1% 0% 1.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% -3% 3% -6.2 0% 0% 0% 0% -9% 3%
IE -20.0 0% 0% 0% 0% -20% 0% 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -0.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0%
IT 10.3 0% 0% 11% 0% -1% 0% 23.7 0% 0% 11% 0% 13% 0% 18.7 0% 0% 11% 0% 7% 0% 7.8 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 10.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0%
LU 0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 9.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 0.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 1.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
NL 4.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 7.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 5% -4.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% -6% 4.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 5.7 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%
AT 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0% 4.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 6.8 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% -1.6 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% 0%
PT 6.9 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 1.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 9.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FI -2.6 0% 0% 0% 4% -6% 0% -3.8 0% 0% 0% 0% -4% 0% 2.3 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% -2.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -3% 0% -3.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -4% 0%
SE 7.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% -1% -4.8 0% 0% 0% -4% 0% -1% -6.8 0% 0% 0% -3% -3% -1% -0.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% -1% 1.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0%
UK 1.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 7.7 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 1% -5.7 0% 0% 0% 0% -7% 1%
CY
CZ -15.4 0% -12% -1% 0% -3% 0% -23.2 0% -12% -15% 0% 4% 0% -23.9 0% -12% -15% 0% 3% 0% 3.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 4.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0%
EE
HU -13.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -18% 4% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% 4% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% 4% 2.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% 5% 2.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% 5%
LT
LV
MT
PL 1.1 0% 12% 0% 0% -9% -2% -10.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -9% -2% -10.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -9% -2% -1.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -2% -1.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -2%
SK 6.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 1% 6.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 1% 6.6 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 1% -0.4 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 1% -5.9 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% -1%
SI
NO -10.1 0% 0% 0% 0% -10% 0% 6.2 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0.0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -4.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% 0% -4.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -4% 0%
SZ
US -16.6 0% 0% 0% -21% 4% 0% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% 9.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0
JP 3.1 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 3.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 3.4 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 0.7 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 2% -0.5 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% -5
150
33 50 67 100 150
33 50 67 100
%
%  
The contributions of social assistance (SA), housing benefits (HB), family benefits (FB), in-work benefits (IWB), income tax (IT) and social security contributions (SSC) to METR. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models. 
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Table A7 - Total tax wedge on labour (including soc. sec. employers) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Change 
2000-
2007* 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Change 
2000-
2007*
Belgium 57.1 56.7 56.3 55.7 55.4 55.5 55.5 55.5 -1.6 51.3 50.7 50.5 49.6 49 49.3 49.4 49.6 -1.7
Denmark 44.3 43.6 42.6 42.6 41.3 41.1 41.3 41.3 -3.0 41.2 40.5 39.8 39.8 39.3 39.2 39.3 39.3 -1.9
Germany 54 53 53.5 54.2 53.2 53.1 53.3 52.2 -1.8 48.6 47.7 48.1 48.8 47.8 48.2 48.4 47.4 -1.2
Greece 38.5 38.2 39 37.9 40 40.5 41.9 42.3 3.8 35.6 35.3 35.7 34.4 35.2 34.9 35.9 36.7 1.1
Spain 38.6 38.8 39.1 38.5 38.7 38.9 39.1 38.9 0.3 34.7 35.3 35.7 34.7 35.2 35.5 35.9 35.6 0.9
France 49.6 49.8 49.8 49.8 49.9 50 50.2 49.2 -0.4 47.4 47.6 47.4 45 42.4 41.3 44.3 44.4 -3.0
Ireland 28.9 25.8 24.5 24.2 24 23.5 23 22.3 -6.6 18.1 17.4 16.7 16.2 19.4 16.8 16.1 15 -3.1
Italy 46.4 46 46 45 45.4 45.4 45.5 45.9 -0.5 43.1 42.7 42.7 41.1 41.4 41.7 41.9 42 -1.1
Luxembourg 38.6 37 34.2 34.7 35.1 35.9 36.6 37.5 -1.1 32.8 31.2 29 29.3 29.6 30.2 30.6 31.4 -1.4
Netherlands 39.7 37.2 37.4 37.1 38.8 38.7 44.4 44 4.3 42 38.9 39.1 40 40.8 41.4 40.5 40.2 -1.8
Austria 47.3 46.9 47.1 47.4 48.1 48 48.3 48.5 1.2 43.2 42.9 43.1 43.5 43.9 43.3 43.7 44.1 0.9
Portugal 37.3 36.4 36.6 36.8 37.8 37.3 37.4 37.4 0.1 33.2 32.2 32.3 32.4 33 32.4 32.6 32.6 -0.6
Finland 47.8 46.4 45.9 45 44.5 44.6 44.1 43.7 -4.1 43 41.4 40.9 40 39.4 39.5 39 38.2 -4.8
Sweden 50.1 49.1 47.8 48.2 48.4 48.1 47.8 45.4 -4.7 48.6 47.8 46.8 47 47.2 46.6 45.9 43.3 -5.3
United Kingdom 32.6 32.2 32.3 33.8 33.9 34 34 34.1 1.5 29.1 28.6 28.7 30.3 30.5 30.6 30.7 30.8 1.7
Cyprus 20.5 20.9 17.3 18.5 18.6 13.6 14.1 ; -6.4 16.8 17.0 17.2 18.5 18.6 11.9 11.9 ; -5.0
Czech Republic 42.7 42.6 42.9 43.2 43.5 43.8 42.6 42.9 0.2 41.4 41.3 41.5 41.7 41.9 42 40.1 40.5 -0.9
Estonia 40.2 39.7 42.2 42.5 41.4 41.6 40.2 ; 0.0 38.2 37.4 40.2 40.7 38.9 39.8 38.4 ; 0.3
Hungary 54.6 55.8 53.7 50.8 51.8 51.1 51.9 54.4 -0.2 51.4 50.9 48.2 44.5 44.8 43.1 43.3 45.9 -5.5
Latvia 43.0 42.7 42.9 42.2 42.5 42.2 42.9 ; -0.1 41.4 41.2 41.4 40.8 41.2 40.9 41.8 ; 0.4
Lithuania 45.0 45.2 44.6 43.4 43.7 44.4 46.3 ; 1.3 42.0 42.2 41.2 39.5 40.0 41.0 43.9 ; 1.9
Malta 22.9 23.4 24.1 23.3 23.6 23.9 24.5 ; 1.6 16.6 17.0 17.7 17.4 17.6 17.8 18.4 ; 1.8
Poland 43.1 42.8 42.7 43 43.2 43.4 43.7 42.8 -0.3 42 41.5 41.4 41.7 41.9 42.2 42.5 41.6 -0.4
Slovak Republic 41.7 42.7 42.5 42.9 42.5 38.3 38.5 38.5 -3.2 40.5 41.3 40.8 40.9 39.6 35.2 35.5 35.6 -4.9
Slovenia 42.5 42.3 42.5 42.5 42.6 42.4 44.0 ; 1.5 41.0 41.0 41.1 41.1 41.1 39.4 39.8 ; -1.2
Bulgaria 43.1 40.4 39.6 39.0 38.9 38.9 35.4 ; -7.7 39.4 35.9 35.2 35.0 34.9 35.3 31.1 ; -8.4
Romania 47.5 47.9 47.3 46.2 45.8 44.0 43.7 ; -3.8 44.7 45.2 44.6 43.4 42.9 42.4 42.2 ; -2.5
Single person without children, 100% of AW across
countries
Single person without children, 67% of AW across
countries
 
Source: OECD, Taxing wages report, Single person without children, 100% and 67% of AW. 
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Table A8 - Tax wedge on labour for the average-wage worker and its components 
Personal 
Income Tax
Social 
Security 
Contributions 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income Tax
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Security 
Contribution 
Employer
Austria 48.5 11.9 13.9 22.7 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0
Belgium 55.5 21.2 10.6 23.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.3
Bulgaria* 31.1 1.5 10.0 19.5 -4.2 -0.9 0.5 -3.8 -4.9 -2.6 3.8 -6.0
Cyprus* 11.9 0.0 5.9 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.2 -0.5 0.3 -5.0
Czech rep 42.8 7.6 9.3 25.9 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Germany 52.2 18.2 17.3 16.7 -1.0 0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.8 -0.7 0.2 -0.4
Denmark 41.3 30.1 10.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -2.2 0.0 -0.1
Greece 42.2 7.8 12.5 21.9 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.9 0.1 0.0
Estonia* 38.4 12.4 2.2 25.1 -1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.4 -0.2 2.2 0.3
Spain 38.8 10.7 4.8 23.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2
Finland 43.6 18.7 5.4 19.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -2.7 -2.4 0.2 -0.5
France 49.1 10.0 9.6 29.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -1.1 0.1 0.2
Hungary 54.4 16.1 12.7 25.6 2.5 0.5 2.0 0.0 -1.4 -3.1 3.4 -1.6
Ireland 22.2 7.8 4.6 9.9 -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0 -3.5 -2.9 0.3 -0.9
Italy 45.8 14.2 7.0 24.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.8
Lithuania* 43.9 17.8 2.3 23.8 2.9 2.9 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg 37.5 13.0 12.6 11.9 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.2
Latvia* 41.8 15.2 7.3 19.4 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.8 0.1 -1.3
Malta* 18.4 4.3 7.0 7.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.1
Netherlands 44.0 12.6 19.3 12.0 -0.3 0.7 -1.2 0.2 6.8 3.2 1.4 2.3
Poland 42.8 5.3 20.4 17.1 -0.8 0.1 -1.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.1
Portugal 37.4 9.3 8.9 19.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Romania* 42.2 6.0 13.1 23.1 -0.3 0.7 0.2 -1.2 -3.0 0.6 4.1 -7.7
Sweden 45.3 15.5 5.2 24.6 -2.4 -2.4 0.0 0.0 -3.7 -3.5 -0.1 -0.1
Slovenia* 39.8 6.7 19.0 14.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 -1.2 -1.5 -0.1 0.4
Slovak rep 38.5 6.5 9.7 22.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -4.2 0.7 0.4 -5.3
UK 34.1 16.1 8.4 9.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.5 0.9 0.6
Difference 2001 - 2007
Total Tax 
Wedge 2007
Of which Difference 2006 - 2007
Single person 
without 
children, 
100% of AW
 
Source: OECD, Taxing wages report. 
Table A9 - Net income replacement rates over the unemployment spell –  
Single person without children, 67% of AW 
NRR after 2 months NRR after 2 months NRR after 7 months NRR after 7 months NRR after 13 months NRR after 13 months NRR after 60 months NRR after 60 months 
Austria 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Belgium 74 74 74 74 64 64 64 64
Cyprus 59 59 53 0 53 0 53 0
Czech Republic 67 67 52 30 52 30 52 30
Denmark 85 85 85 85 85 85 81 6
Estonia 55 55 45 45 28 16 28 0
Finland 67 67 67 67 67 67 65 50
France 70 70 70 70 70 70 46 46
Germany 59 59 59 59 55 16 47 16
Greece 49 49 49 49 33 33 0 0
Hungary 73 73 44 44 31 3 31 3
Iceland 78 78 65 65 65 65 60 7
Ireland 77 49 77 49 77 49 77 49
Italy 64 64 51 51 0 0 0 0
Japan 67 67 42 0 42 0 42 0
Latvia 82 82 32 32 32 32 32 32
Lithuania 74 74 20 0 20 0 20 0
Luxembourg 85 85 85 85 59 0 59 0
Malta 59 49 60 60 60 60 60 60
Netherlands 73 73 80 80 80 80 77 21
Norway 67 67 67 67 73 73 54 0
Poland 70 70 70 70 39 32 39 32
Portugal 78 78 78 78 78 78 24 0
Slovak Republic 61 61 28 0 28 0 28 0
Slovenia 72 72 70 70 48 48 48 48
Spain 78 78 68 68 68 68 33 0
Sweden 76 76 76 76 69 69 64 0
United Kingdom 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
United States 62 62 9 0 9 0 9 0
European Union 
NOSA NOSA NOSA NOSA
( 66 66 62 61 51 41 41 24
European Union ( 66 66 63 63 53 45 41 24
Euro Area 67 66 63 63 52 41 37 19  
NOSA – without social assistance in the calculation of net replacement rates. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models.  
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Table A10 - Net income replacement rates over the unemployment spell –  
Single person without children, 100% of AW 
NRR after 2 months NRR after 2 months NRR after 7 months NRR after 7 months NRR after 13 months NRR after 13 months NRR after 60 months NRR after 60 months 
Austria 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51
Belgium 55 55 55 55 48 48 48 48
Cyprus 58 58 36 0 36 0 36 0
Czech Republic 61 61 38 22 38 22 38 22
Denmark 62 62 62 62 62 62 59 5
Estonia 54 54 44 44 19 11 19 0
Finland 52 52 52 52 52 52 48 37
France 66 66 66 66 66 66 31 31
Germany 59 59 59 59 42 12 34 12
Greece 36 36 36 36 24 24 0 0
Hungary 63 63 35 35 25 2 25 2
Iceland 67 67 48 48 48 48 44 5
Ireland 56 36 56 36 56 36 57 36
Italy 64 64 55 55 0 0 0 0
Japan 54 54 29 0 29 0 29 0
Latvia 84 84 31 31 22 22 22 22
Lithuania 69 69 14 0 14 0 14 0
Luxembourg 87 87 87 87 43 0 43 0
Malta 45 37 45 45 45 45 45 45
Netherlands 73 73 69 69 69 69 56 15
Norway 64 64 64 64 69 69 38 0
Poland 48 48 48 48 26 22 26 22
Portugal 84 84 84 84 84 84 17 0
Slovak Republic 64 64 20 0 20 0 20 0
Slovenia 62 62 62 62 33 33 33 33
Spain 62 62 62 62 62 62 24 0
Sweden 53 53 53 53 53 53 45 0
United Kingdom 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
United States 54 54 6 0 6 0 6 0
European Union 
NOSA NOSA NOSA NOSA
( 58 58 54 53 41 34 29 17
European Union ( 59 58 57 57 44 38 29 17
Euro Area 62 62 60 60 45 36 27 14 
NOSA – without social assistance in the calculation of net replacement rates. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models.  
 
Table A11 - Income replacement rates over the unemployment spell –  
One-earner married couple with two children, 67% of AW 
NRR after 2 months NRR after 2 months NRR after 7 months NRR after 7 months NRR after 13 months NRR after 13 months NRR after 60 months NRR after 60 months 
Austria 65 57 65 57 65 53 65 53
Belgium 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Cyprus 70 70 79 0 79 0 79 0
Czech Republic 67 67 72 23 72 23 72 23
Denmark 86 86 86 86 86 86 76 6
Estonia 57 57 46 46 37 15 37 0
Finland 84 78 84 78 84 78 84 60
France 67 67 67 67 67 67 58 50
Germany 65 60 65 60 60 18 60 18
Greece 52 52 52 52 35 35 0 0
Hungary 76 76 56 44 56 3 56 3
Iceland 76 75 77 58 77 58 79 6
Ireland 106 79 106 79 106 79 106 79
Italy 61 61 49 49 0 0 0 0
Japan 65 65 60 0 60 0 60 0
Latvia 79 79 37 37 37 37 37 37
Lithuania 74 74 39 0 39 0 39 0
Luxembourg 95 84 95 84 81 0 81 0
Malta 65 65 61 61 61 61 61 61
Netherlands 89 87 90 85 90 85 93 16
Norway 74 69 74 69 74 74 77 0
Poland 73 73 73 73 55 31 55 31
Portugal 75 75 75 75 75 75 47 0
Slovak Republic 58 58 44 0 44 0 44 0
Slovenia 82 82 74 74 69 69 69 69
Spain 75 75 64 64 64 64 41 0
Sweden 80 76 80 76 80 69 80 0
United Kingdom 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
United States 61 61 15 0 15 0 15 0
European Union 
NOSA NOSA NOSA NOSA
( 68 66 64 60 55 41 50 25
European Union ( 67 65 64 62 55 45 49 26
Euro Area 68 66 65 62 54 41 46 21  
NOSA – without social assistance in the calculation of net replacement rates. 
Source: Joint European Commission-OECD project, using OECD Tax-Benefits models.  
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Table A12 - UB duration, job availability criteria and performance indicators of low-skilled persons 
Unemployment 
benefit duration 
Unemployment 
benefit duration
(min and max) (min and max)
2004 2007 2004 2007 change 2001-2007 2007
change 
2001-2007 2007
change 
2001-2007
AT 5-12 5-12 3.5 1.2 0.3 8.8 1.7 51.9 4.7
BE unlimited unlimited 2.7 3.8 0.6 13 2.1 40.5 -0.3
BG n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 -8.1 18 -15.9 30.6 3.6
CY 5 5 n.a. 0.7 -0.1 5.1 -0.3 52.8 -0.1
CZ 6 6-12 4.0 2.8 -1.4 20.4 -1.3 24.2 -4.3
DE 6-32 6-18 2.8 4.7 0.9 17 5.4 44.9 0
DK 48 48 3.2 0.6 -0.3 5.7 -0.6 64.2 5.7
EE 6-12 6-12 3.6 2.3 -3.7 11.7 -8.2 33.1 1.8
ES 4-24 4-24 3.0 1.7 -2 10.5 -1.2 57.5 4.9
FI 23 23 3.1 1.6 -0.9 13 -4.8 46.4 -3
FR 7-42 7-36 3.0 3.3 0.3 12.3 -0.9 47.7 1.1
GR 5-12 5-12 2.6 4.1 -1.4 7.8 -1.3 52.3 3.2
HU 9 9 n.a. 3.4 0.8 17.5 6.3 27.3 -1.7
IE 12-15 12-15 n.a. 1.4 0.1 7.7 1.2 49.3 0.6
IT 6-9 7-10 2.8 2.9 -2.8 7.5 -3.7 46.5 2
LT 6 6-9 2.8 1.4 -7.9 7.7 -17.2 25.9 0.9
LU 12-24 12-24 n.a. 1.3 0.7 5.8 3.3 49.8 -1.2
LV 9 9 2.7 1.6 -5.6 10.8 -11.4 38.6 3.6
MT 5 5 2.6 2.6 -1.1 8.5 0.5 46.9 -2.4
NL 6-60 3-38 4.4 1.3 0.7 5.3 2.2 61 0
PL 6-18 6-18 n.a. 4.9 -4.3 16.5 -9.4 24.9 -2.5
PT 12-30 9-30 3.5 3.8 2.3 8.7 4.5 65.7 -2
RO n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.2 -0.1 8.6 3.2 40.3 -11.4
SE 14-28 14-28 2.9 0.8 -0.2 13.2 5.2 53.4 -5.9
SI 3-24 3-24 3.8 2.2 -1.5 7.4 -2.4 43.1 1.1
SK 6 6 3.4 8.3 -3 45.1 2.6 14.7 -2.5
UK 6 6 2.4 1.3 0 9.5 1.7 60 -2.6
Job availability 
requirement 
index
Long term 
unemployment rate
Unemployment rate Employment rate
(15-64) low skilled** (15-64) low skilled**
 
Source: Commission services.  
* Job availability requirement index is a summary indicator and measures the strictness in availability criteria  
(see Søren Hasselpflug (2005): "Availability criteria in 25 countries", Danish Finance Ministry Working Paper, 12, 
2005). 
** Low-skilled persons are those that have pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education. 
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Table A13 - Main features of the unemployment insurance benefits, 2007 (for a 40-year-old single worker without children, with a 22-year employment record) 
Country 
Employment 
(E) and 
Contribution 
(C) conditions 
Voluntary (V) or 
Compulsory (C) 
insurance for 
employees 
Waiting 
period 
(days) 
Minimum 
and 
maximum 
duration 
(months) 
Initial payment 
rate (% of 
earnings base) 
Earnings 
base 
Minimum 
annual 
benefit° 
% 
of 
AW 
Maximum 
annual 
benefit° 
% 
of 
AW 
Permitted 
employment and 
disregards 
Additions 
for 
dependent 
family 
members 
AT 
E: 1 in the last 2 years       
C: 1year (28 weeks if 
repeated spells in 
unemployment) 
C (only up from monthly 
earning of 341,16€) 0 5-12 55 net - - 14548 35 
no reduction up to earnings of 
341,16€ per month, total loss 
above. Exception: benefit 
reduced if <27 days and net 
earning > 341,16€ 
supplement of € 
354 for each 
dependent 
BE E+C 468 days in 27 months  C  - unlimited 60 (50 after 1 year) gross 9201 24 12935 33 
maximum: limit of 3647.28€ (net 
annual taxable income) for 
artistic employment (beyond 
benefit reduced proportionately)     
daily benefit reduced by 
proportion of daily income of 
ancillary activity>11.69€   
minimum benefit 
inctreased up to € 
10951 if dependents 
CZ E+C: 12 months of job in last 3 years C - 6-12 50 in first 3 months, 45 in following 3 months net - - 145152 58 
half of the minimum wage (CZK 
8000)  in a month allowed 
without loosing the entitlement 
to unemployment benefits 
. 
DK 
E: 52 weeks of full time 
work in last 3 years;  C: 
payment of membership 
fee 
V - 48 90 
gross less 8% for 
social security 
contribution 
145600 42 177580 52 Wages reduce amount of benefits by same amount - 
FI 
E: 43 weeks of work in 
last 28 months             
C: 10 months 
V 7 23 
basic benefit (18% of 
AW) + up to 45% of 
earnings exceeding basic 
benefit  
gross (additional 
holiday pay 
excluded) less 
social security 
contributions 
- - none - 
working hours <75 % of full-
time. benefit reduced by 50 % of 
gross income. benefit (including 
child supplement) and income  
<90 % of reference earnings 
supplements: € 
1169, 1716, 2214 
for one, two, threee 
or more children 
respectevely 
FR C: 6 months in last 22 months C - 7-36 57-75 gross 
9493 (if daily 
salary> 2601/75. 
min benefit= 75% 
of daily salary If 
daily salary 
>2601/75 ) 
29 (if 
daily 
salary 
>2601
/75) 
76402 236 
salary< 70% of prior monthly 
salary. working hours <110 hours 
per month. Duration benefits 
<15 months. Benefits reduced 
depending on ratio of gross new 
earnings divided by the daily 
wage of reference 
- 
DE E:12 months;  C: 12 months in last 3 years C 0 6-18 60 net - - 37800 88 
total loss if working hours >15 
hours/week. Earnings < € 
400/month do not qualify for 
unemployment insurance 
contributions 
 initial payment rate 
increases by 
7percentage points 
if children 
GR 
E+C: 125 days of 
employment in last 14 
months or 200 days in 
last 2 years 
C 6 5-12 50 gross 2202 9 - - 
benefits withdrawn if earnings. 
Exceptions exist for part time or 
casual work 
benefit increased by 
10% for each 
dependant  
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Country 
Employment  
(E) and 
Contribution 
(C) conditions 
Voluntary (V) or 
Compulsory (C) 
insurance for 
employees 
Waiting 
period 
(days) 
Minimum 
and 
maximum 
duration 
(months) 
Initial payment 
rate (% of 
earnings base) 
Earnings 
base 
Minimum 
annual 
benefit° 
% 
of 
AW 
Maximum 
annual 
benefit° 
% 
of 
AW 
Permitted 
employment and 
disregards 
 
HU 
E+C: 365 days in the 4 
previous years (if at least 
200 days of employment 
in 4 years, job seeker aid 
granted for 90 days) 
C - 9 
60 % of gross average 
salary for max 3 months. 
60 % of  mandatory 
minimum wage prevailing 
on the first day of 
eligibility for job-seeker 
benefit in second period 
gross average 
salary of the 
previous 4 
calendar quarters 
471600 22 943200 44 
 for short term employment (< 
90 days) benefit suspended. 
employment booklet is another 
exception 
. 
IE* 
C: 39 weeks  
contributions paid in last 
year, or 26 reckonable 
contributions paid in last 
2 years; 52 weeks 
contributions paid since 
start working 
C 3 12-15 fixed amount (31% of AW) - - - - - 
benefit not paid for any day or 
partial day of employment. 
Earnings are not assessed 
supplement of € 
6412 per  adult and 
of € 1144 per child. 
Dependent child 
supplement not 
related to earnings. 
Adult supplement  
of € 4155 in case of 
reduced rate  
IT** C: 52 weeks contribution paid in last 2 years C 7 7-10  50 (40 after 6 months)  
average gross 
earnings in 
previous 3 
months 
- - 12174 51 
no benefits if receiving earnings 
from employment except for 
CIG schemes  
. 
LU E+C: 26 weeks in last 1year C 0 12-24 80 
gross (average 
wage of the 3 
months 
immediately 
preceding 
unemployment) 
. . 42397 93 
accessory work compatible with 
benefits if earning < 10% 
reference salary. benefit reduced 
if income >10% of reference 
salary 
rate increases by 5 
percentage points if 
children 
NL 
E: 26 weeks in the last 36 
weeks;  C:52 days in 4 of 
last 5 years 
C - 3-38 70 or 75 gross 15804 (17068 incl. holiday pay) 
40 (43 
incl. 
holida
y pay) 
45406 115 
If working hours <5 hours/week, 
gross benefit reduced by 70 % of 
gross earnings. If working hours 
>5, benefit reduced in proportion 
to number of hours worked 
Supplementary 
benefits for low 
income households 
to bring income up 
to a minimum 
guaranteed level 
PL 
E+C: 365 days in 18 
months and earnings 
>50% minimum wage 
C 7 6-18 
subject to indexation by 
consumer prices growth 
index.        27% of AW.  
****          
- - - - - gross  income disregard of up to PLN 5616 (half of minimum pay) . 
PT E+C: 450 days in last 2 years C 0 9-30 65 gross 4774 30 14322 91 
if income < UI benefit and 
hours/week worked > 20% and 
<75% of normal hours, UI 
benefit= (UI benefit - income) * 
1,35 
. 
SK E+C: 3 years in 4 years C 0 6 50 gross - - 
since 01/2006 
maximum 
depends on sum 
of premiums that 
one pays for 
unemployment 
insurance 
- - - 
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Country 
Employment  
(E) and 
Contribution 
(C) conditions 
Voluntary (V) or 
Compulsory (C) 
insurance for 
employees 
Waiting 
period 
(days) 
Minimum 
and 
maximum 
duration 
(months) 
Initial payment 
rate (% of 
earnings base) 
Earnings 
base 
Minimum 
annual 
benefit° 
% 
of 
AW 
Maximum 
annual 
benefit° 
% 
of 
AW 
Permitted 
employment and 
disregards 
Country 
ES C: 360 days in last 6 years C 0 4-24 70 (60 after 6 months) gross     5591 26 12230 56 benefits reduced in proportion to hours worked  
increased maxima 
and minima if 
children 
SE E: 6 months;  C: 12 months V 5 14-28 80 for 200 days and 70 for next 100 days gross 83200 25 176800 52 benefit reduced in proportion of number of days worked - 
UK C: 2 years C 3 6 fixed amount (14% of AW) - - - - - 
income >GBP 260 (GBP 520 for 
couples), benefit reduced by the 
same amount 
- 
SI E: 12 in last 18 months, full time equivalent C . 3-24 70 in first 3 months, afterwards 60 gross - - - - 
if finding part time job, UB is 
kept until the end of entitlement 
period 
- 
EE E+C: 12 within the last 36 months C - 6-12 
50 for 1-100 calendar 
years; 40 for 101-360 
calendar years 
the average 
remuneration per 
calendar year 
during 9 months 
- - - - - - 
LV 
E+C: 9 within the last 12 
motnhs; if less than 9 
months then on the basis 
of contributions 
C 
0; for persons 
ending E 
voluntary - 2 
months  
9 
50 to 65 depending on 
insurance period; 
declining over time 
insurance 
contribution wage 98,58 - 143,09 - no disregards - 
LT E+C: 18 within the last 36 months C - 6-9 40 n most cases; declining over time gross earnings in the last 36 months 205 - 949 - no disregards - 
CY E+C: 6,5 months       C: 5 months within last year C 4 6-janv 
60% of basic earning 
+50% of the average 
earning in excess to basic 
earning 
gross earning of 
last year - - 6438,12 49  income < 2427 CYP 
basic benefit 
increased by 1/3 if 
one dependent 
spouse, and by 1/6 
for each dependent 
child 
MT C: 52 months, of which 20 in the benefit year C - 6 - - 1014 15 1700,9 25 - 
increased max and 
min if spouse is 
unemployed or if 
unemployed is a 
single parent 
All benefit amounts are shown on an annualised basis.  
° National currency. 
“–” indicates that no information is available or not applicable. Gross = Gross employment income; Net = Gross minus income taxes minus SSC; SSC = (Employee) Social security contributions. 
*. Where weekly earnings while in employment were below certain amounts, reduced rates of payment are made (from 14% of AW to 24% of AW). If dependent adult is employed, supplement is reduced or suppressed depending on 
income level. 
**. For employees with a temporary reduction of working hours there is also the CIG scheme which pays benefits of 80% of average gross earnings for non-worked hours. 
***. At least 23% of AW during the preceding calendar year or 15% of AW averaged over three years (income from work >1.5 times the basic amount (NOK 66812) the preceding calendar year. 
****. The basic benefit amount is adjusted with the length of the employment record: 80% for under five years, 100% for 5-20 years and 120% for over 20 years. 
Source: Commission services, OECD.  
